A REVIEW OF THE UGANDA POLICE FORCE BUDGET AND ITS EFFECT ON CRIME MANAGEMENT



COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
2006

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BFP	-	Budget Framework Paper
CID	-	Criminal Investigation Department
CMI	-	Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence
DIG	-	Deputy Inspector General of Police
ESO	-	External Security Organisation
FY	-	Financial Year
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GoU	-	Government of Uganda
HIPC	-	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IGP	-	Inspector General of Police
ISO	-	Internal Security Organisation
JLO	-	Justice, Law and Order
JLOS	-	Justice, Law and Order Sector
LAP	-	Local Administration Police
LDU	-	Local Defence Unit
MFPED	-	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MJCA	-	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
MTEF	-	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
PAF	-	Poverty Action Fund
PEAP	-	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PER	-	Public Expenditure Review
PNFP	-	Private Not for Profit
PRSP	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PPA	-	Priority Programme Area
SWAP	-	Sector Wide Approach to Planning
SWG	-	Sector Working Group
UHRC	-	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UNAFRI	-	United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
UPF	-	Uganda Police Force
UPDF	-	Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces
VCCU	-	Violent Crime Crack Unit

1. INTRODUCTION

This is a study on the impact of police funding on crime management and citizen safety in Uganda and is part of a broader study on budgetary allocations of the three police forces of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). The study examines trends in the Government of Uganda's (GoU) budgetary allocations over the period 1999/2000 to 2003/2004 at the global, sector and sub-sector or programme levels.

1.1 Objectives

The study compares and analyses the priority implications of the relationships of budget allocation over the financial period 1999/00 to 2003/04 between:

i. The Justice, Law and Order (JLO) Sector and other sectors;
ii. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) sub-sector and other sub-sectors under the JLO sector;
iii. The different programmes under the UPF;
iv. The UPF and other government security agencies.

Based on the above analysis, the study makes conclusions on:

i. The relative priority ranking of the JLO sector budget within GoU's overall budget and its impact on crime management and citizen safety;
ii. UPF's funding priorities and the implications for crime management and citizen safety.

1.2 Methodology

The study is based on a desk review and analysis of literature and administrative data drawn from grey material and the relevant GoU administrative units.

Limitations encountered in the study include:

a) The absence of budget outturn figures for lower-level accounting entities i.e. at sub-sector and programme levels;
b) The absence of disaggregated data from lower-level accounting entities;
c) The absence of disaggregated budget figures for some cost centres;
d) Comparative difficulties arising from differences in data collection cycles i.e. some data is captured for the calendar year period while some is for the financial year.

1.3 Structure of the Report

Chapter One covers the background and methodology of the study. Chapter Two provides an overview of Uganda's budgeting process and briefly discusses the key budgetary instruments and mechanisms employed by GoU in its allocation and disbursement of budgets. Chapter Three presents a summary of trends in government sector budget allocations over the review period and specifically compares them with allocations to the JLO sector. Chapter Four details and analyses the priority implications of budget allocations between departments of the UPF. Chapter Five presents and briefly discusses crime, population and police personnel growth trends. Based on the analytical findings in Chapters Three to Five, Chapter Six sums up the study with a set of conclusions and recommendations.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE BUDGET CONTEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA

2.1 Overview

The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) – Uganda's overall development framework – has since 1997 guided the formulation of all GoU development policies at national, sector, district, and lower local government levels. The PEAP is a culmination of a long consultative process of preparation which began with a national seminar on poverty, and is intended not to substitute sectoral plans, but to prioritise public actions across various sectors for the objective of poverty eradication[1].

The PEAP is also Uganda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)[2]. However, unlike the case of other PRSP-implementing countries where the PRSP concept was adopted as a World Bank/IMF lending conditionality, the PEAP is 'home grown' and was formulated prior to the PRSP initiative. It also partially served as a model for the World Bank in its development of the PRSP concept.

The PEAP was developed as a national planning framework that would undergo periodical reviews in the medium term in order to strengthen its poverty eradication focus. Its first revision exercise was in 1997 giving rise to the PEAP (2001-2003) and the second revision exercise commenced in January 2003 and is due to be concluded in June 2004 with the publication of the PEAP (2004-2008). The objective of revising the PEAP is to strengthen its poverty focus, based on lessons learned and emerging issues over a given implementation cycle.

Below is an extract from the PEAP (2001-2003) describing the flows and relationships between different planning/policy processes in Uganda and their linkages with the PEAP and other plans and policy documents.

Figure 2.1: Links Between the PEAP, Other Plans and the Planning/Policy Process



*Uganda Vision 2025 spells out the framework for planning Uganda's national economic and social development over the long term (25-year period).

1 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, (1997) *The Poverty Eradication Action Plan* (PEAP).

2 www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/ugprsp

Quick Guide to GoU's Planning Processes[3]

Vision 2025:	An overview of long-term goals and aspirations by the year 2025
PEAP:	The national planning framework on which to develop detailed sector strategies
Sector Plans:	Technical specifications of sector priorities, disciplined by hard budget constraints
District Plans:	Implementation plans for sector strategies based on local priorities and needs
MTEF:	Annual, rolling 3-year expenditure planning, setting out the medium-term expenditure priorities and hard budget constraints against which sector plans can be developed and refined
District MTEF:	Sets out the medium term expenditure priorities and hard budget constraints against which district plans can be developed and refined
National & District Budgets:	Annual implementation of the three year planning framework
Donor, NGO, & Private sector:	Participating and sharing information and ideas in developing sector plans and budgets
Participatory Processes:	Bottom-up participation of districts in the planning and monitoring process, as well as participatory poverty assessments, providing essential feedback on progress towards poverty eradication goals.

