

# Implementation of the Maldives Police Service Strategic Plan 2007-2011:

An Analysis



## Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

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working for the practical realisation of *human rights* in the countries of the Commonwealth

# Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is an independent, non-partisan, international non-governmental organisation, mandated to ensure the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth. In 1987, several Commonwealth professional associations founded CHRI. They believed that while the Commonwealth provided member countries a shared set of values and legal principles from which to work, and provided a forum within which to promote human rights, there was little focus on the issues of human rights within the Commonwealth.

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# **Implementation of the Maldives Police Service Strategic Plan 2007-2011: An Analysis**

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Aim and Scope of the Study

This report examines the first Five-Year Strategic Plan 2007-2011 (hereafter referred to as the 2007 Plan) of the Maldives Police Service (MPS). On its separation from the military in 2004, the Maldives police faced the daunting task of transforming into a civilian institution responsible for maintaining law and order in the island country. One of the measures taken to guide the institution through its transition was the formulation of the Strategic Plan in 2007 that laid down a completely new vision for the police – that of emerging as a community-oriented, professional, and efficient police service. An entirely new approach of policing was enshrined in the Plan, and the values of community service lay at its heart. Understandably, this called for a complete overhaul of policing as was known to the country in the past.

Strategic planning has emerged as an important component of organisational and policy reform across the police services of several countries (see Chapter III). Essentially, it is a process that determines the goals and targets of a police service against which the performance of both the police organisation and its officers is measured. In some countries, strategic planning by the police has developed extensively and is codified as a statutory obligation; in others, it is still in nascent stages with several teething problems. In South Asia, the Maldives is the first country to implement strategic planning for its police in a sustained manner. With the end of its first Plan period, the country has already embarked on a second Strategic Plan for the police.

As the 2007 Plan draws to an end, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) along with the Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) undertook a study to discover how well the goals and standards laid down were implemented across the country. The central aim was to identify gaps and problems that exist, not only in implementation, but also in the perception of the standards and practices of community service among the police. In doing so, the key themes that the study tried to assess include:

- Changes introduced in the organisational culture, functioning and management of the MPS;
- The nature of police interactions with the people;
- People's perception of the police and the level of trust and satisfaction with their performance; and
- The efficiency and satisfaction, within the police, regarding their functions and behaviour.

These components formed the main thrust of the Plan, and thus were used as starting point for the assessment. Although, at various points, the report throws light on the structure of the Plan itself as well as the process of planning, these are only implied. The focus of the study remains on the implementation of the Plan, and not the Plan per se.

Since this new community-oriented approach of policing was an integral component of the larger democratic reforms that the Maldives embarked on in 2003, and because community-oriented policing is the key to the success of several democratic reforms, it was felt that an assessment

of policing at this stage would be valuable in identifying persistent challenges and areas for improvement. While the police have already come out with their second Strategic Plan 2011-2013, it is hoped that this study will inform debate on how community-oriented policing can be best adapted to the conditions in the Maldives. It brings to the fore the problems that the Maldives police face in building trust within the community. The target audiences are the Maldives police, the main agency responsible for implementation, the government of the Maldives who is the funding body for the police, independent accountability bodies responsible for monitoring the exercise of police powers, the international community, civil society, the media and community leaders.

## **Structure of the Report**

The report begins with an introduction into strategic planning, its relevance for police organisations, its usage across various jurisdictions and the essential components that go into a comprehensive and transparent planning process as well as the Plan itself (Chapter III). It then proceeds to give a brief background of the Maldives police, the political context in which it was established as a civilian institution and the process of preparing the Strategic Plan (Chapter IV). This background provides an insight into the extent of western influence on the democratic reforms, including of the police, that were embarked on in the Maldives and helps to identify the gaps in implementation of the Strategic Plan elaborated on in the next chapter. In Chapter V, survey findings are summarised under three categories: preparation of the Plan, implementation of the Plan, and assessment of the Plan. The report concludes with a set of recommendations to enable the police to overcome the gaps identified, and improve on the process of strategic planning in order to develop into a professional service.

## **Key Findings**

The implementation of the Strategic Plan 2007-2011 by the Maldives police has been partial at best. Of the 54 projects enlisted in the Plan, only around 12 were implemented at all. Of these, the most notable ones include forensics (Project 27), investigation enhancement (Project 22), and crime management (Project 21). But these too were implemented in a half-hearted manner. For instance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) appear to have been developed (although they are not publicly available) on arrest, detention and other police powers. However, the level of awareness on these SOPs varies considerably. The general view is that knowledge of these SOPs is limited to senior officers and within larger atolls, whereas most frontline officers in distant atolls have little awareness. Moreover, considerable training is required in the use of the SOPs.

Further, mismanagement of available resources, continued political control over the police and lack of a legal framework governing police powers are some of the factors that have further affected the implementation of the Plan. The planning process itself requires improvement. Hardly any public consultations were held while drafting the first Strategic Plan, resulting in a wide gap between people's perceptions and police priorities. Coupled with this, the evaluation of the Plan was not carried out regularly and/or systematically, and so, such gaps continue to exist.

The greatest challenge came with the change of government in 2008. A Police Act was enacted on 5 August 2008, followed closely by the ratification of a new Constitution on 7 August 2008, and finally, a new government headed by President Nasheed was formed by November 2008 ending President

Gayoom's 30-year rule. Consequently, some of the rules and procedures developed earlier were not in sync with the Police Act. For instance, under the Plan, the police were mandated to develop and implement a system for managing private security agencies that included: "the registration of licensed security companies, develop training programmes for security companies and agents, and providing training to raise the professional standards of select operators within the security industry". Under the Police Act though, the function of private security is not covered. As a result, the project could not be implemented. Thereafter, the Maldives police practically discarded the first Plan and announced the adoption of a new Strategic Plan 2011-2013 by end of 2010.

Notwithstanding these changes, the original Plan was ambitious, to say the least. Although policing was always a separate function under the National Security Service (which was separated into the Maldivian National Defence Force and the Maldives Police Service in 2004), it was highly militarised. Most of the officers went through similar training given to the military. Against this background, the Plan envisaged developing a professional, efficient and democratic police service in accordance with international standards, whereas the fact of the matter is that the Maldives needed to develop its basic facilities first. The Plan mentions developing a forensic unit when several police stations in the atolls have no public transport to cover all the islands of the atoll. Such disconnect is reflected in numerous instances, as will be pointed out in the report.

## **Summary of the Recommendations**

### **To the Government of the Maldives**

- Hold discussions on the need for establishing an independent governing body to oversee the functioning of the Maldives police which will also be responsible for determining policing priorities
- Amend the Police Act, 2008 to make strategic planning a statutory obligation.

### **To the Maldives Police**

- Regularly conduct Needs Assessment Surveys
- Include greater engagement with civil society during the planning process so that people's concerns and expectations are reflected in the policing plans
- Engage with local administrations to promote awareness about police strategies
- Enhance transparency in the functioning of the Maldives police
- Increase awareness within the Maldives police in order to deepen the level of ownership and responsibility regarding policing priorities
- Lay greater emphasis on behavioural and attitudinal reforms during the training imparted to the police officers
- Improve the mechanism for evaluation and monitoring performance
- Engage more closely with the Police Integrity Commission while determining policing priorities.

### **To Civil Society**

- Monitor the working of the MPS closely
- Build and consolidate expertise on democratic policing.

## II. METHODOLOGY

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To assess the implementation of the MPS Strategic Plan 2007-2011 the report looks at two main yardsticks: first, the level of awareness about the goals, standards and projects mentioned in the Strategic Plan among police officers across atolls; and second, the perception of the community at large about the police. The first yardstick helps to demonstrate the nature of organisational changes that have been introduced in police management and practice. The second was selected as a means to test the effectiveness of the changes brought about, if any, and new procedures and practices introduced, if at all. Using both these yardsticks together was important to determine whether policing has witnessed any shift towards community service as envisioned in the Plan, and whether this shift can be attributed to strategies laid down in it.

Since the MPS is a fairly young institution, there is negligible data available on police practice. Many relevant reports, such as the Annual Report of the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives or the procedures developed by the police that are available on their website are only available in Dhivehi at present. For these reasons, the report relies mostly on primary data. To gather data, CHRI and MDN used two main methods: survey, and workshop and interviews with key stakeholders in Malé.

### Survey

A survey was conducted by CHRI and MDN to learn about the implementation of various measures provided for in the 2007-2011 Plan. The survey was carried out across ten atolls of the Maldives (see Table 1 below). *Two separate questionnaires* were prepared – one for the police and the other for the community. The *police questionnaire* was designed to assess the level of awareness across the rank and file of the vision, goals and standards included in the Plan, the compliance of these standards wherever existent, and the level of understanding of the connection between better policing/community service and the standards laid down. The *community questionnaire* was designed to assess the perception of the police within the community, changes in perception and trust in the police since 2007, reasons for the current perceptions, and the types of problems people faced with the police. The questionnaires were prepared along the lines of the programmes and performance indicators mentioned in the Maldives Police Strategic Plan. The questionnaires were first prepared in English and subsequently translated into Dhivehi by MDN. They were then administered across the islands by the Network of Human Rights Defenders (NHRD; see below). The findings were once again translated from Dhivehi into English by MDN.

### Sample

For the *police survey*, the total sample comprised 79 respondents across 11 police stations (Table 1).

**Table 1: List of Police Stations Covered**

No	Atoll	Police Stations	Respondents
1	HaaAlif	Hoarafushi Police Station	7
2	HaaDhaal	Kulhudhufushi Police Station	7
3	Shaviyani	Fonadhoo Police Station	7
4	Noonu	Manadhu Police Station	6
5	Raa	Dhuvaafaru Police Station	6
6	Meemu	Muli Police Station	7
7	Nilandhoo	Nilandhoo Police Station	6
8	Laamu	Gan Police Station	7
9	GaafAlif	Villingili	7
10	GaafDhaal	Thinadhoo Police Station	4
11	Kaafu	Malé Police Headquarters	15
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>79</b>

Since the survey was conducted through MDN's Network of Human Rights Defenders, MDN and CHRI targeted the islands on which defenders are active. While MDN does have active defenders in Noonu atoll, they are based on the island of Holhudhoo. However, Holhudhoo does not have permanent police presence on the island and thus, the survey questionnaires were sent to Manadhu Island Police Station.

Malé was selected as the Police Headquarters is based in Malé and because it has the largest police presence in the Maldives.

Once the stations for the survey were decided on, the MPS was asked to provide MDN and CHRI with a list of seven officers from each police station outside Malé that was to be surveyed. The seven officers from each station comprised the station in-charge, three custodial officers and three patrolling officers.

For the survey in Malé, MDN requested the survey forms to be filled out by 16 MPS officers, of which only 15 including the Commissioner of Police, a Deputy Commissioner, an Assistant Commissioner, a Chief Superintendent, an Inspector of Police, a Sub-Inspector of Police, a Chief Station Inspector, a Sergeant, a Staff Sergeant, a Corporal, three Lance Corporals and three Constables returned the forms.

For the *community survey*, the total number of respondents was 85 in ten islands across ten atolls (Table 2)

**Table 2: List of Atolls Covered: Community Survey**

No	Atoll	Island	Respondents
1	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	13
2	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	6
3	Sahiyani	Funadhoo	7
4	Noonu	Holhudhoo	12
5	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	11
6	Meemu	Muli	5
7	Faafu	Nilandhoo	7
8	Laamu	Gan	10
9	Gaaf Alif	Villingili	8
10	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	6
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>85</b>

As with the police survey, the location for the community survey was based on the islands where human rights defenders were active. To get the most representative sample, the defenders were asked to administer the survey to members of the community from different backgrounds, such as community elders, Imams, education sector workers, health sector workers, members of Community-Based Organizations (CBO), local council members, businessmen and members of Crime Prevention Committees (CPC). The sample size was set as 12 to 15 in each island. However, the number of respondents was lower than this in all islands. Unlike the police survey, the community survey was not conducted in the capital, Malé.


### ***Network of Human Rights Defenders***

MDN initiated its Network of Human Rights Defenders project in March 2010. The project aims to train individuals as human rights defenders in all the 20 atolls of the Maldives. As of August 2011, over 85 defenders have been trained and accredited in 11 atolls. By April 2012, MDN expects to have over 250 defenders active across the country. This Network gives MDN the ability to promote human rights, assess the human rights situation and monitor specific violations on a nationwide scale. Individuals under this project receive training in the following areas:

- Philosophy and history of human rights
- Rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Maldivian Constitution
- The democratic system of the Maldives
- Local legal redress mechanisms
- Maldivians and human rights (Islam and human rights/Maldivian culture and human rights)
- International law and international legal redress mechanisms
- Monitoring and reporting human rights
- Conflict resolution.

In addition to conducting the CHRI-MDN survey, the defenders were also involved in other MDN activities, such as the Electoral Violence Monitoring project for the Local Council Elections held in February 2011 and the ongoing Political Violence Monitoring project.

### Map of the Atolls Covered



(The atolls where the survey was conducted are highlighted in orange)

## The Workshop and Stakeholder Meetings

A workshop and interviews were held to gather additional insights into the implementation of the 2007-2011 Strategic Plan. Once the survey findings were collated, CHRI and MDN held a day-long workshop in Malé on 5 September 2011 with key stakeholders including the police, lawyers, NGOs, activists, donor communities and independent institutions such as the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives (HRCM) and Police Integrity Commission (PIC). This was followed by one-to-one interviews with select stakeholders including:

- Mr Ahmed Tholal, Member, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives
- Ms Jeehan Mahmood, Member, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives
- Ms Shahinda Ismail, President, Police Integrity Commission
- Dr Hala Hameed, Member, Police Integrity Commission
- Mr Shامun Hameed, Director, Investigations Department, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives
- Ms Aminath Naazneen, Access to Justice Programme Specialist, UNDP, the Maldives
- Mr Hassan Afeef, Minister of Home Affairs, Republic of Maldives
- Mr Ahmed Muiz, Prosecutor General, Republic of Maldives.

The main objectives of the workshop and the interviews were: first, to gain additional insights into the survey data and findings regarding the implementation of the Strategic Plan; second, to generate recommendations for the process of strategic planning by the police; and third, to facilitate interaction between the police and civil society in the interest of increased mutual understanding.

At the workshop, the survey (police compliance and community perception) findings and details of the Strategic Plan were summarised and presented under different themes – police response to crime and changes in police functioning. The main aims were to identify the gap between the Plan and the survey findings, discuss the factors explaining the gaps and identify measures to overcome them. Discussions, inputs, debates, suggestions, comments during the course of the workshop are incorporated in various forms in the report as analysis.

## Limitations

Research for this report suffers from two major weaknesses. First, since this is CHRI and MDN's first survey using the HRDs, the selected sample had to be realistic. Within this small sample size, respondents were chosen on a random sampling basis. This runs the risk of over generalising the survey findings, particularly for the community survey. To some extent, the aim of the workshop was to test the veracity of the survey findings with a group of people who regularly engage with policing issues. Nonetheless, the survey data is assumed to be reliable and accurate. Second, even though the police leadership supported the survey and participated in the workshop, we were unable to secure interviews with senior police officers including the Commissioner and the Head of the Strategic Focus Unit in charge of formulating the Strategic Plan. Despite several requests, the police did not give us an appointment. As a result, analysis of police internal procedures and practices is based on our interviews with other stakeholders and media reports.

