Police Reforms in the Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands, like a number of its Pacific neighbours, has a considerable level of Australian and New Zealand (NZ) government supported policing and police reform initiatives.  Since 2003, the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has worked towards restoring peace and order in the aftermath of severe internal conflict which erupted in October 1998. Much of RAMSI’s work involves policing by a predominantly Australian Participating Police Force (PPF) and reform of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (SI Police).  Five years on, a recent review of RAMSI has noted that while there is a considerable level of government and civil society support for the ongoing presence of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands, there are problematic aspects of RAMSI’s approach to and implementation of police reforms. These issues have consequences across the board, from the community’s interaction with the police at a station level, the lack of civil society participation in the reform process and the deteriorating relationship between the Solomon Islands and Australian governments.

Background to RAMSI

In the midst of severe internal conflict, the genesis of which is ongoing ethnic tension between the Malaitan and Guadacanal people, successive leaders of the Solomon Islands government requested international assistance to restore the basic functions of government and deal with the disintegrating law and order. The Solomon Islands’ own police force was incapable of dealing with the crisis. Elements of the Malaitan-dominated police willingly co-opted into the ethnic strife and are implicated in serious human rights abuses, including indiscriminate firing into villages occupied by women and children and ill-treatment of child suspects. Following a coup by the Malaitan militia, the police disintegrated as a functioning organisation and police were either part of the militia or entirely unable to take counter-action.

Initially, the Australian government failed to meaningfully respond to requests for assistance and limited its involvement to financial aid which was distributed through the Australian government’s aid agency, AusAid. In the meantime, the Solomon Islands was on the brink of becoming the Pacific’s first failed state with an almost complete breakdown in governance and security. It was not until the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and Bali in 2002 that Australia finally intervened, identifying a number of its Pacific neighbours, especially the Solomon Islands, as coming within an ‘arc of instability’ which would threaten Australia’s own security and that of the region. Additionally, Australia was, and remains, concerned about the increasing financial influence asserted over the Pacific by China and Taiwan. These factors contributed to a change in Australian government policy in respect of the Pacific, with the establishment of a more interventionist, hands-on approach. The flagship of the new policy direction was the initiation of a region-wide, Australia and NZ-led intervention to rescue the Solomon Islands from governmental, financial and civil implosion.

In July 2003, the ensuing RAMSI agreement was signed in Townsville, Australia and involved varying levels of contribution from fifteen regional partners. In its first phase, RAMSI was essentially a police-led operation with approximately 330 police officers of the PPF, backed by around 1800 military personnel working to disarm militants and clear our the criminal element within the SI Police. This process resulted in numerous successes as existing accountability structures and processes within the SI Police were invoked to clean up the state’s police. Around 50 members were arrested and a further 400 were removed from service, the effect of which set a precedent for better use of internal accountability measures. As the security situation has substantially improved, the military component of RAMSI has been gradually reduced.

The second phase of RAMSI involves a more holistic reconstruction and development programme, across the economic, financial and justice sectors. The aim of this phase is to equip the Solomon Islands Government to function effectively, efficiently and within the framework of international good practices for governance.  RAMSI is also working with the Solomon Islands Government to rebuild key accountability institutions (including the Ombudsman) to shape an efficient and accountable public service. 

RAMSI Five Years On…

In late 2007, the Australian National University (ANU) conducted the “People’s Survey” which quantitatively gauged public perception on key areas of RAMSI’s work. The survey noted that locals generally feel safer and 90 per cent of the 5,154 respondents strongly favour its continued presence. However, the responses to a number of questions around the issue of police performance indicates a reluctance by Solomon Islanders to report crime to police and an unwillingness to make complaints against police who fail to do their job properly. This is due to a number of reasons, including the fact that Solomon Islanders have very little trust in the police’s ability to safeguard their interests. In terms of accountability, as has been demonstrated in other regions, good accountability mechanisms fail if they lack public confidence or are not the subject of community education.

Another problematic aspect of RAMSI, which was not covered in the ANU survey, is the strong feeling amongst civil society in the region (including Solomon Islands) that policing is within the purview of the Australian and NZ governments and that civil society input into the reform process is limited. As the ANU survey demonstrated, Solomon Islanders do not sufficiently trust their police force. In order to build a trusting relationship, the SI Police must be representative of the needs of the community it serves. CHRI’s experiences have found that civil society participation is the key in ensuring that the community has a voice in the reform process and for providing a space for more democratic discussions around the type of service the communities will use and trust.

The general lack of trust in the police, coupled with civil society’s limited participation in the reform process, points to the disempowerment of Solomon Islanders when it comes to the day-to-day functioning of their police service and to the broader reform process. This disempowerment is arguably reflected in the disintegrating relationship between the Australian government and the Solomon Island government, with accusations that Australia’s intervention in the Solomon Islands and its approach to the Pacific generally, has been heavy-handed, paternalistic and non-inclusive. Criticism was leveled at the former Howard Government for taking a ‘what’s good for you’ approach to its assistance in the region, and for communicating its differences with the Solomon Islands government by public statement, instead of more diplomatic approaches. The relationship was further strained by Australia’s attempt to extradite Solomon Islands Attorney-General, Julian Moti, in relation to child sex offences, a move which was criticised by some observers as reflecting the lack of respect Australia has for the sovereignty of the Solomon Islands.

Building Empowerment and Trust – RAMSI’s Second Phase

While not underestimating the enormity of an international intervention which is aimed at ensuring short term security, sustainable peace and good governance, RAMSI must be a more inclusive and collaborative exercise on all levels. The newly elected Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, has foreshadowed a more co-operative engagement with his Pacific neighbours who have expressed their willingness to engage, including the Solomon Islands newly elected Prime Minister, Dr David Derek Dikua.1 The Australian government’s promise of a more collaborative approach to international relations in the Pacific must be reflected in the operation of RAMSI.

A recent report into RAMSI by Australia’s Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) was insightful. It noted that at a governmental and public institution level, RAMSI is failing to adequately build capacity among Solomon Islanders to run their country without RAMSI. Australian and NZ personnel occupy the main positions of influence across the ministries and public service. However, implementation of RAMSI’s second phase is where opportunity for real capacity building and a more inclusive reform process exists. This inclusitivity must be twofold; capacity building at the highest levels of government and police force is vital, but so too is a concerted capacity building exercise at a grassroots civil society level. It is essential to the establishment of a democratic, community focused police force that civil society is involved at all stages of the police reform process. 

The need for collaborative reform is particularly important because there is an element of ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands. As we have seen with the police reform initiatives in countries such as Northern Ireland and India, a successful reform programme is one that sensitively and fairly addresses ethnic tension within a democratic policing framework. Measures must include initiatives such as ensuring an ethnic and gender balance at all levels of policing structure.

It is imperative that the RAMSI reforms process is approached in a collaborative and cooperative manner involving all levels of the Solomon Islands community (from the highest levels of government, to grassroots civil societies). Unless this takes place, there is a danger that the new SI Police will fail to meet the needs or enjoy the confidence of the people it serves.