As the conduit within which government planning efforts are conducted, the PEAP provides for iterative links between itself and other plans including sector and district plans under the Sector Wide Approach to Planning.

The PEAP (2001-2003) is built around four key pillars:

a) Fast and sustainable economic growth and structural transformation;
b) Good governance and security;
c) Increased ability of the poor to raise their incomes;
d) Increased quality of life for the poor.

Progress on the implementation of programmes and activities under the above respective pillars is assessed on the basis of a number of indicators and targets enumerated in Annex 1.

2.2 The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) and the Sector Wide Approach to Planning (SWAP)

As observed in the PEAP (2001-2003), the links between the PEAP and sector plans at all levels are iterative, with information flowing in both directions. A distinctive feature about SWAPs is that they have a medium to long-term outlook, guided by a Medium Term Expenditure Framework. Uganda adopted the Sector-Wide Approach to Planning with the aim of

[3] MFPED, (2001) *The Poverty Eradication Action Plan* (PEAP), p 11.

strengthening the capacity of national institutions to manage the policy making and implementation process, as well as to strengthen ownership and systems of accountability. The SWAP also seeks to enhance donor coordination at the policy level, to simplify management and reporting procedures, and increase the overall effectiveness of aid[4]. Sectors with fully developed sector plans currently include Education, Agriculture, Health, Justice, Law and Order, Social Development and Transport.

Expenditure implications of the PEAP are translated into concrete spending decisions through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF is a three-year rolling budgeting instrument developed to provide a clear analysis of the links between inputs, outputs and outcomes while ensuring consistency of sectoral expenditure levels with overall resource constraints, in order to ensure macroeconomic stability and to maximise the efficiency of public expenditure in attaining predetermined outcomes.

GoU adopted the MTEF approach to national budgeting on the grounds that "while medium-term plans establish a policy framework and desired outputs and outcomes, they are meaningless unless they can be disciplined by hard budget constraints and they can translate into actual budgets"[5].

Within the MTEF is a virtual ring-fenced fund called the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). The PAF was established in 1998 in response to the need to reorient budget expenditures to poverty reduction. It started as a means of demonstrating the additional nature of savings from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and donor support, in terms of increases to pro-poor expenditures in the budget, but has since become a means of ensuring that resources are increasingly allocated towards poverty-reducing expenditures[6]. It comprises a given percentage of the national budget that is protected from budget cuts that may occur during the course of the financial year and caters for funding to Priority Programme Areas (PPAs). PPAs are selected sectoral programmes whose activities are deemed critical for poverty reduction and are identified based on established criteria (Box 2.1). PAF funding sources have since increased to include GoU's own contributions and other additional donor grants for general budget support.

Box 2.1: PAF Access Criteria:

- must be in the PEAP;
- must be directly poverty-reducing;
- must deliver a service to the poor; and
- must have a well-developed plan.

2.3 The Budget Cycle

Sectoral allocations of the Government of Uganda budget are set out in the MTEF. These allocations are arrived at through a consultative budget process, which involves all key stakeholders.

The consultative budget process follows an annual timetable, partially determined by the requirements of the 2001 Budget Act. The process starts around October/November of each

4 Kasumba G. and Land A. (2003) *Sector-Wide Approaches and Decentralisation, Strategies pulling in Opposite Directions? A Case Study from Uganda,* European Centre for Development Policy Management Maastricht.

5 MFPED, (2001) *The Poverty Eradication Action Plan.*

6 Williamson T. and Canagarajah S. (2003), "Is there a place for Virtual Poverty Funds in Pro-Poor Public Spending Reform? Lessons from Uganda's PAF", *Development Policy Review*, 2003, 21 (4): 449-480

year, with communication by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) of indicative budget ceilings for each sector over the medium term. These ceilings guide the preparation of Budget Framework Papers (BFPs) by Sector Working Groups (SWGs), which bring together all stakeholders in the respective sectors including local governments.

The sectoral BFPs are discussed at ministerial level with MFPED, to arrive at a National Budget Framework Paper. This is discussed and approved at Cabinet level, and it forms the basis of the Macroeconomic Plan and Indicative Budget Framework submitted to Parliament by April 1st each year, as per the 2001 Budget Act.

The Framework is also discussed with development partners at the annual Public Expenditure Review (PER), which is typically held in May. After consultations with Parliament and with development partners, the final budget allocations are prepared and read out in the Budget Speech by June 15 of each year.

3. BUDGET TRENDS FOR THE PERIOD: FY 1999/00-2003/04

3.1 Inter-Sector Budget Allocations

The GoU budget comprises a total of 10 sectors[7] namely: security; roads and works; agriculture; education; health; water and sanitation; justice, law and order; accountability; economic functions and social services; and public administration. Each of these sectors is further broken down into a number of sub-sectors, which vary from sector to sector in size, mandate and sometimes in autonomy. The sub-sectors of the Justice, Law and Order Sector are listed in Box 3.2.