Apart from these, a few minor issues, such as the language barrier and the inability to cover all atolls may also find a bearing on the report but only partially. Regarding language, care was taken to ensure that the essence of the survey questions was not shifted during translation between English to Dhivehi.

### III. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE POLICE

#### Introduction

With its origins in the private/corporate sector, the public sector has increasingly adopted the process of strategic planning, developed by the world of private enterprise and business, particularly in recent decades. Police departments are foremost among public sector organisations which have integrated strategic planning into their own planning and policy processes. This is amply evident among the police across Commonwealth countries both developed and developing, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Bangladesh, India, and of course the Maldives.<sup>1</sup> Some countries have developed the use of strategic planning by the police extensively and it has been codified as a statutory obligation; in others, it is still in the nascent stages with several teething problems. Nevertheless, strategic planning is rapidly becoming essential in the effort to streamline and bolster police service delivery and organisational efficiency.

In South Asia, the Maldives is the first country to implement strategic planning for its police in a sustained manner and has already embarked on a second Strategic Plan for the police.

This makes it necessary to understand what strategic planning in relation to the police entails. In short, strategic planning for the police is merely a highly organised planning approach. Some of the questions it seeks to answer are: What are the police doing today? What should the police be doing in the immediate future? What does the public want from its police? What are the pressing crime concerns? What short-term objectives and longer-term goals must be accomplished to ensure that the police work optimally and address public needs?

The basic requirement of strategic planning is to shape a vision for policing, identify precise goals and targets against the vision, and put in place a system to evaluate implementation and police performance (such as performance indicators) against the set goals and targets.

Most strategic planning frameworks centre on the drafting of a Strategic Plan, which is essentially the roadmap that documents the vision, and lists the goals and targets that must be achieved. These plans usually stretch over a span of three to five years, and it is their effective implementation which is the real marker of the success of the planning process. This chapter provides a snapshot of the various methods in which strategic planning for the police is carried out in different Commonwealth countries.

<sup>1</sup> This is not necessarily an exhaustive list; these countries are listed as they have definitely embarked on strategic planning for the police.

## Relevance of Strategic Planning for the Police

Undeniably, policing continues to grow more complex across the world. At the same time, there is also a visible trend towards making policing more transparent and accountable at multiple levels, both for performance and misconduct. The growth of strategic planning for the police is one indication of this growing trend, with police services throughout the world developing strategic plans to help ensure efficient and effective delivery of services to the public. Judging from the experience so far, some of the positive benefits which flow from strategic planning for the police include: a stated commitment to meeting community demands, an obligation (and plan) to reduce crime, and greater understanding of the public's expectations within the police. This makes it crucial to ensure that a process of public consultation is written into the planning framework. In fact, some countries have established different means, and in some cases institutions, to gather public input (some of these various strategies are referenced below). In these countries, public consultation in strategic planning is a critical part of the legitimacy and relevance of the entire exercise. Not only does public consultation make the planning relevant and participatory, it also reduces the scope of political and/or partisan interests interfering in policing.

To be sure, the obstacles blocking smooth planning processes and strong implementation are also diverse. Poor training, lack of information and capacity, resistance to change, and weak communication channels across rank and file are some of the factors limiting the ability of police to develop and implement effective plans. It is precisely such obstacles that the process of strategic planning helps to identify faster. Ultimately, it is crucial that the various processes of strategic planning within an organization continue regularly, year after year, irrespective of change of guard. Only then will the practice become part of the organizational culture. A break in any of the process of strategic planning will not only affect the police understanding of crime trends and patterns but also affect the communication links across ranks within the organization.

## Codifying Strategic Planning in Police Legislations

One way of embedding strategic planning in the organisational culture of the MPS is by making it a legal obligation under the police legislation. Several countries, with relatively newer police acts, have enshrined the framing and drafting of a Strategic Plan within its text. Some of these formulations require that the responsibility for strategic planning is distributed between several stakeholders, usually the Minister responsible, the Chief of Police and an independent body with citizen representation. In this way, the law not only pinpoints the individuals and institutions responsible, but also sets out a process for planning.

For instance, the United Kingdom's Police Reform Act, 2002, makes it the duty of the Home Secretary to frame a National Policing Plan every year with a view to identifying national-level policing priorities. At the same time, the 2002 Act stipulates that police strategy plans have to be framed at the local level. These set out the medium and long-term policing priorities for the local area concerned. The annual Local Policing Plan is published by the local Police Authority and drafted in collaboration with the Chief Constable. The Police Authorities<sup>2</sup> of England and

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<sup>2</sup> It must be noted that the Police Authorities of England and Wales will be gradually phased out to make way for Police and Crime Commissioners, a new system which should be in place by end 2012. This will significantly change the police accountability architecture of England and Wales.

Wales are local-level, independent bodies, comprising elected local councillors, magistrates and members of the public.

Together with the Home Secretary and chief police officers, the Police Authorities are responsible for the management of policing in England and Wales. There is a Police Authority for each local police force – 43 in England and Wales. These bodies have serious responsibilities which include appointing the Chief Constables of their local police force, setting the police budget, and drawing up local policing plans. The Chief of Police continues to retain full operational control of the force, but the Police Authorities ensure that ordinary citizens have a say in how they are policed and have a direct channel to hold the Chief accountable for police service delivery. The Local Policing Plan brings together any national policing priorities which might be set by the Home Office with local priorities identified through consultation with communities and partners. It details the performance of the local police over the last year, as well as areas of policing for particular focus in the coming 12 months.

Northern Ireland has a similar decentralised and consultative process of strategic planning as England and Wales. The Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000, carefully apportions responsibility for strategic planning for the police between the executive (through the Secretary of State), police leadership (represented by the Chief Constable), and the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB, an independent policy-setting body for the police which is headquartered in Belfast and comprises of both political and independent members). The law explicitly assigns the duty to develop long-term objectives and principles to the Secretary of State, for medium-term objectives and priorities to the Policing Board, and for shorter-term tactical and operational plans to the Chief Constable.

Every Police District Commander in Northern Ireland (there are a total of 26 administrative districts) is mandated to draft a Local Policing Plan in consultation with the local District Policing Partnership (DPP), which are independent bodies set up to monitor the performance of their local police similar to the Police Authorities (NIPB oversees the work of the DPPs). These Local Policing Plans are expected to be consistent with, and are reflected in, the Policing Plan drafted by the NIPB at the national level.

Many Canadian provinces follow a similar model. The value of this type of planning process is that all the major stakeholders – the political executive, the police and representatives of the public – are involved in all stages of the process from drafting to implementation and evaluation.

In South Africa, strategic planning is actually a constitutional responsibility. The Constitution makes it the political responsibility of the Cabinet Minister responsible for policing to determine the national policing policy after consulting the provincial governments and taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the provinces.<sup>4</sup> South Africa also has Community Police Boards at the provincial and local area levels which feed public concerns and safety needs to the police, and help shape the policing priorities at the provincial level, which in turn impact the national policing policy.

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<sup>4</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Article 206 (1).

These are a few examples of the extent to which the process of strategic planning has been localised and made consultative in different countries.

## **Essential Components of Police Strategic Plans**

Essentially, as described above, police strategic plans detail the policing vision, principally by identifying the strategic priorities or objectives for policing within the strategic planning cycle adopted by the country. After articulating the objectives, strategic plans frame performance targets and indicators which are used to assess police performance in achieving the set targets. In the more participatory planning processes, the performance targets and indicators are framed specifically in response to concerns identified through public consultations. Interestingly, the latest Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service contains an entire section devoted to a situational analysis of crime figures and trends. This is a relevant innovation for a context such as South Africa where crime levels, across the board, including violent crime, are high and a major cause for public and political concern. It is important to contextualise police strategic plans as far as possible to the particular needs and current situations of the country.

By and large, policing priorities usually comprise: operational priorities – crime detection, investigation, response and prevention; organisational priorities – internal management, policies, procedures, processes; and financial priorities – budget and resource management. These underpin most police strategic plans. Public needs and concerns are mainly reflected in the operational priorities, though of course they influence the framing of all targets and indicators relevant to them. The best strategic plans are short and concise, with realistic and achievable targets and clearly stated indicators.

### **Operational Priorities**

The Policing Plan 2011-2014 of Northern Ireland is structured around three main objectives: “dealing with local concerns, delivering an excellent service and tackling serious harm”.<sup>5</sup> Regarding “dealing with local concerns”, the Plan refers to the crime concerns identified in consultations with the District Policing Partnerships and frames performance targets and indicators based on these. The crime concerns identified are:<sup>6</sup>

- Antisocial behaviour
- Domestic burglary and theft
- Community/neighbourhood policing
- Road traffic offences/road safety
- Drugs
- Violent crime
- Domestic abuse
- Hate crime (racist, homophobic and sectarian).

<sup>5</sup> The Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Policing Plan, 2011-2014, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> The Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Policing Plan, 2011-2014, p. 9.

Performance indicators and specific targets for strengthened detection and reduction in the occurrence of these crimes are provided for all these crime concerns in the 2011-2014 Plan. In just one example, to tackle domestic burglary and theft, the Plan's performance indicator is "the number of burglaries and the detection rate for burglary" and the targets specified are: (i) "to reduce the number of burglaries by 3 per cent, and (ii) to increase the detection rate for burglary by 2 percentage points".<sup>7</sup> Both these targets were set using available data and past performance statistics. In the 2010-14 Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service, crime prevention is one of the broad policing priorities identified and the medium-term target is a 4-7 per cent reduction in all levels of serious crime.<sup>8</sup> Framing targets in this type of quantifiable manner is important to measure police performance and effectiveness. Thus, stakeholders involved in drafting the Plan must ensure that the requisite expertise is available and forms part of the drafting process.

### **Organisational Priorities**

Targets and indicators for organisational priorities can be somewhat more difficult to quantify compared to crime detection and reduction targets, as these are broader and more diverse in scope. Looking at different countries' strategic plans, priorities related to the organisational health of the police force can comprise a range of issues depending on the specific needs of the particular police organisation. These include the creation of new internal units, recruitment and training policies, gender equity, the health and fitness of police personnel, community engagement strategies and internal performance appraisal systems.

### **Evaluation**

Periodic evaluations of strategic plans are extremely important. The objectives of such evaluations are: for officers at operational levels to make better decisions; to make allocation of resources and development of policies more strategically aligned; and to enable the community and police to better judge the efficiency and effectiveness of police services. Evaluation must be based on allocated resources and integrated with any other tasks being implemented. Otherwise it becomes a useless exercise in meeting reporting deadlines, rather than an essential input for decision-making.

#### **Evaluation of Policing Plans: Northern Ireland**

The Policing Plan of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) lays down a comprehensive arrangement for evaluating the overall performance of the police service as against the goals and standards agreed upon in the Plan. Prepared by the independent Northern Ireland Policing Board (hereafter referred to as the Board), this arrangement includes three distinct strands:

- **Improvement Projects:** The police service is required to submit a progress report on all strategic projects, known as Continuous Improvement Projects, to the Police Board twice a year. The Board then publishes an annual Continuous Improvement Plan in consultation with the Chief Constable (police chief) containing an assessment of the implementation of the projects.

<sup>7</sup> The Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Policing Plan, 2011-2014, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> South African Police Service, Strategic Plan, 2010-2014, p. 12.

- **External Inspection Programme:** The independent oversight body, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Criminal Justice Inspection, is mandated to conduct inspections on the police service against national benchmarks.
- **Efficiency Plan:** In addition to the strategic projects, the police service is required to publish a Four-Year Efficiency Plan which will underpin all the continuous improvement projects. The Deputy Constable is responsible for formulating the Efficiency Plan.

## Public Consultation on Policing Plans

Consultation with the community is an important aspect of policing. It provides an opportunity to explain the background, context and need for better policing and explains the objectives and vision of policing. There are few examples of consultation on policing plans that have been widely carried out.

### Public Consultations on Policing Plan: The United Kingdom Experience

Public consultations form a critical part of the planning cycle of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), an independent body mandated to ensure the accountability of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) operating in London. The Authority set up a Strategic and Operational Policing Committee that is responsible for preparing and consulting on the annual Policing and Performance Plan. To do this, the MPA organises "Have Your Say on Policing in London" consultations in London every year that runs over five to six months. Advertisements promoting the consultations are placed in various media including local authority publications, via email to all respondents of previous years' surveys, groups representing different organisations in London, to all Safe Neighbourhood sergeants and at various community meets attended and organised by the MPA and MPS. In 2010, the consultations used four different sources to obtain information about Londoners' priority for policing:<sup>9</sup>

- A full qualitative survey asking Londoners to list their top three priorities for policing
- A shorter postcard-style questionnaire asking people to select their priorities from a set list
- A Public Attitudes Survey (PAS) conducted by the MPS every year to determine people's perception of crime. Two questions are asked in the consultations around priorities included in the PAS
- In 2010, the MPA targeted the business community specifically and circulated a slightly different questionnaire to business groups asking them to identify the top three policing priorities for their businesses.
- The analysis of the consultations are then discussed by the MPA committee and passed on to the MPS to be used in the development of the Policing Plan. The MPA publishes the report of the consultations on policing priorities as well as the minutes of all their meetings on their website.

<sup>9</sup> "Public consultations results to inform the Policing London Business Plan, 2012/13," Metropolitan Police Authority, Publications, Policing Plan, available at: <http://www.mpa.gov.uk/publications/policingplans/>

## Conclusion

The need for police planning is self-evident. A strategic plan ensures a basis for evaluating progress in improved policing. They enable the police to think strategically about doing more with less. The rising crime graph and general feeling of insecurity also requires the police to lay out priorities and achievable targets and goals clearly. To this end, a consultative process of strategic planning is critical for the success of strategic planning. It is a process that helps the police to be more responsive to public expectations and concerns, and thereby develop ties with the communities.

A vision of policing coupled with an annual strategic policing plan is essential to effectuate and operationalise policies and can form the basis of budgetary allocations and long-term infrastructure and manpower planning. For successful implementation of the plan, it is vital for the provisions be binding on the police department, that the government supports it with reasonable budgetary allocation and that the plan be laid down in an unbiased manner.

The importance of establishing independent public bodies for drawing up strategic policing plans lies in their bi-partisan and independent composition that serves as a crucial link between the government, the police and the community. Such a body acts as a buffer against undue political interference over determining the priorities and goals of policing. While governments have a key role to play in setting the police's policy priorities, this must not amount to dictating goals in line with vested interests. At the same time, the inclusion of independent and civil society members helps to ensure the police's responsiveness to community needs as well as accountability to the people.

## **IV. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND: THE MALDIVES POLICE SERVICE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING**

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### **Political Transition<sup>10</sup>**

In October 2008, the Maldives held its first multiparty democratic elections that saw the defeat of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, in power since 1978, and the victory of the human rights activist, Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). This paved the way for the greatly needed strengthening of political, legislative and institutional reforms, based on rule of law and commitment to human rights, a process initiated first by Gayoom in 2004. Pro-democracy protests backed by international pressure prompted Gayoom to initiate a constitutional reform process that was refined into a *Roadmap for the Democratic Reform Agenda* in March 2006. These reforms paved the way for the introduction of a multiparty system, an independent judiciary, greater accountability through the People's Majlis (parliament) and independent oversight bodies such as the Human Rights Commission and the Judicial Services Commission.