Over the review period (FY 1999/00 to 2003/04), the overall GoU budget nearly doubled in size. Total government spending rose from Ushs. 1,236.7 billion in the FY 99/00 to Ushs. 2,331.6 billion in FY 2003/04[8]. This represents a percentage increase of 87% in the national budget over a five-year period. This increase has however, been variedly distributed across the 10 sectors with the highest percentage increases occurring in the accountability sector (689.1%) and the lowest in the public administration sector (41.4%) as shown in Figure 3.1 below.

The Justice, Law and Order Sector budget, under which funding for the UPF falls, registered the fifth lowest increase over the same period with its nominal budget increasing by 77.6% from Ushs. 90.5 bn in FY 99/00 to Ushs. 160.7 bn in FY 03/04.

On the other hand, the Security Sector, which is comprised of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), registered an increase of 73.4% over the same period with its nominal budget increasing from Ushs. 191.0 bn in FY 99/00 to Ushs. 331.1 bn in FY 2003/04 (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1[9]: Sector GoU Budgets (Ushs. Bn)

Sector	Financial Year					
	89/99 Outturn	99/00 Outturn	00/01 Outturn	01/02 Outturn	02/03 Outturn	03/04 Approved[10]
Security	203.1	191.0	208.4	238	296.9	331.1
Roads and Works	63.1	100.7	127.8	157	155.0	168.9
Agriculture	9.8	18.1	21.8	42	49.1	48.6
Education	275.0	325.1	373.0	456	491.8	529.9
Health	66.5	79.9	110.1	163	189.9	218.8
Water	12.8	18.4	36.4	49	55.2	61.9
Justice, Law and Order	**73.4**	**90.5**	**97.7**	**127**	**145.7**	**160.7**
Accountability	6.2	10.1	16.3	21	26.1	79.7
Economic Functions and Social Services	28.0	56.9	75.0	122	151.9	129.2
Public Administration	211.9	251.1	301.6	366	367.2	355.0
Interest Payments Due	72.1	94	127.6	153	180.8	227.8
TOTAL	1021.7	1,236.7	1,495.7	1,895	2,109.5	2,311.6

Source: MFPED, Annual Budget Performance Reports 1999/00 to 2003/04 (semi-annual draft)

7 The use of sector classification here is as applied by the Budget Directorate which is, to some degree, different from the classification applied under the planning process/functional classification.

8 MFPED, *Approved Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (Recurrent and Development) 1998/1999* to 2003/04.

9 MFPED, (2003) *Public Expenditure Contributions to the PEAP Review.*

10 MFPED, (2004) *Semi-Annual Budget Performance Report FY 2003/04.*

Figure 3.1: Percentage Growth of Sector Budgets Between FY 1999/00 and 2003/04 in Nominal Terms



Looking at the trend of the budget shares of the respective sectors (Figure 3.2) it is notable that with the exception of the accountability sector, there is a general convergence in the percentage annual growth rate of various sector budgets over the review period. That is to say, over the review period, the percentage annual increase in the nominal sizes of the different sector budgets has progressively become more or less equal. The difference in the percentage annual budget increase between the sector with the highest percentage annual budget increase in 1999/00 and that with lowest was 109.4% compared with 26% in 2002/03 and 41% in 2003/04.

Figure 3.2: Trends in Percentage Annual Increases of Sector Budgets in Nominal Terms



The growth trend of the JLO Sector budget over the same period shows that the Sector's budget registered its highest annual increase in FY 01/02 when it increased by 30.0%. Its annual budget growth rate has since averaged 12%. This is a favourable trend in nominal terms considering that the Sector's budget recorded an average over-performance of 102.4% in the first four years of the review period (Table 3.2). Budget performance measures the actual budget released by the Treasury as a percentage share of the approved budget. For example, in FY 2002/03, the JLO Sector received a total of Ushs. 145.7 billion against a budgeted amount of Ushs. 142.2 billion; giving it a budget performance of 102.5%. The over-performance of the JLO Sector's budget occurred despite a 23% across the board cut on all non-PAF budgets resulting from a Cabinet decision to increase defence funding in FY 2002/03 in order to mitigate security risks. The 99% performance witnessed in FY 2001/02 came about because the Sector's wage bill performed at 93.8%, as a result of unfilled vacancies in the Judicial Service Commission that performed at 24.1%[11].

Table 3.2: Historical Trends of Budget Performance by Sector

Sector	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	Average
Security	98.5%	99.4%	103.8%	113.5%	103.8%
Roads and Works	95.3%	92.6%	92.0%	93.9%	93.5%
Agriculture	98.7%	90.3%	86.4%	105.0%	95.1%
Education	95.2%	92.4%	99.5%	97.3%	96.1%
Health	96.3%	96.4%	95.8%	96.9%	96.4%
Water	99.9%	100.0%	90.8%	113.2%	101.0%
Justice, Law and Order	103.8%	103.4%	99.0%	102.5%	102.2%
Accountability	137.2%	95.4%	94.4%	97.9%	106.2%
Economic Functions and Social Services	71.3%	78.7%	87.5%	101.4%	84.7%
Public Administration	102.6%	113.9%	112.4%	101.7%	107.7%
Total (excluding Interest)	95.8%	97.0	98.9%	101.9%	2499.2%
Interest Payments Due	105.7%	119.1%	98.9%	125.0%	112.2%
Total	96.5%	98.5%	98.8%	103.5%	99.3%

Source: MFPED, (2001) Budget Performance Report 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03

Table 3.3: Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Sector Budget Expenditures in Nominal Terms

Sector	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04
Security	-5.96%	9.11%	14.20%	24.75%	11.52%
Roads and Works	59.59%	26.91%	22.85%	-1.27%	8.97%
Agriculture	84.69%	20.44%	92.66%	16.90%	-1.02%
Educations	18.22%	14.73%	22.25%	7.85%	7.75%
Health	20.15%	37.80%	48.05%	16.50%	15.22%
Water	43.75%	97.83%	34.62%	12.65%	12.14%
Justice, Law and Order	23.30%	7.96%	29.99%	14.72%	10.30%
Accountability	62.90%	61.39%	28.83%	24.29%	205.36%
Economic Functions and Social Services	103.21%	31.81%	62.67%	24.51%	-14.94%
Public Administration	18.50%	20.11%	21.35%	0.33%	-3.32%
Interest Payments Due	30.37%	35.74%	19.91%	18.17%	26.00%

Source: MFPED, (2003): Budget Directorate PEAP Revision Submission

[11] MFPED, (2003) *Annual Budget Performance Report 2002/03.*

As far as the shares of the different sector budgets as a proportion of the national budget are concerned, the Education Sector currently takes the largest budget share (22.92%) of the national budget while the Agriculture Sector takes the least share (2.10%). The JLO Sector on the other hand accounts for a share of 6.95% of the national budget. This is mildly down from a share of 7.32% that it had in FY 99/00. As for the Security Sector, its share of the national budget currently stands at 14.3%, down from 15.4% in FY 1999/00.

Table 3.4 below shows the percentage shares of different sector budgets as a fraction of the national budget over the review period.

Table 3.4: Sector Budgets Sizes as Percentage Share of the National Budget

Sector	Financial Year				
	99/00 Outturn	00/01 Outturn	01/02 Outturn	02/03 Outturn	03/04 Approved
Security	15.44%	13.93%	12.56%	14.07%	14.32%
Roads and Works	8.14%	8.54%	8.28%	7.35%	7.31%
Agriculture	1.46%	1.46%	2.22%	2.33%	2.10%
Education	26.29%	24.94%	24.06%	23.31%	22.92%
Health	6.46%	7.36%	8.60%	9.00%	9.47%
Water	1.49%	2.43%	2.59%	2.62%	2.68%
Justice, Law and Order	**7.32%**	**6.53%**	**6.70%**	**6.91%**	**6.95%**
Accountability	0.82%	1.09%	1.11%	1.24%	3.45%
Economic Functions and Social Services	4.60%	5.01%	6.44%	7.20%	5.59%
Public Administration	20.30%	20.16%	19.31%	17.41%	15.36%
Interest Payments Due	7.60%	8.53%	8.07%	8.57%	9.85%
TOTAL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: MFPED, (2003) Public Expenditure Contributions to the PEAP Revision

The trend of the JLOS budget share has almost been constant over the review period compared to that of other sectors such as education, public administration, economic functions and social services whose trends show either a decline or a rise from one year to another. This means that GoU's annual budget allocations to the JLO Sector have been growing at more or less a consistent rate with overall government expenditure. This assumes that the Sector's funding requirements have been growing at the same rate as that of overall government expenditure. However, as seen later in Chapter Four and also as argued by the JLOS in Box 3.1, there is strong evidence to the contrary.

Box 3.1: JLOS Review of Past Financial Performance

The maintenance of the minimal budget share, in the context of increasing crime and increased commercial activities, compromises the Sector's ability to maintain law and order, and administer justice fairly and transparently. Since FY 2000/2001, ten development partners have supported reform in JLOS through both budget support and direct project aid. The Criminal Justice Reform Programme budget grew from US $800,000 in the first year to US $15 million FY 2003/2004. In effect, development partners became key in driving the reform process in the absence of GoU support.

The JLOS is now concerned that MFPED is indicating a stagnation of growth in budget share for the JLOS, as well as implementing what may be described as punitive measures for the increasing level of donor support to the Sector. During the semi-annual Joint GoU–Donor Review, the Ministry of Finance stated, *"for FY 2004/2005 the JLOS budget provision is projected to grow by 1.6%"*[12]. It is notable that this projected increase is below the rate of inflation. MFPED further stated, *"any further increase in expenditures on the donor projects will mean that GoU budget will have to be adjusted downwards. Conversely, if spending on the donor project is reduced, there may be room for raising the GoU ceiling"*[13]. As illustrated in the graph below, indeed there has been a "trade off" between recurrent and development expenditure since FY 1998/1999.



While the rationale underlying the medium-term expenditure frameworks, and thus sector ceilings, is appreciated, the Justice Law and Order Sector remains well below the budget share of 1998/1999 in the context of increased crime, increased private sector investment, increased population growth and higher expectations in terms of adherence to human rights and good governance principles. Without a significant increase in GoU budget share, the Sector will continue to offer compromised services, characterised by poor service delivery, corruption and abrogation of human rights norms and standards

Source: JLOS BFP 2003/04 – 2005/06

3.2 Justice, Law and Order Sector

3.2.1 Sector Composition

The JLO Sector MTEF comprises a total of ten institutions (Box 3.2). The 10 institutions are all key stakeholders in the process of the administration of justice and maintenance of law and order through ensuring personal safety, security, rule of law, due process, prevention of crime, investigation and prosecution of criminal activity.