Policing too underwent significant changes as part of the reform agenda. A police force was first established by law in 1933 under colonial rule. It was subsequently disbanded and re-established only in 1972 as part of the National Security Service (NSS). Unlike other nations in the Commonwealth, the Maldives did not have police legislation even after independence in 1965.

Till 2004, the police functioned as part of NSS, a paramilitary force under the Ministry of Defence and National Security. Plans to create a civil police service are believed to have started in March 2004. A Change Management Committee was set up to oversee the founding of such a police service. Its main tasks involved research into the structure of other police departments across the globe; signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with some of these departments and their training academies; drawing up programmes of operation and training that would be “community-oriented”, and designing the new uniform.<sup>11</sup> It is unclear whether September 2004 was the agreed date of announcement, but it appears that the massive anti-state protests that broke out in Malé in August 2004 pushed Gayoom towards this decision.

In September 2004, the Maldives Police Service (MPS) was created as a civilian law enforcing body under the Ministry of Home Affairs, while the NSS (renamed the National Defence Force in April 2006) remained under the Ministry of Defence. The fact that it was named as a *service* as opposed to a *force* was to highlight the fact that the police were meant to provide a service to the public and not act as a force upon them.

Through this transformation, President Gayoom sought to convey his government's commitment to political reforms. Initially, little change was visible in the policing culture on the ground. This can partly be attributed to the absence of necessary legislation guiding police powers

<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed assessment of police reform initiatives in the Maldives through the transition period, refer to the chapter on the Maldives in *Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed 2010*, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi.

<sup>11</sup> Jauregui, B. (2010), “Bluing Green in the Maldives: Countering Citizen Insurgency by Civil-izing National Security”, in John D. Kelly et al. (eds.), *Anthropology and Counterinsurgency* (University of Chicago Press; Chicago & London).

and responsibilities. It was only with the passing of the Police Act, 2008, followed closely by the ratification of the Constitution, that a legal framework was provided to carry forward police reforms in true earnest. President Nasheed's entire campaign rested on demanding rule of law and human rights reform, which greatly enhanced the possibility of achieving democratic policing.

## The Maldives Police Service: Transformation to Civilian Policing

It was hoped that calling the police a service rather than a force would encourage people to accept the new police as their protectors. The name was actually designed to increase that acceptance and encourage the goal of community policing.

With Nasheed coming to power, the Maldives entered a new stage of its history. The country was experiencing democracy for the first time and the police had to adapt to this situation. In 2008, the parliament passed the Maldives Police Act. Amongst other things, the Act established community-oriented policing as a goal for the reorganised Maldives Police Service.

This was clearly a step in the right direction. The community-oriented policing model, if properly implemented, would replace the former strategy of maintaining the status quo at whatever cost. Community policing would be an instrument of change for the new MPS. It would also be a method of providing proactive policing. Much of policing under the Gayoom era was reactive to protests and demonstrations. It was thus crucial for the MPS to be able to act proactively under a new democratic government. Building a relationship with the communities in which the officers worked was seen as the first step toward becoming proactive.

The police also had to adapt to cosmetic changes aimed at bringing it closer to a democratic service. The NSS used military ranks and titles for their officers. These were discarded in favour of more civilianised ranks with the Commissioner of Police at its helm.<sup>12</sup> New ranks were created under two categories: commissioned (from sub-Inspector upwards) and non-commissioned (constable upwards). Owing to a shortage of manpower, however, many officers from the NSS were retained within the civilian police, including the first Commissioner, a former Major General in the NSS. All allegations of misconduct associated with their time in the NSS were overlooked and never investigated. As a result, concerns over the performance of the police, particularly in the absence of legislation specifying roles, powers and functions of the police, continued to linger within civil society.<sup>13</sup>

Initially, the MPS suffered from several teething problems, elaborated in a report submitted to the Commissioner and Management Board by the retired Scottish Police Superintendent, John

<sup>12</sup> The ranks of the MPS include: starting from the lowest rank – Constable, Lance Corporal, Corporal, Police Sergeant, Police Staff Sergeant, Police Station Inspector, Chief Station Inspector, Sub-Inspector, Inspector, Chief Inspector, Superintendent of Police, Chief Superintendent, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of Police. See *101 Questions You Always Wanted to Know about the Police* in Dhivehi, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and the Maldivian Democracy Network, 2010 available at: [http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=195&Itemid=103](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195&Itemid=103)

<sup>13</sup> Interviews conducted in Malé, 5-8 September 2011

B. Robertson (who worked as a Consultant to the MPS)<sup>14</sup> in October 2006.<sup>15</sup> Several frontline officers performed administrative duties, and the available manpower was never used optimally. Aggrieved citizens cited the need for a comprehensive legislation that specified the roles and responsibilities of the police; their powers of arrest; their ability to conduct searches and seizures; the nature of the chain of command; and the mechanisms that exist for review of complaints.<sup>16</sup> Citizens and CSOs remained concerned about the country's weak legal and institutional framework to ensure human rights protection, to guarantee freedom of expression and association, freedom from torture and the right to fair trial.<sup>17</sup>

To tackle these teething problems, and cement the foundation of community-oriented policing, the Maldives police entered into a process of drafting a Five-Year Action Plan.

## Drafting the Strategic Plan, 2007-2011

It was felt that to implement community-oriented policing, new strategies and policies needed to be formulated and the existing law enforcement ones required complete overhaul. There was a lack of expertise within the country to arrive at a new vision of policing. This early recognition prompted some officers to initiate talks with police organisations around the world. An agreement was entered into with the Western Australia Police (WAP) in late 2006/early 2007 to assist the MPS to emerge as a professional, responsive and representative institution.

Two officers of WAP were sent to the Maldives – a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a Senior Sergeant (Sr. Sgt), to provide assistance. The Sr. Sgt was tasked with training, while the SP was to work closely with the police executive in shaping policy. A Strategic Focus Unit (SFU) comprising 12 senior officers from the MPS along with the two Australian police officers was established. Its aim was to identify the key processes, structures and standards necessary to achieve responsive service delivery, keeping in mind the changing political environment and the objectives of the Government of Maldives Seventh National Development Plan (2006-2011).<sup>18</sup> Accordingly, a Strategic Intentions document was prepared on the basis of which priority areas were determined and projects developed. A team was formed to bring this Plan into action. A basic police training course under this programme was conducted in March 2007.<sup>19</sup> The Commissioner of Police (Western Australia) officially handed over this Plan to the MPS in March 2007 on the completion of the one-year MOU signed with the MPS.

<sup>14</sup> The Maldives Police Service, available at: <http://police.gov.mv/page/20002>, accessed on 15 August 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Commissioner and Management Board (2006), *Maldives Police Service: A Review of the Capital Police*, 28 October.

<sup>16</sup> National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2004), Assessment of the Opportunities and the Challenges to the Development of Political Parties in the Maldives, 16 December, available at: [http://www.mv.undp.org/v2/publication\\_files/4b35f8cdb59cc.pdf](http://www.mv.undp.org/v2/publication_files/4b35f8cdb59cc.pdf), accessed on 20 July 2011.

<sup>17</sup> Amnesty International (2004), Maldives - Human rights violations in the context of political reforms, December, available at: <http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/speicalreports/AmnestyInternationalVisittoMaldives2005.htm>, accessed on 20 July 2011

<sup>18</sup> The Seventh National Development Plan – Creating New Opportunities – was formulated over a two-year period by officials of the Ministry of Planning and National Development to cover the period 2006-2010. The Plan sets out 12 main goals through 88 activities. Goal 10 is to “Promote access to justice, rule of law and maximise public safety” and the objectives set out in the Chapter entitled “Police Services” are exactly in line with those enumerated in the “National Strategic Development Plan – Sector Road Map” of the MPS, which they prepared with the assistance of external collaborators.

<sup>19</sup> Miadhu (2008), Police implementing strategic plan, 10 March, available at: <http://www.miadhu.com/2007/03/local-news/police-implementing-strategic-plan-1722/>, accessed on 21 July 2011.

Thereafter, consultants from the Perth-based Global Justice Solutions (GJS), Australia, specialising in intelligence-led policing, community policing and strategic direction were hired to complete the job WAP had started. GJS was mandated to convert the concept of the Strategic Plan into a tangible programme to be implemented in the near future. They were to formulate projects and create a programme regiment to achieve the goals identified in the “Way Forward till 2010” and assist the MPS in implementing the programme. An important point that GJS staff made was that the Strategic Plan and its implementation was “not to have noble intentions or create something you could take a picture with, but to create a fabric and shape a culture of policing to meet democratic standards and enable the MPS to shrug their military leanings”.<sup>20</sup>

The DRP-led government provided complete support to the initiative by way of funding. The Ministry of Home Affairs allotted more funds than were required for everyday policing.

GJS along with the MPS formed a Programme Management Committee, which was responsible for ensuring that the programmes were conducted according to the Plan, and an Internal Review Committee to check how these programmes were conducted. The Commissioner was the Committee’s Chair, and had two executives from GJS (programme managers) and executive police officers (ACPs, SPs, Chief Inspectors, Inspectors).<sup>21</sup> The meetings were conducted regularly and were the most frequent method of evaluation available to project leaders in what were called “periodic internal reviews”. What is most impressive is that this effort continued to be bank-rolled above and beyond the resources of the MPS for regular policing and was sustained on the initiative of the MPS. Till the end of 2008, MVR **9,941,825** was spent on the “Way Forward” alone.

Meetings on planning and implementation were periodically attended by the Home Minister, where programme implementation was discussed, amended if required and roles assigned within the MPS to ensure implementation. The progress report that was issued in 2009 shows responsibilities attached to certain police officers.

However, getting the officers to agree to the Strategic Plan was not an easy task. During the drafting of the Plan, the MPS had only a few “reform-oriented” policemen. The then Commissioner of Police, Mr Adam Zahir, was considered to be one of the officers who played an instrumental role in restructuring the MPS. However, his past record was not entirely clean and he was replaced with the change in government in 2008. The other challenge was to get the officers interested in behavioural reform. “The Maldives Police Service in 2007 was full of young, highly educated officers, many of whom were Malé-centric and had received tertiary education abroad. They were extremely taken up by the technology that police have at their disposal abroad, and aside from that they were interested in very little else.”<sup>22</sup>

The Plan faced an additional challenge in its ability to disseminate information within the organisation and the community at large. The fact that the government was cognizant of the

<sup>20</sup> Telephone interview with Mr. Glenn Crannage, Global Justice Solutions, Project Head Maldives Police Strategic planning on 19 August, 2011

<sup>21</sup> Refer to Footnote 12 for the ranks of the Maldives Police Service.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Mr Glenn Crannage, Global Justice Solutions, Project Head the Maldives Police Strategic Planning on 19 August, 2011.

need for this is evident from several awareness schemes included in the Plan. “We had always insisted on the larger outreach and publicity for the Plan so that it reached the maximum number of people” claims Crannage. The Way Forward Project Catalogue was compiled and circulated to various government and non-government agencies in the Maldives.

Yet it is unclear whether any consultations were held within the government departments regarding the Plan draft. Moreover, no public consultations were held while drafting the Plan to get a sense of community needs and problems.

Around 50 programmes were conducted entirely by the MPS, with GJS acting as the mentor. GJS also supplied the government with a draft Criminal Procedure Bill. At their own admission, this was based on the Western Australian situation and had not yet been contextualised to the Maldivian context. Nevertheless, in a rush before the elections of 2008, DRP lawmakers, eager to pass as many progressive legislations as they could, did a rushed job of it, and subsequently it did not pass in the Majlis. No movement as such has taken place on the Bill since then.<sup>23</sup>

## **Summary of the Strategic Plan, 2007-2011**

One of the notable features of the Strategic Plan was the emphasis on a new approach to policing that was consistent with the call for democracy and human rights. Central to the approach were features such as:

- Building working partnerships with local and national agencies/organisations
- Coordinating with other government agencies to develop a holistic approach to policing
- Respect for human rights
- Focusing on community responsiveness
- Improving transparency and accountability of the police services
- Equitable access to the services.

The key features of the Strategic Plan were:

Vision	Build and sustain public trust in the police
Mission	In partnership with the community, create a safer and more secure Maldives by building sustainable quality police services
Desired Outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Lawful Behaviour and Community Safety</b> <i>Key Goal:</i> Reduce incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour</li> <li>2. <b>Offenders Apprehended and Dealt with in Accordance with Law</b> <i>Key Goal:</i> Improve capacity in investigations and evidence gathering</li> <li>3. <b>Professional and Responsive Services Provided</b> <i>Key Goal:</i> Improve confidence and respect within the police</li> <li>4. <b>Good Governance</b> <i>Key Goal:</i> Developing good governance within the police</li> </ol>

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Mr Glenn Crannage, Global Justice Solutions, Project Head Maldives Police Strategic Planning on 19 August, 2011.

The MPS adopted an incremental project-based approach to institutionalise the new processes, procedures, practices and standards. Fifty-four projects were listed in the Plan each addressing one or more of the priority issues identified by the MPS as desired goals and which sought to strengthen its capacity to deliver services effectively. The Project Catalogue, however, provided only the broad skeleton of each project and the detailed designs were to be prepared by the relevant authorities. Projects were categorised as priority 1, 2 or 3 keeping in mind the MPS's limited resources and capacity when it was created.

Thematically, the 54 projects could be clubbed under three broad categories:

- i) Response to crime
- ii) Building public trust
- iii) Professional delivery of services.

## **Response to Crime**

A key objective of the Maldives police was the creation of safer communities and a reduction of the vulnerability of people to drug offence, juvenile crimes and terrorism. In order to achieve this, the Maldives police identified two key aspects: first, building closer ties with the community to allow better reporting of offences and collection of information. This they believed would lead to quicker intelligence on criminal activities and help the police to respond rapidly. The second aspect was building the skills and capacity of the police themselves to better understand social issues and identify key trends in crime. Their priorities for handling crime related to drug offences and juvenile crimes. With more than 45 per cent of the population aged 18 years and under, the Juvenile Justice project sought to position the Maldives Police Service to focus and address these issues appropriately.

Project	Key Outputs Promised	Timeline
<b>National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set up a Crime Prevention Monitoring Desk for the evaluation of programmes</li> <li>• Set up youth-friendly police clubs</li> <li>• Set up police and parent unions</li> <li>• Hold a workshop on community leaders and police</li> </ul>	30 September 2008
<b>Anti-Drug Strategy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct awareness programmes</li> <li>• Revised rehabilitation and counselling schemes</li> <li>• Cooperation with local NGOs on education programmes</li> </ul>	31 March 2009
<b>Juvenile Justice</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a Juvenile Justice Policy</li> <li>• Conduct awareness programmes among the youth</li> <li>• Enhanced training for police on juvenile justice</li> </ul>	30 September 2008
<b>Criminal Gangs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop National Intelligence Strategy</li> <li>• Training on intelligence gathering and analysis</li> </ul>	31 March 2011

<b>Family and Child Protection Units</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish Family and Child Protection Units (FCPU) in various islands</li> <li>Partner with local NGOs and Ministry of Gender and Family</li> <li>Establishment of Safe Houses</li> </ul>	31 March 2009
<b>Victims of Crime Project</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Victims of Crime Act</li> <li>Develop procedures for victim assistance services including police responsibilities in dealing with victims</li> </ul>	31 December 2008
<b>Evidence Protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop procedures for crime scene examinations</li> <li>Develop standards for collection and protection of evidence</li> </ul>	30 June 2009
<b>Emergency Response</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishment of Regional Emergency Response Units</li> <li>Emergency training exercise in coordination with other government agencies and NGOs</li> </ul>	31 March 2011

### Performance Indicators

The indicators laid down in the Plan to assess progress on these measures included:

- Development of working partnerships at the national and local levels to focus on crime and community safety
- Development of a National Crime Prevention Strategy
- Improvement in the response to crime investigations and victims of crimes
- Enhancement of police and community relations.

### Building Public Trust

As the vision of the Plan indicates, building and sustaining public trust was its key motivation. Several projects were developed under this category.

Project	Key Outputs	Timeline
<b>Understanding Community Perceptions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survey on community policing needs</li> <li>Improving police conduct in accordance with Code of Conduct</li> </ul>	30 June 2011
<b>Increased Visibility of the Police</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publication of quarterly bulletins and annual report</li> <li>Awareness camps and workshops</li> <li>Open day scheme</li> <li>Regular patrolling</li> </ul>	Ongoing
<b>Customer Service Charter (to provide police response to customer needs)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training of police personnel on the content of the Customer Service Charter</li> <li>Sharing its intent with the community and inviting feedback</li> </ul>	30 September 2008

## Professional Delivery of Services

Apart from reducing crime and ensuring community safety, the Strategic Plan gave due weightage to improving policing standards and behaviour in accordance with the rule of law and human rights. This was seen as critical for the Maldives police to deal effectively with modern-day security challenges and develop into an organisation that the public could trust and have confidence in. A new approach to policing was developed in the Plan with greater commitment to service, accountability and transparency. New processes, procedures and standards were laid down in the Plan to help the MPS develop into a professional organisation.

Project	Key Outputs	Timeline
<b>Improving Organisational Culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Studying police occupational culture to examine how police independence and accountability is achieved</li> <li>• Develop an organisational framework for handling complaints against the police</li> <li>• Survey on police personnel's attitude towards their duty and responsibilities</li> </ul>	31 March 2011
<b>Ethics and Integrity Project</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formulating a Code of Conduct and Statement of Values and ensuring all personnel comply with these</li> <li>• Developing strategies to reward integrity and ethical behaviour</li> </ul>	31 April 2008
<b>Internal Investigations Unit</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish procedure for receiving, processing, investigating and documenting allegations or complaints against the MPS</li> </ul>	31 March 2009
<b>Improving Investigative Skills of the Police</b>	Revised procedures and processes on crime investigation to improve the police's capacity in conducting investigations such that it inspires confidence in the criminal justice system	30 June 2008

### Performance Indicators

Common performance indicators were laid down under the categories of building public trust and professional delivery of services.

- Development of the Customer Service Charter, Code of Conduct and Statement of Values and its demonstration by personnel across the organisation
- Use of the MPS as a consultant of choice by groups and agencies whose mandate is to support community safety
- Development of a framework for assessing community perception on crime and community safety
- Development of an Organisational Performance Review process

## **V. SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: DRAFTING, IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PLAN**

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CHRI and MDN designed this survey to assess the implementation of the Strategic Plan. The survey is an exercise aimed at evaluating how the Plan was implemented and targets met. The parameters against which the evaluation was done and results arrived at relate to three stages of the Plan:

1. Preparation of the Strategic Plan (including internal consultations and training)
2. Implementation of the Plan
3. Assessment of the Plan

Under each of the headings, the results of the police survey and the community survey<sup>24</sup> have been presented in percentile form. Although the surveys were conducted in ten atolls, the result is mostly presented in an aggregate form. Atoll-specific analysis has been given in only few themes where notable trends could be found. This is mainly because the idea was to highlight the broad issues and concerns regarding implementation of the Plan instead of providing analysis of specific geographical differences. The same is also the reason why rank-specific analysis in case of the police survey is not extensive.

### **1. Preparation of the Strategic Plan**

The survey questions tried to assess the levels of awareness of, and involvement with, the design and creation of the Plan across the rank and file of the Maldives police. Indicators for assessing this included:

- i.) If the Plan was discussed across the rank and file during the drafting phase;
- ii.) The officers' knowledge about the Plan
- iii.) The manner in which information about the Plan was passed on to every officer across the MPS
- iv.) The training that was imparted about the Plan

Consultations on the Plan across the rank and file appeared to be limited. A quarter of the officers (23 per cent) believed that consultations were held across rank and file, though a majority of these (19 per cent) thought that only Sub-Inspectors and above were consulted. Regarding awareness of the Plan, most of the officers (92 per cent) said they were aware of it. The most commonly cited source of information for their awareness was through their seniors, either during formal sessions or informal discussions (68 per cent). Notably, only 18 per cent of the respondents cited orientation as their source of knowledge. Regarding specific aspects of the Plan, training was noted to be higher on the Code of Conduct (57 per cent) followed closely by Statement of Values (52 per cent) than on the Operations Manual (43 per cent) or the Customer Service Charter (42 per

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<sup>24</sup> The term 'police respondents' refers to the survey conducted with the police, while the term 'community respondents' refers to the survey conducted with the community.

cent). This is perhaps why most of the officers (65 per cent) believed that their level of knowledge on the Plan was merely fair, while only 6 per cent felt it was comprehensive.

### **Commentary**

As we were unable to meet or interview the police, we did not gather any further insights into the process of planning and drafting of the Strategic Plan.

## **2. Implementation of the Plan**

This section provides data on the implementation of the policies, standards and projects proposed in the Plan. For the sake of clarity, the themes of the Plan were clubbed under the following themes:

- a. Response to crime
- b. Building public trust
- c. Professional delivery of services (see Chapter IV).

The survey results too are presented under these themes, while the complete survey is included as an Appendix.

### **Response to Crime**

One of the key desired outcomes of the Plan was *reduced incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour*. Emphasis was laid on crime prevention and improving investigations by way of reducing crime. This section pertains to data on the implementation of the projects relating to crime reduction – steps that were taken by the police to carry out their projects juxtaposed with the community's perception of these.

- Perception of Crime Rates

Survey results indicated that the general perception was that there was a rise in crime levels during the past five years.<sup>25</sup> Notably, though, this perception is much higher within the community with 72 per cent of the respondents stating that crime had risen, as opposed to 53 per cent of the police respondents. In terms of the main law and order concerns, the police respondents identified drug-related offences (49 per cent) as the most serious issue affecting the country. Interestingly, the second most serious concern pointed out was robbery and chain snatching (34 per cent), even before juvenile-related offences and gang warfare. Responses across the islands too alternated between drug-related offences and robbery and chain snatching, with Kulhudhufushi island citing the highest percentage (80 per cent) in support of drug-related, and Dhuvarfuru and Nilandhoo in support of robbery and chain snatching (61 per cent and 60 per cent respectively). A variation was also noted between officers of different ranks. While chain snatching was a major concern among the police constables (45 per cent), drug-related crimes was the main concern of the police corporals and officers. Among the community respondents though, release of criminals into society and unemployment were cited as the major concerns.

<sup>25</sup> The period of five years was taken as a reference point to coincide with the Strategic Plan period.

- Strategies to Combat Criminal Activities

The Plan laid out several strategies that were to be implemented to tackle crimes such as drug-related offences, juvenile crimes, gang warfare and robbery. Some of these included developing procedures for crime scene examination, collection and protection of evidence and maintaining data on criminal gangs.

The survey tried to ascertain the level of awareness amongst police officers of these specific strategies. Most respondents could only point to awareness programmes for the public. A few officers pointed to witness protection programmes and enhanced evidence gathering measures, but were unable to give specific details of these programmes. Officers also received some training to deal with specific crimes. Most training programmes focused on handling cases of child abuse. These also relied on considerable liaising with the gender departments of the government.

- Crime Prevention Strategies

The Plan laid down specific crime prevention measures such as setting up of CPCs, youth-friendly police clubs and holding awareness camps among the youth on drugs and related offences. The survey tried to establish if the officers were aware of these measures. Most respondents were aware of the establishment of CPCs but had no further details of what these were or how they functioned. Barring a few officers, no one had gone through or knew about specific capacity building programmes within the department. In fact, a large majority of the police respondents (84 per cent) stated that they did not receive sufficient training nor were they given adequate resources to carry out their work.

The perception among the community respondents was that the police were failing in their task of crime prevention. Of these, 56 per cent stated that the police were not doing sufficient to deal with drug-related offences whereas 48 per cent and 43 per cent believed similarly on violence against women and child sexual abuse respectively. CPCs too do not appear to be functioning. Within the community, 53 per cent had never heard of their local CPC. Islands where a majority of respondents were not aware of the CPCs include F. Nilandhoo (71 per cent), G. A. Villingili (75 per cent), Sh. Funadhoo (71 per cent), G. Dh. Thinadhoo (83 per cent), M. Muli (60 per cent) and N. Holhudhoo (58 per cent). Even in islands where respondent were aware of the CPCs, namely Kulhudhufushi (66 per cent) and Hoarafushi (85 per cent), they claimed that the CPCs are barely functional and meetings were seldom held.

The Family and Child Protection Unit appeared to fare better. Most of the respondents in H. Dh. Kulhudhufushi (100 per cent), G. A. Villingili (100 per cent), F. Nilandhoo (100 per cent), Sh. Funadhoo (71 per cent), G. Dh. Thinadhoo (83 per cent) and L. Gan (50 per cent) stated that there were FCPUs in their area.

### **Commentary**

One of the major concerns regarding police response to crime was cited as the lack of a needs-assessment survey that could help measure the police's requirements too tackling crime rates and patterns across the atolls. The resources available to the police are not evenly spread and, at times, they are not even proportionate to the needs of the atolls. For instance, not every island

has a police station. Most police stations are located in the capital and the larger islands of an atoll.<sup>26</sup> In several such atolls, the police are not even provided with basic amenities such as ferry boats to cover all the islands of the atoll. As a result, gathering evidence, particularly from crime scenes, suffers tremendously. At the same time, ironically, a state-of-the-art forensic unit equipped with the latest technologies was built in Malé. Officers considered the forensics unit of minimal use, since they seldom managed to reach the crime scene on time to collect any evidence. In fact, concern was raised against the heavy concentration of police personnel in Malé as against the other islands, perpetuating inadvertently a feeling of insecurity among those living in the city.

Several facilities and services provided by the police are inactive or suffer from shortages of resources and capacity. The police hotline number 119, for instance, is often unreachable or found too complicated to follow the automated procedure. As a result, most people still prefer to approach police stations directly to register complaints. Given the geographical spread and difficulties of the Maldives, the importance of accessibility cannot be overemphasised. The CPCs are set up in most islands but are inactive or unable to function objectively, for, in the smaller islands, in particular, close community links is believed to colour their functioning. To address these difficulties, CPCs require guidelines and a code of conduct which are yet to be formulated.

Underlying these challenges is a lack of training and capacity building within the MPS, a point that was repeatedly emphasised during discussions. The police officers are unable to respond sensitively to victims of child abuse or drug offences. This was attributed to various factors including lack of knowledge on the law and procedures, misunderstanding of the role of the police and insufficient understanding of the sociological roots of particular crimes.

### **Building Public Trust**

Building public trust lies at the heart of the MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011. The sole objective of the Maldives police, as articulated in the Plan, is to respond better to community needs and expectations. It seeks to accomplish this by working in partnership with the community and improving transparency, accountability and efficiency of police services. A slew of initiatives are listed in the Plan for building public trust.

A large majority of the police respondents (92 per cent) believe that **community participation is an essential component of policing**, but many (62 per cent) acknowledge that people are hesitant to approach the police. To overcome this trust deficit, the Plan proposed a range of programmes including holding awareness camps, police open days, engagement with the youth, and counselling activities. The main aim of these initiatives was to increase police officers' visibility and accessibility and to reach out to people living in the remote islands and areas. But the frequency of these initiatives in most islands covered in our survey was found to be dismal. Most of the police respondents stated that these programmes were carried out just once a year – awareness programmes (48 per cent), police open days (52 per cent), and counselling activities (34 per cent). Interestingly though, most of the community respondents stated that they found these programmes very useful. The awareness programmes, in particular appeared to be extremely popular (89 per cent).

<sup>26</sup> The Maldives currently has 54 police stations across 196 islands.

The Plan also proposed conducting **several baseline surveys** to identify the needs, grievances and expectations of the community. Community participation in these surveys was low (38 per cent), and 42 per cent of the community respondents said that they were unaware of the Community Perception survey and the Victimisation survey that were conducted, while 47 per cent and 48 per cent of the respondents claimed that they did not participate in the respective surveys.

Another means by which the police sought to increase visibility was simply through **regular patrolling**. The extent to which this happened varied considerably across the islands we covered. Most of the responses were split between daily patrol (40 per cent) and only when an incident occurred (44 per cent). In a few islands, such as Thinadhoo, the respondents said that the area was too large and required more policemen for regular patrolling.

Distrust of the police remains high in the community. Survey results show that the police's efforts to reach out to the people did not have any substantial impact. The majority of the community respondents thought that not much had changed about the police. About 34 per cent said that they were as unfriendly and unhelpful as earlier, while 33 per cent stated that there was no improvement in their response time or efficiency and 31 per cent observed that corruption levels in the police were as high as ever. If building public trust was a major objective of the Plan, the police have not fared too well. Half (50 per cent) of the community respondents were still reluctant to approach the police owing to fear and a lack of confidence. A staggering 73 per cent mentioned that the police needed to do more by way of engaging with the community.

### **Commentary**

Distrust of the police continues partly owing to its past image. As part of the NSS, police action was feared and loathed by the people. Human rights violations were rampant, and since several of the senior police officers remain from that period, it adds to the trust deficit. Certain voices also state that due to the trust deficit, police actions have a tendency to be exaggerated and labelled as an "atrocity" without thorough investigation.<sup>27</sup> But public distrust continues also because of the lack of sincerity with which community outreach programmes were carried out and an inadequate capacity and understanding of the goals and principles of the Plan.

The failure of outreach programmes can be attributed to several reasons. The general sense is that most of the police's efforts are focused on the capital island of Malé. Information about police rules and outreach programmes is disseminated through the police website. With internet access being limited, this information is not available to large sections of the population. Another drawback is the failure to reach out to the migrants, mostly from Bangladesh, who are largely illiterate and only barely conversant with Dhivehi. Crime by and within the migrant community is emerging as a major concern in the country. Strangely though, this issue does not find focus even in the police's new Strategic Plan. In fact, there was a strong disagreement with the prioritisation of crimes as "very high priority", "high priority", "medium priority", and "low priority" by the police in the second Strategic Plan.<sup>28</sup> Violence is considered very high priority whereas crimes against women and children are high priority. Whether crimes against women includes violence

<sup>27</sup> Interview, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, 6 September 2011.