12 MFPED, (2003) *Financing the Justice Law and Order Sector Reform within the Medium-term*, 2 December, p. 4.

13 Ibid. p. 5.

Box 3.2: Institutional Composition of the Justice, Law and Order Sector

- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- The Judiciary
- The Uganda Prison Services
- The Uganda Police Force
- The Directorate of Public Prosecution
- The Judicial Service Commission
- The Uganda Law Reform Commission
- Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Probation Services
- Ministry of Local Government, Local Council Courts

The JLOS formed after the launch of the PEAP in 1997, partly in response to the sector-wide planning approach adopted by the Government under the PEAP framework for reasons earlier explained in Chapter Two. The Sector's mission is "to enable all people to live in a safe and just society". Its broad policy objective in the medium-term is to maintain law and order and increase access to justice for all persons through infrastructure reform, law reform, improved legal services and civic education[14].

The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MJCA) is the Ministry responsible for the Sector and its mandate is to maintain internal peace and stability by enforcing law and order. The Ministry's mandate is implemented through the functions of: (i) the Ministry's Headquarters office; (ii) the Uganda Police Force; (iii) the Uganda Prisons Service; (iv) the Immigration Department; (v) the Analytical Laboratory; (vi) the Amnesty Commission; (vii) the Community Services Programme; and (viii) the Finance and Administration Department[15].

The different sub-sectors under the JLOS each have defined mandates and objectives that are derived from the Sector's mandate. For the purpose of this study however, the following section will only focus on the mandate and medium term objective of the Uganda Police Force. A summary of the mandates and objectives of the other sub-sectors has been annexed (Annex 1) for the benefit of the interested reader.

The Uganda Police Force, in existence as per the Police Statute of 1994 and Section 212 of the 1995 Constitution, has a mandate to:

- Protect life and property;
- Enforce law and order, and maintain security and peace in the country;
- Prevent crime by carrying out foot and mobile patrols, establishing police stations and posts all over the country and carrying out general policing duties;
- Investigate, arrest suspects and summon witnesses to appear in courts of law;
- Train police personnel and equip them with modern skills of detecting and combating crime;
- Liase and co-operate with other security agencies both nationally and internationally to fight crime.

[14] MJCA, *Justice, Law and Order Budget Framework Paper 2004/05 - 2006/07*
[15] MJCA, *Justice, Law and Order Budget Framework Paper 2003/04 - 2006/07*

The medium-term objectives of the Uganda Police Force are to[16]:

- Improve the efficiency of managing public order, safety and crime prevention
- Review, reformulate, integrate and document all human resource, financial and management and operational policies
- Ensure prompt and satisfactory disposal of cases
- Reduce the fear of crime and increase public safety and order
- Promote safety and order on Uganda's roads
- Help communities fight crime
- Provide intelligence and combat support for policing and national security needs
- Provide an efficient and reliable workforce
- Equip police personnel with appropriate skills and competencies and develop in them the attitudes and behaviour essential for the practical, technical and managerial needs for policing in Uganda
- Manage the Force's financial resources to maximise value for money and increase the returns on its limited budgets
- Ensure its staff are equipped to do their jobs
- Promote consistent and focused development of policing in Uganda
- Enhance the performance and implementation of force planning and strategy and promote internal accountability
- Ensure the Force's activities are guided and conducted within the law and coherent policy framework
- Provide reliable transport system to meet a wide range of policing needs
- Provide suitable estate to meet the operational and support needs of the force
- Provide the best possible communication and information technology services.

3.2.2 Intra-Sector Budget Allocations

The budget structure for the JLO Sector is classified into a four-tier hierarchy comprising of the following levels in their descending order: (i) votes; (ii) programmes; (iii) cost centres; and (iv) cost items. A vote is technically defined as a budget allocation to a self-accounting body and each vote is made up of a number of programmes. A programme, on the other hand, is a spending unit under a given vote. Each programme is further broken down into a number of cost centres under which expenditures are finally allocated to individual cost items. The JLO Sector has a total of eight votes, whose classification does not entirely connect with that of its institutional composition (Box 3.3)

Box 3.3: Budget Vote Composition of the Justice, Law and Order Sector

- Police (including local defence units)
- Prisons
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Director of Public Prosecutions
- Judiciary (Statutory)
- Ministry of Justice [Court Awards (Statutory); Attorney General (excluding compensations); Attorney General (compensations)]
- Judicial Service Commission
- Law Reform Commission

[16] MJCA, *Justice, Law and Order Budget Framework Paper 2003/04–2006/07*

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present a summary of approved budget estimates and budget outturns of votes under the JLO Sector over the first four years of the review period.

Table 3.5: GoU Approved Budget Estimates for Votes Under the Justice, Law and Order Sector: FYs 99/00 – 03/04 (Ushs. Billions)

Vote	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04
Police	51.74	49.80	63.86	66.94	75.61
Prison	12.59	12.95	17.60	18.73	17.66
Ministry of Internal Affairs	2.47	3.81	7.40	6.83	7.51
Director of Public Prosecutions	1.68	1.32	4.06	3.82	4.00
Ministry of Justice	6.30	19.75	18.59	27.30	32.45
Judiciary	13.29	10.79	20.72	21.76	21.35
Judicial Service Commission	0.51	0.46	0.75	0.79	0.78
Law Reform Commission	0.66	0.54	0.88	1.33	1.35
Total	89.24	99.16	133.87	147.15	160.71

Source: MFPED Approved Revenue and Expenditure for FYs 1999/00 to 2003/04

Table 3.6: Budget Outturns of the Justice, Law and Order Sector Votes for FYs 99/00 – 03/04 (Ushs. Billions)

Vote	99/00 Provisional	00/01	01/02	02/03
Police	45.98	51.14	65.34	64.89
Prison	10.39	14.20	18.16	16.85
Ministry of Internal Affairs	2.12	5.84	8.93	12.36
Director of Public Prosecutions	0.61	1.56	2.66	3.09
Ministry of Justice	4.62	9.44	15.93	33.69
Judiciary	9.52	14.52	14.94	20.70
Judicial Service Commission[17]	0.00	0.38	0.39	0.46
Law Reform Commission	0.55	0.59	0.96	3.51
	73.78	97.66	127.3	155.53

Source: MFPED Approved Revenue and Expenditure for FYs 1999/00 to 2003/04

Table 3.7: JLOS Vote Outturns as a Percentage Share of Approved Budget Estimates

Vote	99/00 Provisional	00/01	01/02	02/03
Police	89%	103%	102%	97%
Prison	83%	110%	103%	90%
Ministry of Internal Affairs	86%	153%	121%	181%
Director of Public Prosecutions	36%	118%	66%	81%
Ministry of Justice	73%	48%	86%	123%
Judiciary	72%	135%	72%	95%
Judicial Service Commission[17]	0%	83%	52%	58%
Law Reform Commission	83%	109%	109%	264%

[17] The vote of the Judicial Service Commission for FY 1999/00 reads 0 because it was then treated under the Judiciary vote.

Budget performance analysis of the JLOS budget votes (vote outturns as a percentage share of approved budget estimates) shown in Table 3.7 above indicates varying levels of budget realisation for the different votes under the JLOS. While the budget for the JLOS as a whole has on average witnessed an over-performance for most of the review period, particular votes under the sector have suffered persistent under-performance. The most affected votes include the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Judicial Service Commission and the Judiciary. Each of these four votes under-performed in 3 of the first 4 years of the review period with some under-performing by over 30%.

Table 3.8: Approved Budget Estimates for Votes under the JLOS as a Percentage Share of the Overall JLOS for FYs 99/00 – 03/04 (Ushs. Billions)

Vote	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04
Police	51.74	49.8	63.86	66.94	75.61
Prison	12.59	12.95	17.6	18.73	17.66
Ministry of Internal Affairs	2.47	3.81	7.4	6.83	7.51
Director of Public Prosecutions	1.68	1.32	4.06	3.82	4.00
Ministry of Justice	6.3	19.75	18.59	27.3	32.45
Judiciary	13.29	10.79	20.72	21.76	21.35
Judicial Service Commission	0.51	0.46	0.75	0.79	0.78
Law Reform Commission	0.66	0.54	0.88	1.33	1.35
Total	89.24	99.16	133.87	147.15	160.71

Source: MFPED Approved Revenue and Expenditure for FYs 1999/00 to 2003/04

Of the eight votes in the Sector's MTEF, the Uganda Police Force has the largest percentage vote share averaging 49.68% of the Sector's budget over the review period. Its share is however, on a downward trend and has declined from a percentage share of 57.98% in 1999/00 to 47.05% in 03/04. This decline represents a total share drop of 8.5% over a five-year period. The general decline of the JLOS budget as a share of the national budget and the growing priority that capital expenditure is gaining over recurrent expectation in the GoU national budget (Figure 3.3) appear to be the two major factors behind the declining trend in the share of the UPF budget within JLOS budget. According to the Sector's Budget Framework Paper: "for increased coherence and efficient programme implementation, there is need to have the percentage share of the recurrent budget increased in tandem with the development budget. This is because increased capital expenditure in one financial year necessitates an increase in recurrent costs in the next financial year as programmes and initiatives are integrated into the recurrent budget of sector institutions."

Figure 3.3 shows that the JLOS is witnessing a progressive rise in the size of its development budget as a share of both the Sector's overall budget and the national budget. The share of the Sector's development budget as a percentage of its total budget has grown from 32.8% in FY 1999/00 to 44.4% in FY 2003/04 and is projected to rise to 50.8% in the FY 2005/06. As later argued, this phenomenon poses a threat to the ability of the institutions in the Sector to effectively carry out their routine duties, which are financed through their recurrent budgets.

Figure 3.3: Comparative Bar Graph Showing JLOS Recurrent and Development Expenditure as a Share of the Corresponding National Budget for the Period 1998/9-2005/6



Source: JLOS (2004:19) Budget Framework Paper (FY 2004/2005 - 2006/2007)

4 UGANDA POLICE FORCE BUDGET: FY 99/00-03/04

The budgeting framework of the Uganda Police Force vote, like JLOS, its mother sector, does not totally match that of its institutional framework. Under the institutional framework, UPF is categorised into:

- 4 directorates: Administration, Operation, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Special Branch.
- Special units, including: Criminal Investigation Department; Fire, Railways, Estates, Marines, Dog, Airwing, Avipol and Quarter Master

Under the budgeting framework however, the above directorates and units are classified into the eight programmes listed in the first column of Table 4.1 below. Each of the eight budget programmes of the Force are further divided into eight cost centres listed in the second column of Table 4.1 under which funds are allocated during the budgeting process.