<sup>28</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2011-2013, p. 12.

remains unclear. Further, financial crimes are categorised as very high priority, whereas trafficking of people and migrant smuggling are high priority. When confronted about the rationale behind this categorisation, the police representative replied that it was based on the level of competence within the MPS to deal with the issues.

This disconnect is largely due to lack of public consultations while drafting the Strategic Plan. Most participants complained about lack of consultations with civil society while drafting documents such as the Customer Service Charter or Community Perception surveys.

### **Standard-Setting and Professional Delivery of Services**

Professional delivery of services is understood to mean accountable, efficient, effective and responsive delivery of services under the Plan. This included efforts to ensure ethical as well as effective performance by individual officers and instituting processes and standards to help create a strengthened institution as a whole.

In order to “create a culture within the MPS where integrity and ethical behaviour is paramount to all activities,” the **Plan included development and implementation of a Code of Conduct and Statement of Values for the MPS**. These were part of the Ethics and Integrity project which sought to develop the MPS as an organisation that met international standards of police conduct, and which attempted to develop an ethics/integrity/anti-corruption framework to guide recruitment, promotion, transfer, decision-making, policies and procedures.<sup>29</sup> The fact that the project was listed as one of the top priorities of the Plan reflects seriousness by the police leadership. Our survey result, too, shows that both of these – Code of Conduct and Statement of Values – are in place and some efforts have been made to implement them. For instance, most of the police respondents said that they received training on the Code of Conduct (57 per cent) and Statement of Values (52 per cent). Most of them also believed that these two documents were important to develop the police as a role model for the community. Among the most notable features of these documents, as identified by the respondents, include emphasis on honesty, integrity and responsibility by officers and following the rule of law.

The Plan also proposed developing a **Human Resource Development Plan for the MPS** to enhance human resource management, including recruitment, postings, promotions, remuneration and the general welfare of the police. The project sought to effectively and progressively manage people, keeping in mind current trends and future goals.<sup>30</sup> In practice though, the impact of the Plan on human resource management appears limited. Most of the police respondents believed that there was no change or only minor improvements in human resource management issues. While 23 per cent of the respondents stated that the recruitment process had improved after the implementation of the SAP 24 per cent noted there was no change in recruitment processes. What was worrying was that close to 20 per cent of the respondents believed that recruitment processes had in fact deteriorated. In relation to postings, 33 per cent said that these have improved whereas 29 per cent claimed that there was no change. On welfare activities, opinions

<sup>29</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011, p. 76.

<sup>30</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011, p. 62.

were evenly split with 24 per cent stating that conditions had improved and 24 per cent declared that the situation had worsened. Notably, almost 49 per cent of all the respondents stated that the process of grievance handling had improved within the MPS since the implementation of the Plan.

Another key aspect for building the organisational effectiveness of the MPS was **developing an Order and Procedures Manual** to clearly articulate the requirements necessary to fulfil operational and administrative functions. The objective of this project was to provide specific directives to ensure that police practice is guided by consistent modern-day orders and procedures.<sup>31</sup> This too was given top priority under the Plan. However, the survey shows that training on the Operations Manual was extremely inconsistent, with 43 per cent denying having received any training. An equal number, however, maintained that they had received some training around the contents of the Manual. **On specific guidelines within the Manual, for instance on arrest and detention,** responses were mixed. While 87 per cent of the police respondents held that guidelines on detention and custodial treatment do exist but were unsure what these really were, an alarming 58 per cent said that no guidelines on arrest or detention were formulated, and if they were, they had no information on the matter.

Although formal guidelines on arrest may not exist, our **community survey findings** indicate that there appears to be some guidance on police duties regarding arrest. Community respondents were asked whether they thought the performance of the police was “satisfactory,” “somewhat satisfactory,” or “not at all satisfactory,” with respect to specific duties of the police during arrest as shown below:

		Satisfactory (per cent)	Somewhat satisfactory (per cent)	Not at all satisfactory (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
1	Providing the grounds for arrest in writing within 24 hours	45	26	14	15
2	Informing family/friend about an arrest	28	35	20	16
3	Facilitating access to legal counsel for the detainee	25	33	25	18
4	Respecting the detainee's right against self-incrimination/right to silence	32	25	22	21
5	Producing the detainee before a judge within 24 hours	40	22	18	20
7	Ensuring the detainee's physical and mental safety	27	31	22	20

<sup>31</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011, p. 56.

The table above indicates that people thought that generally the police carried out arrest procedures satisfactorily. Some problems may persist but that is to be expected. On other aspects of police behaviour, the response was less positive. Most of the community respondents had no opinion on the nature of force used by the MPS (excessive, inadequate, necessary or excessive towards the vulnerable sections of society). About 29 per cent of the respondents said that the police's handling of offenders had seen no change at all. An astounding majority maintained that the police needed to do more in terms of respecting the rights of all persons (85 per cent) and in terms of following the provisions of the law (79 per cent).

Finally, to increase human rights compliance within the police organisation and ensure lawful behaviour of the officers, the Plan proposed to develop and implement accountability mechanisms. An Internal Investigating Unit (IIU) whose objective would be to "detect, deter, prevent and eradicate corruption, misconduct, mismanagement, and abuse of power and other abuses in the Maldives Police Service"<sup>32</sup> was to be set up. The IIU appears to have been set up in most of the islands covered under the survey. About 86 per cent of the police respondents confirmed the existence of the IIU in their jurisdictions. Complaints against police also increased following the establishment of the IIU, as claimed by 56 per cent of the respondents. But whether this resulted in greater adherence to the law or acted as a deterrent to other officers remains uncertain.

A majority of the respondents (40 per cent) were unaware of the outcome of complaints registered with the IIU. Only 19 per cent stated that the outcomes of investigations against police usually resulted in dismissal or removal from service. This is corroborated by the community survey where most of the respondents (41 per cent) confirmed that while the police did register their complaints against fellow officers, it did not consequently lead to any action. It is not surprising then that even though most respondents would go to a police station to register complaints of police misconduct, a large majority of the respondents (81 per cent) hold that an external independent body, such as the Police Integrity Commission, should also look into such complaints instead of the police department alone.

### **Commentary**

A major weakness of policing in the Maldives is the absence of substantive and procedural laws. The Maldives is still to pass a Penal Code, Procedure Code or Evidence Act. Although SOPs have been adopted, these suffer from several drawbacks. The police officers pointed out that most SOPs were drafted in 2008, but following the adoption of the Constitution and passing of a Police Act in late 2008, most of these remain to be amended. The police claimed that the SOPs were dispatched to all islands but according to an assessment carried out by the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) in Meemu, H. Alif, H .Dhal and Laam atolls, not a single copy of the SOPs was available in any of these stations or regional commands. Moreover, it was also noted that mostly top ranking officers had a good working knowledge about fundamental rights but this did not extend to frontline officers.

<sup>32</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011, p. 83.

### **Police Integrity Commission**

The Police Integrity Commission is an independent oversight body established under Section 18 of the Police Act, 2008 to ensure accountability in the Maldives Police Service. Composed of five members, the Commission is mandated to investigate unlawful activities by the police and take action as mentioned in the law. It was first established in September 2006 under former President Gayoom, but was generally considered toothless and inactive. Section 19 of the Police Act, 2008 mandates the Commission to fulfil the following functions:

- To promote respect for law by police officers
- To investigate unlawful activities by the police independently and take actions as mentioned in the law
- To provide the necessary legal protection to police officers to perform their duty
- To enhance public trust and confidence in relation to the police service.

A lack of awareness of these SOPs impacted heavily on police investigations. Since most of the officers were uncertain about the procedures to be followed, investigations remained weak, inefficient and ad hoc. Arbitrary arrests and detention continued to plague policing, as did custodial torture. The Police Integrity Commission is of the view that the change of government had not brought about any substantial reduction in arbitrary arrests and detentions or systemic torture. The only visible change was the absence of political prisoners which were a dominant feature of the Gayoom regime.

An important transformation in the Maldivian criminal justice system since the introduction of the Plan/onset of democracy was the shift from a confession-based system of justice to an evidence-based one. Officers accustomed to the old system perhaps found it difficult to adapt to the new one. The police's lack of a clear understanding of the new procedures and their roles was a major reason for much of the public distrust and the police's own dissatisfaction. To address this problem, the PIC is in the process of developing minimum standards for police stations. These aim to lay down basic facilities that should be available at the police stations and are likely to be ready by the end of the year.

The ultimate goal of the MPS is to become a democratic police organisation. For this to happen, there is the important issue of accountability. To strengthen police accountability, the general view was that the establishment of an IIU was a positive step but it requires further strengthening. The fact that internal investigations took too long to complete or did not result in any action against the police further tainted the image of the service. Most community respondents strongly felt that an external independent body to examine complaints against the police would reduce the trust deficit and enhance accountability.

Since the establishment of the PIC and the appointment of its current members in mid-2009, the Commission has actively monitored police performance, internal disciplinary procedures, taken up complaints against officers and conducted inspections of police stations among other things. However, the Commission is struggling with shortage of resources. The President of the

Commission, Shahinda Ismail, explained that the PIC was not provided a proper work environment. The budget allotted to the PIC in July 2009 was withdrawn in early September on the grounds that “the funds were not utilised by the end of August.” The Commission then had to make several requests to the Finance Ministry for sanctioning funds all over again. This is unfortunate, as ensuring the PIC’s proper functioning will not only help in cementing trust in the police but also to identify crime patterns and institutional weaknesses.

## Assessment of the Plan

This section pertains to the strengths and weaknesses of strategic planning within the MPS. Almost 86 per cent of the respondents stated that a Strategic Plan is important for an agency like the MPS. The police respondents were asked to identify three main strengths and weaknesses of the Plan in open-ended questions. The predominant view was that a Plan helps the police to tackle crime, train officers in intelligence-led policing, and work towards community safety, reflecting the priority of crime reduction by the police. On the other hand, the most common weaknesses identified in the Plan include lack of accountability mechanisms for implementation of goals and projects, lack of emphasis on the necessity of a police service beyond Malé, and lack of consistency and uniformity in the benefits available across various ranks.

The Strategic Plan included a **Monitoring and Evaluation Project** to identify key indicators for evaluation and appropriate methods of analyses for the projects.<sup>33</sup> Our survey result shows that about 57 per cent of the respondents confirmed the existence of a performance evaluation framework, whereas 15 per cent said it had not been created and 20 per cent were not aware of it. In terms of the frequency of reviewing the Plan, 29 per cent of all respondents stated that the MPS was reviewed periodically against their goals, 22 per cent stated they were not aware how often this was done, whereas another 20 per cent stated that this was only done once a year. This suggests either a lack of uniformity in the evaluation process followed by the MPS or that the evaluation process is not inclusive of all ranks and lends credence to the weaknesses identified by the respondents.

In terms of the impact of the Strategic Plan on policing in general, the survey sought to determine the police respondents’ opinions on the level of improvement noticed in their functioning. While 49 per cent of the respondents believed that the Plan had achieved its objective of “policing in accordance with law”, 43 per cent observed that it had significantly improved the police’s “understanding of community needs”. Almost 39 per cent stated that the Strategic Plan had made a significant impact on “increasing transparency and accountability within the MPS” whereas 34 per cent maintained that it helped in “building safer communities”. The islands where the perceptions were most negative include Sh. Funadhoo, Nilandhoo and Manadhoo. In Funadhoo, most of the respondents said that no significant impact could be seen in building safer communities and increasing transparency and accountability within the MPS.

There is also some sense, although not predominant, that the positive impact of the Strategic Plan is confined to senior officials. Police respondents were asked what ranks received the maximum benefits from the implementation of the Plan. While 20 per cent responded that it was confined

<sup>33</sup> MPS Strategic Plan, 2007-2011, p. 76.

to high-ranking officials, the majority (33 per cent) stated that the benefits were shared equally between high-ranking and low-ranking police officials, government officials and the general public.

Finally, in terms of the success of the Plan, only 20 per cent considered it to be highly successful whereas around 25 per cent thought it was moderately successful and 10 per cent of the respondents (both police and community) were of the view that it had failed and was merely a policy document.

### **Commentary**

Arguably the major weakness of the Plan was the lack of emphasis on evaluation, an integral feature of strategic policing plans across the world. No mechanisms or procedures were specified for project evaluation. The Plan only mentioned that a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the Project Catalogue was to be developed before 31 March 2008. There was no information on the existence of such a framework. The MPS though did produce a review report in 2009, titled “Way Forward” that sought to evaluate the progress of the Strategic Plan. But this document reads more like a vision statement than a review. It was, however, pointed out that with the new Strategic Plan, 2011-2013, the MPS is following a system of publishing quarterly review reports. The new Plan does lay down a quarterly review process but no details are given in terms of who is responsible for submitting the reports and the criteria of the reviews. In the absence of a meeting with the police, we were unable to verify the frequency of such reports.

The implementation of the Strategic Plan, 2007-2011 by the Maldives police was partial at best. Of the 52 projects enlisted in the Plan, only around 12 were implemented, of which the most notable ones include forensics, investigation enhancement and crime management. But these too were implemented in a half-hearted manner. For instance, Standard Operating Procedures seem to have been developed (although not publicly available) on arrest, detention and other police powers. However, the level of awareness on these SOPs varied considerably. The general sense is that knowledge of these is limited to senior officers and within the larger atolls, whereas most frontline officers in distant atolls have little awareness. Moreover, considerably more training is required in the use of these SOPs.

Mismanagement of available resources, continued political control over the police and lack of a legal framework governing police powers are some of the factors that have further affected the implementation of the Plan. The planning process itself requires improvement. Hardly any public consultations were held while drafting the first Strategic Plan, resulting in a wide gap between people's perceptions and police priorities. Coupled with this, the fact that evaluation of the Plan was not carried out regularly and/or systematically means that such gaps continue to exist.

The greatest challenge came with the change of government in 2008. A Police Act was enacted in August 2008, a new Constitution was ratified in October 2008 and finally, a new government headed by President Nasheed was formed in November 2008, ending President Gayoom's 30-year rule. Consequently, some of the rules and procedures developed earlier were not in sync with the Police Act. For instance, under the Plan, the police were mandated to develop and implement a system for managing private security agencies that included “the registration of licensed security companies, develop training programmes for security companies and agents,

and providing training to raise the professional standards of select operators within the security industry". Under the Police Act though, the function of private security is not covered. As a result, the project could not be implemented. Thereafter, the Maldives police practically discarded the first Plan and announced the adoption of a new Strategic Plan, 2011-2013 by end of 2010.

The Strategic Plan, to say the least, was ambitious. An entire new system of policing was envisaged, but the foundational blocks to build this were not given adequate importance. To be fair on the police, it was not realistic for the MPS to change overnight to a radically altered mission and purpose. Eventually though, they will be expected to attain the goal of reform. Transforming to a democratic police organisation is not an easy task. Such a dramatic shift in police ideology demands that change takes place at several levels. People's perception of the police, according to our survey, is not encouraging, but at the same time, it is not deeply negative. A community-oriented approach is the right one. The MPS seriously needs to review the manner in which this is understood by every officer and the manner in which it is implemented at the ground level. The Plan's success will be largely dependent on these factors.

## **VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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The implementation of the Strategic Plan 2007-2011 by the Maldives police has been partial. As this is the Maldives police's first strategic plan, it sought to lay down the foundation of a strong, democratic and professional police institution capable of responding effectively to community needs. Five years since, the result is disappointing. Of the 54 projects enlisted in the 2007 Plan, only about 12 were implemented, of which the most notable ones include forensics, investigation enhancement and crime management. The service made significant strides in overcoming the trust deficit in the community – the predominant feeling in the streets of Malé today is that the police are far better than earlier. The police is more accessible to the public and is willing to share information with it. The Human Rights Commission, for instance, stated that it was quite pleased with the cooperation extended by the Police Commissioner to the Commission.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, new centres and procedures were developed to professionalise policing. The Forensic Unit is a case in point. Traffic enforcement has also seen improvements.

However, systemic reforms remain far less satisfactory. For instance, the practice of holding consultations, both within the police organisation and with the community at large, forms the bedrock of any responsive, transparent service. But consultations were either weak or non-existent. Consequently, there appeared to be a distinct disconnect between the community's expectations and police priorities, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter. Perhaps this disconnect can be conceded to some extent in the first Strategic Plan as teething problems. But even in its second Strategic Plan 2011-2013 this disconnect was evident during discussions, and it is a worrying sign. This goes to show that despite striving towards the vision of a community-oriented police service, the tendency is still to act as a "force" imposed on the people. Public consultations remain few and far between and require a coherent policy.

Further, the fact that the plans are drafted by the MPS alone, and any evaluation therefore will be conducted by the police itself, does not inspire much confidence. Since the objective of the Plan is to make policing more responsive to community needs and aspirations, it follows that the entire drafting, implementation and evaluation processes should be carried out in conjunction with community leaders and representatives.

### **Recommendations**

Strategic policing plans are important to strengthen democratic oversight and management of the Maldives police. Democracy in the Maldives is in its fledgling stage; most institutions, such as parliament, judiciary, the media, security and law enforcement agencies as well as civil society are grappling with their reformed roles under a multiparty democracy. There are also several competing demands before these institutions without the resources to always meet them. The foundations laid at this stage will form the bedrock of the country's future. To this end, the following set of recommendations aim to contribute to the process of strengthening democratic governance within the Maldives police.

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with Ms Jehan and Mr Ahmed, Members, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, 6 September 2011.

## To the Government of Maldives

1. **Engage on the need for establishing an Independent Governing Body for the Maldives police:** Arguably the largest problem with policing in the region is the lack of democratic functioning. Police priorities are often defined by, and changed according to, the will of the political executive. Concern over this was repeatedly raised in discussions during the workshop and meetings held in Malé. Till policing is insulated from undue political and executive interference, it is likely that the police will be used to protect the interests of the government (party in power). This will deeply affect the democratic culture and performance of the police and lead to the erosion of the rule of law. While governments must exercise oversight over the police, it is important that day-to-day functioning remains objective and independent of partisan interests. To address this problem, other jurisdictions have established independent public bodies, such as the Police Integrity Commission in the Maldives that oversee and guide police governance and management. The benefits of such an independent governing body are manifold and have been explained earlier in this report. It is strongly advised that a dialogue begins on the problem of political interference over policing and the various models and means to address the issue.
2. **Amend the Police Act 2008 to make strategic planning a statutory obligation:** A significant omission in the Maldives Police Act is the requirement of strategic and annual policing plans. This impedes the development of good policing and signals an unfortunate ambiguity of commitment to improving the service in a significant way. We recommend an amendment to the Police Act that addresses the requirement to prepare policing plans as well as to ensure that these plans are placed before Parliament for debate and discussion and made readily accessible to the public.

## To the Maldives Police

3. **Regularly conduct Needs-Assessment Surveys:** To address policing needs and the community effectively, it is imperative that the police constantly review crime patterns and social concerns across the various atolls and allocate resources accordingly. A thorough needs-assessment should include: a baseline study of the state of policing; focus on the public's perception of the police; victimisation issues; the human rights situation; the level of corruption; the needs and demands of communities; and on social and administrative structures. The survey should cover representative samples of police staff and of society, across a range of communities, including ethnic and other communities.
4. **Greater engagement with civil society:** To bridge the trust deficit between the police and the public it is crucial for them to reach out to the public. Police planning needs to take into account public expectations of the police. There are several benefits of community involvement in policing for both building public trust and increasing police capabilities to fight crime. Strategic planning should take into consideration this requirement. Finalisation of strategic and annual plans must not take place, till the people are consulted. Consultation however needs to be more regular rather than merely while drawing up the Plan or compiling an annual one. Frequent and periodic consultation at the lowest levels can help identify the

existing and emerging policing needs of an area. These can then be taken into consideration by the officer-in-charge of the police station while preparing the annual Policing Strategy and Action Plan for the jurisdiction before submitting the Plan to the police chief.

5. **Engage with the local administration in promoting awareness about police strategies:** Another way in which the police can reach out to the people is through a tie up with the new decentralised system of administration in the Maldives. In lieu of Chapter 8 of the Maldivian Constitution and subsequently the Decentralisation Act of 2010, local councils have been set up for general administration in the islands and atolls. Unlike earlier, when atoll chiefs were appointed by the central government, elections were held for the first time in early 2011 to elect council members. The police can enter into an arrangement to hold consultations on community needs and concerns through these local councils.
6. **Enhance transparency in the Maldives Police's functioning:** Several stakeholders raised concern over a lack of knowledge over the police functioning. Both Strategic Plans are unavailable on the police website. In fact, in our workshop, there were strong disagreements between the participants and the police over the priority concerns listed in the new Strategic Plan. Till then, this was not shared even with the key stakeholders in the Maldives. Unless the police share the findings of community perception surveys that they claim to conduct, suspicion and fear of the police is likely to linger. It is therefore urged that the police shares their reports and survey findings on their website.
7. **Increase Awareness within the Maldives Police Service:** Another strong concern voiced during the discussions was the lack of awareness and understanding among the frontline officers about the priorities and standards laid down in the Plan. The frontline officers are the first point of contact for the people, and unless their knowledge of crime trends and social concerns within their jurisdiction is tapped into, the policing priorities will suffer from lack of ownership within the organisation. It must be the duty of the police station heads to communicate standards and guidelines to ensure every officer under them is fully aware.
8. **Greater emphasis on behavioural and attitudinal reform in the training imparted to police officers:** Inadequate training of police officers was cited as one of the main concerns by the civil society participants in our workshop, particularly while dealing with victims of crimes. Alongside increasing awareness about the strategies and laws governing police action, it is equally important to reform inter-personal communication skills, stress management and personal attitudes and prejudices. Such training is an important measure to enhance positive attitudes and healthy behaviour, which in turn will help improve police professionalism.
9. **Improve the mechanism for evaluation and performance monitoring:** The Strategic Plan suffered from a lack of periodic evaluations. A regular assessment of the progress of projects and an evaluation of their outcomes and impact are essential for the success of any plan.

The second Strategic Plan 2011-2013 lays down a quarterly evaluation cycle which includes a midyear conference, a staff survey and an end of year conference to review the implementation of strategic projects. The details of these must be made publicly available. This will help people to better understand the working of the police and eventually help build trust in the institution. Public surveys can also be a useful tool to evaluate police performance and achievement of Plan objectives, and these surveys must be included in the

evaluations. To avoid any perceptions of biased assessments or conflicts of interests, and to raise the credibility of evaluations, self-evaluations by the police could be complemented by independent external evaluations.

10. **Engage more closely with the Police Integrity Commission while determining policing priorities:** As an independent oversight body mandated to promote respect for law within the police officers and enhance public trust and confidence in relation to police service, the PIC's role is crucial while determining policing priorities. The fact that it investigates complaints against police officers enables it to understand the shortcomings of the police and the gap that exists between police behaviour and people's expectations. Its inputs and suggestions will help the police overcome this gap. In our discussions, the tension between the PIC and the police was apparent to the extent that the new Strategic Plan 2011-2013 was not even shared with the PIC. In fact, the police are involved in drafting a new bill for the PIC which was only shared with the PIC at their request. A widening gap between the two institutions will deeply affect police accountability. Effort must be made by the police to cooperate with the PIC and work together to develop into a professional service.



## To Civil Society

11. **Work with the Maldives police to encourage community participation in strategic planning:** To ensure the success of the strategic planning initiatives, CSOs and other stakeholders need to engage with the initiative, help build and mould it as well as be continuously involved in its monitoring and evaluation.
12. **Monitor closely the working of the MPS:** Public pressure by various interest groups play an important role in ensuring the delivery of public services. It is important for CSOs to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Strategic Plans for the police.


**Annexure 1****POLICE SURVEY: QUESTIONNAIRES AND FINDINGS****Section A: General Questions on the MPS Strategic Plan****1. Are you aware of the Maldives Police Strategic Plan?**

Yes: 92 per cent

No: 8 per cent

**2. What is the extent of your knowledge of the MPS Strategic Plan 2007-2011?****3. How did you learn about the Plan?**

**4. What ranks of officer(s) were consulted during the formulation of the Plan?**



**5. Community participation is an essential component of policing:**

- Yes: 92 per cent
- No: 4 per cent
- May be: 4 per cent

**6. In this regard, do you agree that the community:**

	Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Occasionally (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Is forthcoming in approaching the police	30	8	62	0
Quickly reports incidences	32	16	52	0
Makes proper use of the police emergency line 119	34	8	56	2

## Section B:

### MPS Strategic Plan: Measures Taken to Build Capacity

- 1. Did you receive/impart any training to familiarise staff with the contents of the following documents?**

	Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Operations Manual	43	43	14
Customer Service Charter	42	42	16
Code of Conduct	57	29	14
Statement of Values	52	34	14

- 2. What kind of training did you receive or impart in relation to the Operations Manual? (please specify)**

Though a majority of our respondents did not answer this question, the most common responses were

- Training in operations
- Through a brief workshop (a few days to a few weeks) and a diploma course
- Training on preparing action plans and briefings.

- 3. List two aspects that you agree with the most in the following documents: (most common answers)**

- Customer Service Charter
  - i) Building better relations with the public
  - ii) Sharing accurate information
- Code of Conduct
  - i) Obey orders/follow the rules
  - ii) Protect privileged information
- Statement of Values
  - i) Honesty, responsibility and integrity
  - ii) Police as role models for the community.

**4. To increase confidence and trust in the police, how frequently have you conducted the following?**

	Weekly (per cent)	Every Fortnight (per cent)	Monthly (per cent)	Quarterly (per cent)	Annually or more (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Awareness programmes	5	8	23	16	48	-
Police Open Days	1	5	3	6	52	33
Survey on community needs	1	1	8	14	54	22
Engagement with the youth	3	10	15	24	39	9
Counselling activities	5	6	8	19	34	28

**5. What steps have been taken to implement the Standard Operating Procedure on the following:**

- I. Victims of Crime:
  - Provide immediate healthcare to all victims
  - Quick investigations.
- II. Crime Prevention:
  - Holding regular awareness programmes
  - Increased patrol
  - Set up crime prevention committees.
- III. Juvenile Justice:
  - Special training given to investigating officers
  - Work closely with the gender departments of the islands
  - Sensitivity training in dealing with such cases.
- IV. Emergency Response:
  - Follow the Operations Manual closely
  - Inform the Command Centre of all emergencies as soon as possible
  - Have adequately equipped emergency response teams in place.
- V. Anti-Drug Strategy:
  - Locating and gathering intelligence on supply lines
  - Holding regular awareness programmes for the public
  - Rehabilitation and counselling for addicts.
- VI. Crime Scene Management:
  - Secure crime scenes as soon as possible
  - Take pictures and gather evidence at the scene immediately
  - Increased training and manpower.

**VII. Investigations:**

- Expediting the entire investigative process
- Following set procedures on investigation
- Training and refresher courses for investigating officers

**6. Have any guidelines on detention and custodial treatment been formulated?**

Yes: 87 per cent

No: 13 per cent

**7. To what extent are these guidelines followed?**

The most common answer we received was that guidelines were being followed “as far as possible” with the available resources. The second most common response was that these guidelines were being followed very well.

Nilandhoo had the largest gap here, with most respondents stating that these were not followed on the islands.

**8. To your knowledge, have new guidelines on arrest been formulated?**

- Yes: 37 per cent
- No: 58 per cent
- Did not answer: 5 per cent

**8.1. If yes, what is the most important focus of these new guidelines?**

The most common responses were:

- To protect the rights of those arrested as provided under the Constitution
- To provide the grounds for arrest to the person as soon as possible
- To ensure the safety of an arrested person.

**9. After the implementation of the MPS Strategic Plan 2007-2011, what has been its effect on the following?**

	Improved (per cent)	No change (per cent)	Deteriorated (per cent)	Don't know/ can't say (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Recruitment	23	24	20	28	5
Promotions	29	24	19	22	6
Postings	33	29	13	19	6
Remuneration	38	28	14	15	5
Welfare	24	23	24	24	5
Performance Appraisal	42	24	9	20	5
Grievance Handling	49	23	9	13	6

- \* More respondents stated that recruitment processes had deteriorated rather than improved in Villingili, Hoarafushi, Kulhudhufushi, Dhvaafaru and Nilandhoo islands. This was also echoed by constables throughout the distribution.
- \* None of the respondents from Villingili believed that postings had improved since the implementation of the SAP. This was also observed in Nilandhoo and Manadho. More corporals stated that conditions remained the same or deteriorated, than those who said that they had improved.
- \* The perception of welfare amongst respondents was poor in Villingi, Hoarafushi, Nilandhoo, Manadho and Funadhoo islands with more respondents stating that welfare had actually deteriorated or remained the same. More constables and corporals agreed that welfare had deteriorated or remained the same than those who said they had improved.
- \* The perception of the MPS's ability to handle grievances was perceived negatively in Villingili, Kulhudhufushi and Funadhoo islands with more respondents stating that this had deteriorated or remained the same rather than improved. Nilandhoo island was the most negative with all respondents stating conditions had worsened.