Table 4.1: Uganda Police Force Budget Structure

Programme	Cost Centre
a) Inspector General of Police	a) Employee costs
b) Administrative Service	b) Administrative costs
c) Operation Service	c) Supplies and services
d) Criminal Investigation Service	d) Transport and plant costs
e) Special Branch Services	e) Property costs
f) Mobile Police Patrol Unit	f) Transfer payments to other agencies
g) Local Defence Units	g) Other expenditure
h) Anti-Stock Theft Unit	h) Loan charges

4.1 Uganda Police Force Inter-Programme Budget Allocations

This section examines the mandates of each of the above programmes and trends in their budget allocations. It also examines the type of cost items included under each of the above cost centres. Unlike at the sector and vote budget levels where it has been possible to undertake budget analysis based on outturn figures for the respective budget lines, this section uses approved budget estimate figures for its budget analysis. This is because of the absences of reliable outturn expenditure figures at the programme and cost centre level. This should not however, pose a problem given that the discrepancy between the approved budget estimates and budget outturn figures in the case of the UPF vote is within the acceptable level of plus or minus 5%. The UPF vote's average annual share of its outturn budgets as a percentage of the approved budgets for the first four years of the review period is 98% with a range of 14 percentage points between the highest and lowest budget performance levels (Table 3.7). These figures however, do not immediately tell the story of what has happened to the Force's development as later revealed.

Another element of critical importance in the comparative analysis of programme budgets under this section is that the figures used are for the programmes' recurrent expenditures and exclude the development budget component. The reason for this is that development funding for the Force is realised by MFPED on a project as opposed to programme basis. It is therefore not possible to attribute particular development expenditures to a single programme.

However, the section does provide a brief analysis of the overall trend in the Force's development budget.

4.1.1 Budget Programmes: Mandates[18]

Inspector General of Police (IGP):
The office of the IGP is the apex office in the institutional structure of the UPF and is responsible for senior management and overall coordination of the entire Force. Immediately under the IGP is the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) who is supported by a total of four Commissioners and five Assistant Commissioners (see Annex 3 for detailed organogram).

Administrative Service:
This includes all the support services under human resource management, human resource development, non-human resources and medical supplies.

Operation Service:
This includes all the core functions of the Force such as crime detection and prevention, traffic and road safety, public order and safety and community assistance.

Criminal Investigation Department (CID):
CID is a directorate and is mandated to:

- Detect crime;
- Gather information on criminals and disseminate it with a view to detect crime;
- Receive complaints on criminals and investigate;
- Gather criminal evidence and assemble it for purposes of criminal prosecution.

Special Branch Services:
These are charged with the responsibility of detecting and investigating state related offences.

Mobile Police Patrol Unit:
This unit is responsible for preventing crime and carrying out general policing duties.

Local Defence Units:
These are local residents appointed by an officer-in-charge of a given area in which an unlawful activity has occurred or is likely to occur. Their responsibility is to reinforce members of the Force ordinarily employed for maintenance of law and order in that area.[19] The Inspector General determines the terms and forms of their appointment. In terms of administration, they are answerable to the Local Government but the Inspector General is responsible for matters pertaining to their standardisation and training.

Anti-Stock Theft Unit:
This is a part of UPF's auxiliary forces whose recruitment is provided for under Part VIII and section 65 (1) of the Police Statute 1994. The unit was formed as part of GoU's strategy for protecting and maintaining peace in the districts neighbouring Karamoja[20]. It is made up of hundreds of vigilantes recruited, trained and deployed to protect the neighbouring districts of Karamoja from armed aggression by the Karamojong.

18 Uganda Police Force, (2003) *PEAP Revision Submission*; UPF, (1994) *The Police Statute*
19 UPF, (1994) *The Police Statute*, Part VIII, Section 65 (1)
20 UHRC, (2001) *Annual Report* (2000-2001)

4.1.2 Inter-Programme Recurrent Budget Analysis

Trends in the size and share of budget allocations to UPF programmes show an irregular pattern over the review period, reflecting either a substantial shift in the relative priority accorded to the different programmes or simply a gradual squeeze in size of resources allocated to particular programmes.

The most affected programmes include the Inspector General of Police and Operation Services. The budget size of the IGP programme as a share of the total UPF budget declined from 48% in 99/00 to 7.6 % in 2003/04 while that of Operation Services has risen from 13.64% in FY 99/00 to 32.27 percent. This most likely reflects the increased priority that GoU has accorded to development expenditure over recurrent expenditure during the review period as earlier shown in Figure 3.3. While this may be good news to the Operations Departments, it compromises the UPF's ability to attain an optimal level of efficiency because increased capital investment must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in staff numbers and other recurrent consumables. It is also worth noting that while the budget share of the Operation Service programme has modestly improved, the rise has more to do with the small size of the Department's starting budget as compared to the nominal increase in its budget size as shown in Table 4.2.