**10. Has an internal mechanism/unit to deal with police misconduct or misbehaviour been set up in your jurisdiction?**

Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Don't Know (per cent)	Did not Answer (per cent)
86	5	5	4

I. If yes, has there been an increase in the number of complaints received since the mechanism/unit was put into place?

Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Don't Know (per cent)	Did not Answer (per cent)
56	10	24	10

II. Has the increase been due to:

- Setting up of internal investigations mechanism/unit: 25 per cent
- Increase in criminal behaviour within the police: 9 per cent
- Both: 16 per cent
- Other (please specify): 6 per cent
- Did not answer: 44 per cent

**11. What has the outcome of the inquiries conducted against policeman generally been?**

- Complaint found to be false: 13 per cent
- Minor punishment: 6 per cent
- Demotion/reduction in rank: 5 per cent
- Suspension (permanent/temporary): 4 per cent

- Dismissal/removal from service: 19 per cent
- Criminal prosecution: 1 per cent
- Don't know: 40 per cent
- Did not answer: 12 per cent

**12. While determining the deployment of your officers, what is most important to you? (Please assign ranks from 1-5, with 5 being least important).**

	Ranks in per cent (in descending order with 5 being least important)				
	1	2	3	4	5
Predetermined roster	20	9	11	18	29
Spread and density of crime	13	13	19	14	15
Density of population	27	14	15	10	22
Experienced officer/suitability to particular area	22	28	14	13	11

**13. Has a framework been developed for performance evaluation?**

Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Don't Know (per cent)	Did not Answer (per cent)
57	15	20	8

**14. How often is the MPS evaluated against its goals?**


- Periodically: 29 per cent
- Annually: 20 per cent
- Whenever needed: 16 per cent
- Not aware: 22 per cent
- Never: 5 per cent
- Did not answer: 8 per cent

**15. Have your conditions of service improved since the plan was implemented?**

- Marginally: 35 per cent
- Significantly: 32 per cent
- Same as before/No change: 25 per cent
- Did not answer: 8 per cent

## Section C: Response to Crime

**1. In the last five years, crime in your areas has:**



**2. What are the major concerns affecting your area? (Please assign ranks from 1-7, 7 being least important).**

	Ranks						
	1 (per cent)	2 (per cent)	3 (per cent)	4 (per cent)	5 (per cent)	6 (per cent)	7 (per cent)
Drug-related crimes (71) <sup>36</sup>	49	5	4	0	4	6	22
Anti-social gatherings (69)	23	4	6	4	9	14	28
Gangs (69)	25	8	16	8	4	13	13
Prostitution/sexual crimes (69)	14	13	9	14	14	8	15
Robbery/chain snatching (70)	34	13	9	9	8	9	8
Rampant corruption (77)	24	5	15	15	19	5	14
Juvenile crimes (69)	25	11	15	11	5	10	9

G.A Villingili: Nearly 37 per cent of all respondents stated that drug-related crimes were their top concern. This was followed by 25 per cent of respondents who listed gang-violence as their top concern.

Hoarafushi: About 47 per cent stated that drug-related crimes were their major concern. The second was gang violence.

Kulhudhufushi: Nearly 80 per cent of all respondents stated that drug-related crimes were their biggest concern. Next came robberies and anti-social gatherings.

Dhuvaafaru: Almost 61 per cent of all respondents stated that robber/chain snatching was their major concern. This was followed closely by drug-related crimes and juvenile crimes.

<sup>36</sup> The numbers indicate the total respondents to this question.

Nilandhoo: Almost 60 per cent of all respondents mentioned robber/chain snatching as their major concern. This was followed by drug-related crimes, corruption and juvenile crimes.

Manadhoo: About 66 per cent of all respondents gave drug-related crimes as their largest problem. The next concern was gang violence.

Muli: Almost 67 per cent of all respondents stated that drug-related crimes were their major concern.

Sh. Funadhoo: About 38 per cent of all respondents stated that juvenile crimes were the major concern in their area. Drug-related crimes and anti-social gatherings were other important concerns here.

### **3. What special measures have been taken to deal with offenders of the following classes:**

#### **I. Drug-related offences:**

The majority of all the respondents pointed out that there were different operations across the islands to deal with drug-related crimes. One of the special measures taken is to spread awareness about drug abuse in the Maldives. Investigations are another special measure, as several arrests often result in no convictions, usually on unreliable evidence, or lack of witnesses to substantiate charges. Most of the respondents also stated that the entire drug-trafficking network is being watched more closely to see how drugs enter society.

#### **II. Anti-social gatherings:**

Most of the respondents stated that the first step is always to advise the crowd before dispersing them. Other common measures include identifying the leaders of the gatherings and advising them. Thirdly, greater patrolling is carried out to avoid large numbers of people converging at any place. Awareness programmes and rapid investigations in these matters were also cited.

#### **III. Criminal gang warfare**

A majority of the respondents mentioned that awareness programmes were conducted in an effort to curb gang warfare. Another major component was to break up street fights. Wherever violence was the end result, most of the respondents agreed that the gang members should be arrested and their cases forwarded to the prosecutor general's office as per the law.

#### **IV. Robbery**

With regards to robbery, a large number of respondents stressed the need for increased patrolling on the islands. One of the measures taken is to arrest and punish those suspected of robberies through enhanced police processes, particularly better collection of evidence and witnesses. To make people more aware of how to protect themselves in the absence of the police is another special measure being employed.

#### **V. Juvenile crimes**

Rehabilitation of juvenile offenders was the most important measure, according to most of the respondents. Awareness programmes were also stressed on as a measure to control juvenile crimes. Discussions were held with parents to decide on the best

course of action according to a fair number of respondents. Most cases deal through the FCPU, however, this system is inadequate to handle repeat offenders according to the respondents.

#### VI. Corruption

The majority of the respondents stated that the most important component to battle corruption was proactive sharing of information with the community. Harsh penalties were to be introduced as a special measure, along with close observation of suspected corrupt activities.

#### VII. Sex worker/Child-sexual abuse

A large number of respondents stated that awareness was the most important measure taken to reduce these crimes. Raids were also being conducted to flush out this criminal activity wherever appropriate. Close inter-departmental coordination was required between the police, FCPU and Gender Department. The last important measure was to make parents more responsible to prevent the abuse of children in particular.

#### **4. Is there a separate distribution within the MPS between watch and ward, and investigations?**

- Yes: 61 per cent
- No: 3 per cent
- Did not answer: 16 per cent

#### **5. Do Investigating Officers (IOs) receive specialised training?**

- Yes: 91 per cent
- No: 4 per cent
- Did not answer: 5 per cent

#### **6. What does training of Investigating Officers comprise of?**

The most common responses in order of occurrence were:

- Laws and regulations guiding investigations
- Increased training in investigative skills
- Increased training on the manner in which to deal with minors, senior citizens and immigrants
- Human rights sensitisation.

#### **7. Your officers are generally able to respond to an emergency call within?**

- <5 minutes: 75 per cent
- <10 minutes: 11 per cent
- <20 minutes: 0
- <40 minutes: 1 per cent
- Did not answer: 13 per cent

## Section D: Impact and Lessons Learnt

**1. What according to you are the three major strengths of the Strategic Plan?**

The most common responses included:

- It details ways to tackle crime
- Provides opportunities to train police in an intelligence-led model
- It stresses on community safety and community interactions.

Other responses included equal policing for all, reducing the drug problem in the Maldives, and some responses even included the statement of values and the code of conduct.

**2. According to you, what are the three main weaknesses of the Plan?**

The most common response included:

- No accountability attached to implementation
- More attention needs to be focused on the requirement of police presence outside Malé
- Benefits of the Plan are not available across the board for all police officer.

Other responses included more emphasis required on cyber crimes and improving the investigations of the MPS.

**3. To what extent has the Plan affected the performance of the police in the following:**

	Significant (per cent)	To a certain extent (per cent)	Marginally (per cent)	Not at all (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Understanding the needs of the community	43	27	11	10	9
Providing professional services	37	33	8	13	9
Policing in accordance with law	49	25	6	10	10
Building safer communities	34	28	13	16	9
Increasing transparency and accountability within the MPS	39	24	10	16	11

**4. What cross-section do you feel received the maximum benefit with the implementation of the plan?**

- High ranking police officials: 20 per cent
- Lower ranking police officers: 1 per cent

- Government officials: 1 per cent
- The general public: 27 per cent
- All of the above: 33 per cent
- None of the above: 5 per cent
- Did not answer: 13 per cent

**5. What challenges does your police station face?**

The most common challenges to be listed in order of occurrence were:

- Increasing politicisation within the police
- Lack of adequate manpower and resources
- Lack of a merit-based system for selection of senior officers
- Low rate of convictions in the criminal justice system means more work for the police.

**6. Based on your knowledge, please state your opinion on the success/failure of the Plan of 2007-2011**

- Highly successful in meeting its objectives: 20 per cent
- Moderately successful in achieving its objectives: 25 per cent
- Has failed to meet most of its objectives: 10 per cent
- Was merely a policy document: 10 per cent
- No opinion/don't know: 22 per cent
- Did not answer: 13 per cent

**7. In your opinion, is a Strategic Plan important for an agency such as the MPS?**

- Yes : 86 per cent
- No: 4 per cent
- Did not answer: 10 per cent

**8. As a member of the MPS, do you think that the public appreciates the work of the MPS?**

- Yes: 62 per cent
- No: 29 per cent
- Did not answer: 9 per cent

**9. The MPS gives a lot of importance to victim protection.**

- Yes: 78 per cent
- No: 10 per cent
- Did not answer: 12 per cent

**10. How many years was the Strategic Plan for?**

The majority of respondents gave the correct answer of five years; however a small minority thought this plan covered a three to four year period.

11. As a member of the MPS, do you believe that you are provided with adequate training and equipment to carry out your work successfully?

- Yes: 13 per cent
- No: 84 per cent
- Did not answer: 3 per cent

## Section E: Background Information

Name (optional)

Island/Atoll

Age

Rank

Year of Appointment

Police station

Year of Joining



Ethnicity

## Annexure 2

**COMMUNITY SURVEY FINDINGS<sup>37</sup>****1. Have you had any interaction with the police in the last five years?**


- Yes: 52 per cent  
 No: 48 per cent

If yes, for what reason:


**1.1. In your interaction with the police, how did you find their attitude?**

<sup>37</sup> The total number of respondents of the community survey was 85. Unlike the police survey, respondents answered every question, and thus this section does not indicate the total number of respondents for each question separately.


**1.2. You would go to the police station:**



**1.3. You might feel reluctant to go to the police station because you are:**



**2. In the last five years, do you think the police**




**3. From what you know of the police, do you think they should be doing more, less or same of the following:**

	More (per cent)	Less (per cent)	The same (per cent)	Can't say (per cent)	Did not Answer (per cent)
Protect and respect the rights of all citizens	85	1	5	6	3
Engage with the community	73	5	7	10	5
Follow the law	79	2	6	8	5
Be more transparent and accountable	80	-	5	10	5

**4. Do you know the police officer in charge of the local police station?**

- Yes: 48 per cent
- No: 52 per cent

**5. How often do you see your local policeman on patrol?**




**6. How actively do the police conduct the following:**

	Weekly (per cent)	Every Fortnight (per cent)	Monthly (per cent)	Quarterly (per cent)	Annually or more (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Awareness programmes	6	-	8	1	59	26
Police open days	2	-	1	-	52	45
Engagement with the youth	7	1	5	1	46	40
Counselling activities	3	1	5	1	49	40


**6.1. How useful did you find these programmes?**

	Very useful (per cent)	Somewhat useful (per cent)	Not at all useful (per cent)	Can't say (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Awareness programmes	84	2	--	5	9
Police open days	82	7	--	1	9
Engagement with the youth	2	7	69	11	11
Counselling activities	75	4	1	11	9

- 7. Did you participate in the Community Perception survey conducted by the MPS?**
  - Yes: 7 per cent
  - No: 47 per cent
  - I was not aware this survey had been conducted: 38 per cent
  - There was no survey: 8 per cent
  
- 8. Did you participate in the Victimisation survey conducted by the MPS?**
  - Yes: 4 per cent
  - No: 48 per cent
  - I was not aware this survey had been conducted: 42 per cent
  - There was no survey: 6 per cent
  
- 9. Are you aware of any Crime Prevention Committee in your area?**
  - Yes: 47 per cent
  - No: 53 per cent
  
- 10. How often does the CPC conduct meetings in your area?**



**11. In your opinion, the CPCs are doing:**



**12. From what you know of the CPC, do you think they can be doing more, less or about the same of the following:**

	More (per cent)	Less (per cent)	The same (adequate) (per cent)	Can't say (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
Provide assistance to victims of crime	78	-	2	8	12
Receive complaints against the police	72	1	2	15	9
Counselling activities	72	-	2	12	14

**13. Is there a Family and Child Protection Unit in your area?**

- Yes: 50 per cent
- No: 50 per cent

## Section B: Police Powers and Response to Crime

**1. Have you ever used the Emergency Line 119?**


Yes: 20 per cent

No: 80 per cent


**2. In case of an emergency call, you find that the police usually respond within**

- < 5 minutes: 17 per cent
- < 10 minutes: 13 per cent
- < 20 minutes: 19 per cent
- < 40 minutes: 12 per cent
- Over one hour: 39 per cent

**3. In your opinion, the police in your area use:**



**4. In the past five years, do you think the police have improved the performance of the following:**



**5. In case of an arrest, do you think the police perform the following duties:**

		Satisfactorily (per cent)	Somewhat satisfactorily (per cent)	Not at all satisfactorily (per cent)	Did not answer (per cent)
1	Informing the grounds of arrest in writing within 24 hours	45	26	14	15
2	Informing family/friend about an arrest	28	35	20	16
3	Facilitating access to legal counsel	25	33	25	18
4	Respecting the detainee's right against self-incrimination/right to silence	32	25	22	21
5	Producing the detainee before a judge within 24 hours	40	22	18	20
7	Ensuring the detainee's physical and mental safety	27	31	22	20


**6. Have you ever tried to file a complaint against the police?**

- Yes: 4 per cent
- No: 96 per cent


**7. From your experience, do you think the police register complaints easily?**

- Yes: 11 per cent
- No: 14 per cent
- No experience: 75 per cent


8. Name three problems you most commonly encounter while registering complaints.
  - The police did not know what to do when approached to file a complaint
  - Difficulty in identifying who to approach when making a complaint
  - The police were indifferent in their response.
9. Are you aware of any mechanism/body in your area where you can go to file a complaint against the police?




#### 9.1. How did you make the complaint?




#### 9.2. How was your complaint handled?




**9.3. In your opinion, complaints against police officers should only be investigated by:**




**10. With respect to detainees, do you think the police is:**



**11. What is your opinion on the quality of investigations of the MPS?**



**12. Do you think the police conduct investigations:**




**13. Name three most common problems in your experience with police investigations.**

- The MPS was careless and slow with their investigations
- The MPS worked under the will of their political masters
- Many stated that their methods of investigation are flawed, and they are unable to produce witnesses or keep evidence to hold suspects

### **Section C: General Perceptions on Law and Order**

**1. In the past five years, do you think that the crime in your area has:**



**2. What are three main law and order/security concerns in your area?**

- The release of criminals back into society after 24 hours of detention owing to a lack of evidence and witnesses to hold them
- The lack of awareness amongst the police of laws and regulations
- Political influence was cited as a major problem.

**3. Do you think the police is doing enough to deal with the following problems:**

	Yes (per cent)	No (per cent)	Can't say (per cent)
Drug-related incidents	31	56	13
Violence against women	29	48	23
Sexual abuse of children	41	43	16
Anti-social behaviour	26	48	25
Crimes against migrant workers	20	54	26

**4. In the following crimes, do you believe the police to be involved?**

	Actively Involved (per cent)	Passively Involved/ turning a blind eye (per cent)	Not involved (per cent)	Can't say (per cent)
Drug-related incidents	20	42	5	32
Sexual abuse of children	17	20	18	45
Crimes against migrant workers	10	21	13	56

**5. Name three ways in which you think the police can improve their services**

- Reduce shortages in manpower is suggested from almost all islands in the survey.
- The MPS should be more responsible in their functioning
- MPS investigations, protection of witnesses, respecting confidentiality should be improved
- Better interactions with the public, through awareness programmes and other targeted activities.
- Increased transparency and reduced political influence
- Respect equality before the law, and improve their knowledge on this issue.

**Annexure 3****LIST OF POLICE RESPONDENTS****Villingili Police Station**

<b>Rank &amp; Name</b>	<b>Service No:</b>	<b>Designation</b>
P. Corporal Ahmed Rasheed	1410	Station In charge
P. Corporal Shiruhan Ibrahim	1995	Custodial Officer
P. Corporal Mohamed Shameem	1327	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ismail Safeeq	2475	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ugail Ibrahim	3722	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Zaheedh Naseem	3922	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Akhthar Hassan	3478	Patrol Officer

**HA. Hoarafushi Police Station**

<b>Rank &amp; Name</b>	<b>Service No:</b>	<b>Designation</b>
P. Corporal Ibrahim Haleem	1629	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Ibrahim Rasheed	3179	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Ali Waheedh	3288	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Hussain Faisal	2047	Custodial Officer
P. Corporal Mohamed Waheed	3185	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Mohamed Shareef	4112	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Hussein Fayaz	3723	Custodial Officer

**R. Dhuvaafaru Police Station**

<b>Rank &amp; Name</b>	<b>Service No:</b>	<b>Designation</b>
P. Corporal Ahmed Adam	1683	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Ali Hassan	3137	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Anwar Ahmed	3664	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Asif Ahmed	3670	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Ahmed Hathim	3729	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Abdulla Riza	3813	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Mohamed Aslam	3954	Patrol Officer

**F. Nilandhoo Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. Sergeant Ahmed Rameez Moosa	1430	Station In charge
P. Corporal Ahmed Ismail	1659	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Ibrahim Imadh	1423	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Abdhulla Niyaz	3030	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ahmed Rafeeu	3158	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ismail Rafeeu	4166	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Ahmed Shaheen	3735	Custodial Officer

**HDH. Kulhudhufushi Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. S. Sergeant Aboobakuru Ali	1127	Station In charge
P. Corporal Ibrahim Abdhul Kareem	1711	Custodial Officer
P. Corporal Mohamed Ahmed	1945	Custodial Officer
P. Corporal Ali Mohamed	2297	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Hassan Fayaz	2304	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Mohamed Aboobakuru	3077	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Haidhar Mohamed	2830	Patrol Officer

**G. DH Thinadhoo Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. Sergeant Ali Rasheed	1298	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Hassan Zilal	3543	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Mohamed Nafees	1999	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Ahmed Bilal	2799	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ahmed Shifaz	2652	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Ibrahim Waheed	4251	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Hussain Saif	2455	Patrol Officer

**L. Gan Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. S. Sergeant Adnan Ali	1411	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Ali Shahid	1538	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Ismail Saamy	3779	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Imran Sulaiman	4055	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Abdulla Azeez Hussain	4178	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Ahmed Fayaz	4151	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Mohamed Shabeen	4257	Patrol Officer

**M. Muli Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. Corporal Ahmed Niyaz	1543	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Ahmed Firag	3251	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Mohamed Shabeen	3660	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ibrahim Zakee	3442	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Munavvar Adam	3126	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Mohmaed Naeem	3496	Patrol Officer
P. Constable Mohamed Abdul Samad	1993	Patrol Officer

**Sh. Fonadhoo Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. Corporal Mohamed Naushad	1619	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Hussain Fahudh	1780	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Hussain Irushad	3533	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Abdulla Yasir	2977	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Ibrahim Rasheed	2833	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Ismail Easa	2230	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Abdulla Zaahir	2950	Patrol Officer

**M.Manadhoo Police Station**

Rank & Name	Service No:	Designation
P. Corporal Ahmed Athif	1243	Station In charge
P. L. Corporal Mohamed Bishau	3958	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Ali Nimal	3637	Custodial Officer
P. Constable Ibrahim Muneel	4082	Custodial Officer
P. L. Corporal Arif Haroon	3391	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Ahmed Mohamed	3172	Patrol Officer
P. L. Corporal Bunyamin Abdulla	3648	Patrol Officer

**Annexure 4****PROFILE OF COMMUNITY RESPONDENTS**

No	Atoll	Island	Age	Gender	Occupation
1	Faafu	Nilandhoo	54	Male	Imam
2	Faafu	Nilandhoo	52	Male	Entrepreneur
3	Faafu	Nilandhoo	39	Male	Health Sector
4	Faafu	Nilandhoo	28	Female	Health Sector
5	Faafu	Nilandhoo	24	Male	Education Sector
6	Faafu	Nilandhoo	43	Female	Health Sector
7	Faafu	Nilandhoo	49	Male	Island Councillor
8	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	48	Male	Imam
9	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	17	Female	Private Sector
10	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	42	Female	N/A
11	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	39	Male	Island Councillor
12	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	28	Male	Island Councillor
13	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	37	Male	N/A
14	Sahviyani	Funadhoo	N/A	N/A	N/A
15	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	24	Male	State Employed
16	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	21	Male	Education Sector
17	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	23	Male	Island Councillor
18	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	44	Female	Education Sector
19	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	25	Male	State Employed
20	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	75	Male	Entrepreneur
21	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	37	Female	Health Sector
22	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	65	Male	Imam
23	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	27	Male	Health Sector
24	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	35	Male	Private Sector
25	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	20	Female	Imam
26	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	27	Male	Island Councillor
27	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	24	Female	Education Sector
28	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	38	Male	Education Sector
29	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	39	Male	Island Councillor
30	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	40	Male	Civil Servant
31	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	23	Female	Education Sector
32	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	29	Male	Health Sector
33	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	42	Male	Civil Servant
34	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhufushi	30	Male	Civil Servant
35	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	26	Male	Education Sector
36	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	26	Male	Entrepreneur
37	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	40	Male	Education Sector
38	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	N/A	Male	Imam
39	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	N/A	Female	N/A

40	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	47	Male	State Employed
41	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	39	Male	N/A
42	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	31	Male	State Employed
43	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	33	Male	Health Sector
44	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	42	Male	Civil Servant
45	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	45	Male	Civil Servant
46	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	30	Female	N/A
47	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	45	Male	Entrepreneur
48	Laamu	Gan	N/A	N/A	N/A
49	Laamu	Gan	N/A	N/A	N/A
50	Laamu	Gan	30	Male	Civil Servant
51	Laamu	Gan	30	Male	Island Councillor
52	Laamu	Gan	N/A	N/A	N/A
53	Laamu	Gan	N/A	N/A	N/A
54	Laamu	Gan	30	Female	Education Sector
55	Laamu	Gan	26	Female	Education Sector
56	Laamu	Gan	19	Female	Health Sector
57	Laamu	Gan	27	Female	N/A
58	Meemu	Muli	53	Male	Island Councillor
59	Meemu	Muli	52	Male	Civil Servant
60	Meemu	Muli	N/A	N/A	N/A
61	Meemu	Muli	45	Male	N/A
62	Meemu	Muli	26	Male	State Employed
63	Noonu	Holhudhoo	42	Male	Entrepreneur
64	Noonu	Holhudhoo	25	Female	Civil Servant
65	Noonu	Holhudhoo	30	Male	Self Employed
66	Noonu	Holhudhoo	28	Female	Imam
67	Noonu	Holhudhoo	25	Female	N/A
68	Noonu	Holhudhoo	55	Female	Health Sector
69	Noonu	Holhudhoo	55	Female	Education Sector
70	Noonu	Holhudhoo	38	Female	State Employed
71	Noonu	Holhudhoo	32	Male	N/A
72	Noonu	Holhudhoo	25	Female	N/A
73	Noonu	Holhudhoo	25	Female	N/A
74	Noonu	Holhudhoo	38	Male	State Employed
75	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	50	Male	N/A
76	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	N/A	N/A	N/A
77	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	28	Male	Island Councillor
78	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	27	Male	Island Councillor
79	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	21	Female	Health Sector
80	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	53	Male	Judiciary
81	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	34	Male	Education Sector
82	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	23	Male	N/A
83	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	22	Female	Health Sector
84	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	22	Male	N/A
85	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	28	Male	Education Sector

**Annexure 5****LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ATOLL</b>	<b>ISLAND</b>	<b>GENDER</b>
Ahmed Mueen	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Male
Aminath Ismail	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Female
Hafiyya Ibrahim	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Female
Ibrahim Rasheedh	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Male
Mohamed Hamdhoon	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Male
Mohamed Samir	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Male
Zahira Ismail	Faafu	Nilandhoo	Female
Ibrahim Salim	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Male
Mariyam Shiuna	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Female
Migsad Ibrahim	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Male
Mohamed Shareez	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Male
Natasha Azeez	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Female
Sharfeela Hassan	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Female
Shizanaa Rashidh	Gaafu Alif	Villingili	Female
Aishath Zaha	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Female
Asna Hassan Ahmed	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Female
Hassan Faihath Qudhurathullah	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Male
Hussain Muwazzin	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Male
Ismail Abdulla	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Male
Saima Moosa	Gaafu Dhaalu	Thinadhoo	Female
Ahmed Rasheedh	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Male
Aminath Najeeb	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Female
Ilyas Ibrahim	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Male
Khadheeja Inaza	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Female
Mohamed Iqbal	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Male
Ummu Kulshoom Zahir	Haa Alif	Hoarafushi	Female
Ali Mohamed	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Male
Aroosha Abdul Rasheed	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Female
Mohamed Aboobakuru	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Male
Moosa Adam	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Male
Saudulla Naeem	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Male
Zoobiya Mohamed	Haa Dhaalu	Kulhudhuhfushi	Female
Abdulla Gassam	Laamu	Gan	Male

Ahmed Massoodh	Laamu	Gan	Male
Hawwa Zahira	Laamu	Gan	Female
Ilyas Ibrahim	Laamu	Gan	Male
Irushadha Mohamed	Laamu	Gan	Female
Ismail Zaki	Laamu	Gan	Male
Mariyam Nishana	Laamu	Gan	Female
Mariyam Zaki	Laamu	Gan	Female
Rifasha Ibrahim	Laamu	Gan	Female
Ahmed Shareef	Meemu	Muli	Male
Ahmed Warish	Meemu	Muli	Male
Asma Hussainfulhu	Meemu	Muli	Female
Hussain Arif	Meemu	Muli	Male
Ihusana Hussain	Meemu	Muli	Female
Yusra Saeed	Meemu	Muli	Female
Zaeema Abdulla	Meemu	Muli	Female
Abdulla Lishan	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Ahmed Jaleel	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Ahmed Mohamed Manik	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Ahmed Samah Sameer	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Aishath Azma	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Female
Ibrahim Maumoon	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Mohamed Nisham	Noonu	Holhudhoo	Male
Abdulla Amir	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Male
Ibrahim Firaq	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Male
Ismail Ali	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Male
Mariyam Mohamed	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Female
Mariyam Shifaya	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Female
Mohamed Musadhdhig	Raa	Dhuvaafaru	Male
Ahmed Ameen	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Ahmed Irfan	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Ahmed Naseem	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Aishath Rizna	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Female
Ibrahim Rasheedh	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Mausoom Naeem	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Mohamed Naeem	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Mohamed Ameen	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Mohamed Nazeem	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Male
Zuleykha Naeem	Shaviyani	Funadhoo	Female

## ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community-based Organizations
CPC	Crime Prevention Committees
DPP	District Policing Partnerships
DRP	Dhiveli Rayyithunge Party
GJS	Global Justice Solutions
HRCM	Human Rights Commission of the Maldives
MDN	Maldivian Democracy Network
MDP	Maldivian Democratic Party
MHA	Minister of Home Affairs
MNDF	Maldivian National Defence Force
MOU	Memoranda of Understanding
MPA	Metropolitan Police Authority
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service (UK)
MPS	Maldives Police Service
NIPB	Northern Ireland Policing Board
NPP	National Policing Plan
NSS	National Security Service
PAS	Public Attitudes Survey
PIC	Police Integrity Commission
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
SFU	Strategic Focus Unit
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SP	Superintendent of Police
Sr. Sgt.	Senior Sergeant
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WAP	Western Australia Police

# CHRI Programmes

CHRI's work is based on the belief that for human rights, genuine democracy and development to become a reality in people's lives, there must be high standards and functional mechanisms for accountability and participation within the Commonwealth and its member countries. CHRI furthers this belief through strategic initiatives and advocacy on human rights, access to information and access to justice. It does this through research, publications, workshops, information dissemination and advocacy.

**Strategic Initiatives :** CHRI monitors member states' compliance with human rights obligations and advocates around human rights exigencies where such obligations are breached. CHRI strategically engages with regional and international bodies including the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, the UN, and the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights. Ongoing strategic initiatives include: Advocating for and monitoring the Commonwealth's reform; Reviewing Commonwealth countries' human rights promises at the UN Human Rights Council and engaging with its Universal Periodic Review; Advocating for the protection of human rights defenders and civil society space; and Monitoring the performance of National Human Rights Institutions in the Commonwealth while advocating for their strengthening.

**Access to Information :** CHRI catalyses civil society and governments to take action, acts as a hub of technical expertise in support of strong legislation and assists partners with implementation of good practice. It works collaboratively with local groups and officials, building government and civil society capacity as well as advocating with policy makers. CHRI is active in South Asia, most recently supporting the successful campaign for a national law in India; provides legal drafting support and inputs in Africa; and in the Pacific, works with regional and national organisations to catalyse interest in access legislation.

## Access to Justice

**Police Reforms :** In too many countries the police are seen as oppressive instruments of state rather than as protectors of citizens' rights, leading to widespread rights violations and denial of justice. CHRI promotes systemic reform so that police act as upholders of the rule of law rather than as instruments of the current regime. In India, CHRI's programme aims at mobilising public support for police reform. In East Africa and Ghana, CHRI is examining police accountability issues and political interferences.

**Prison Reforms :** CHRI's work is focused on increasing transparency of a traditionally closed system and exposing malpractices. A major area is aimed at highlighting failures of the legal system that result in terrible overcrowding and unconscionably long pre-trial detention and prison overstays, and engaging in interventions to ease this. Another area of concentration is aimed at reviving the prison oversight systems that have completely failed. CHRI believes that attention to these areas will bring improvements to the administration of prisons as well as have a knock-on effect on the administration of justice overall.

This report examines the first Five-Year Strategic Plan 2007-2011 of the Maldives Police Service (MPS). The MPS was established in 2004 following its separation from the military as part of the democratic reforms process underway in the Maldives at the time. With the separation, the Maldives police faced the daunting task of transforming into a civilian institution responsible for maintaining law and order in the island country. One of the measures taken to guide the institution through its transition was the formulation of the Strategic Plan in 2007 that laid down a completely new vision for the police – that of emerging as a community-oriented, professional, and efficient police service. As the Plan draws to an end, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) along with the Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) undertook a study to discover how well the goals and standards laid down were implemented across the country. The central aim was to identify gaps and problems that exist, not only in implementation, but also in the perception of the standards and practices of community service among the police. Since this new community-oriented approach of policing was an integral component of the larger democratic reforms that the Maldives embarked on in 2003, and because community-oriented policing is the key to the success of several democratic reforms, it was felt that an assessment of policing at this stage would be valuable in identifying persistent challenges and areas for improvement. While the police have already come out with their second Strategic Plan 2011-2013, it is hoped that this study will inform debate on how community-oriented policing can be best adapted to the conditions in the Maldives.

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