In terms of budget size ranking, the Operations Department currently has the highest budget share (32.27%) followed by the Local Defence Units (LDUs) department with 18.49%. Unlike the IGP and Operations Services, the trend of the LDU budget programme has been relatively even, averaging 17.4% over the review period with a variation of only 3.87 percentage points. Both the trend and share of the LDU's budget programme is explained by the continued insurgency in areas in the north and the east of the country, which required an increase in the number of auxiliary forces under UPF. As of 2003, the total number of auxiliary forces under the UPF stood at 12,160[21] (78% of the size of the regular police force of which 4,500 are Special Police Constables and 6,560 are Local Administration Police).

These forces need financial assistance from time to time in support of their activities to bolster security in conflict-affected areas of the country. The same is true of the Anti-Stock Theft budget programme whose share has steadily risen from 0.78% in 99/00 to its current level of 7.02%. The need for these auxiliary forces becomes clearer in the context of the challenge posed by the declining size of the regular police force against a background of a deepening decentralisation policy in the country. The third largest budget programme after Operation Services and LDU is the Administrative Services programme with a current budget share of 10.33% and an average of 6.68% over the review period. Its share has also modestly improved from 6.42% in 99/00 to 10.33% in FY 03/04. The programme registered a drastic rise in its budget in the FY 03/04 of 58.43% giving it the largest increase amongst UPF's programmes for FY 2003/04. Again, the rise in this programme's budget share has to do with the increased need for support service to the large number of auxiliary forces.

The budget shares of the Criminal Investigation Services, Mobile Police Patrol Unit and Special Branch Services programmes rose mildly over the first three years of the review period but plateaued over the last two years. As of now, there is no clear particular reason for this trend other than variation in relative programme priorities.

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21 UPF, (2003) *PEAP Revision Submission.*

Table 4.2: UPF Programme Budget Shares for the Period 1999/00 to 2003/04

Programme (Department)	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Programme (Department)	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Inspector General of Police	48.02%	18.27%	29.66%	7.40%	7.63%
Administrative Service	6.42%	4.36%	5.85%	6.52%	10.33%
Operation Service	13.64%	41.66%	32.54%	42.11%	32.27%
Criminal Investigation Service	4.69%	8.68%	7.79%	10.77%	10.54%
Special Branch Services	3.28%	4.71%	2.70%	5.58%	5.47%
Mobile Police Patrol Unit	4.15%	4.32%	5.60%	8.97%	8.25%
Local Defence Units (LDUs)	19.02%	17.22%	15.15%	17.06%	18.49%
Anti-Stock Theft Unit	0.78%	0.78%	0.70%	1.59%	7.02%
Sub Totals	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Figure 4.1: Trends in UPF Programmes' Recurrent Budget Shares



4.1.3 UPF Development Budget.

Table 4.3: Uganda Police Force Development Budget FY 1999/00 - 2003/04 (Ushs. Millions)

Type of Development Investment	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Construction and Buildings	3,800	2,370	1,620	1,225	987
Machinery & Equipment	1,000	900	350	350	641
Trucks	230	680	210	240	-
Cars/Pickups	1,200	1,000	490	455	2,005
Other Vechicles	-	300	140	340	-
Other Fixed Assests	450	284	140	140	-
Consultants	100	40	-	-	30
Training	100	-	-	-	-
Value Added Tax	-	200	390	400	157
Other Taxess	500	500	800	800	1,029
Sub Totals	7,380	6,274	4,140	3,950	4,849

Source: Approved Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (1999/00 to 2003/04)

Table 4.3 above is a summary of the approved development budget allocations for UPF over the review period. Most notable from the table is the progressive decline in the size of funds allocated to the Force over the review period as shown in the sub-totals row. While the aggregate JLOS development budget is on a progressive rise at the sector level, the situation is the opposite in the case of the UPF development budget. The share of the development budget as a percentage of the total UPF budget has declined from 14.12% in FY 99/00 to 6.14% in FY 2003 (Table 4.4 & Figure 4.2). This very poorly compares with the growth of the overall JLOS development budget, which has risen from a percentage share of 32.8% to 44% over the same period.

Table 4.4: Relationship Between Uganda Police Force Recurrent and Development Budgets for FY 1999/00 - 2003/04 (Ushs. Millions)

FY	Rec.	Annual Growth Rate	Dev.	Annual Growth Rate	Total	Annual Growth Rate	Dev/Total (%)
99/00	44,894.76	-	7,380.00	-	52,274.76	-	14.12%
00/01	49,636.31	10.56%	6,274.00	-14.99%	55,910.31	6.95%	11.22%
01/02	62,630.73	26.18%	4,140.00	-34.01%	66,770.73	19.42%	6.20%
02/03	65,510.54	4.60%	3,950.00	-4.59%	69,460.54	4.03%	5.69%
03/04	74,107.17	13.12%	4,849.00	22.76%	78,956.17	13.67%	6.14%

Figure 4.2: Trend in the Relationship Between Uganda Police Force Recurrent and Development Budgets for FY 1999/00 - 2003/04 (Ushs. Billions)



4.1.4 Cost Centres

As earlier defined, a cost centre is a budget line where expenses on related cost items are budgeted and accounted for under a given budget programme. The eight UPF budget programmes are each sub-divided into eight cost centres (Table 4.1, column 2), and they include the cost items described below

<u>Employee costs</u>: Expenses under this cost centre include : staff salaries; allowances other than salaries; travelling and transport of person (inland and abroad); recreation, welfare and entertainment; and staff training.

<u>Administrative costs</u>: These include : office expenses; telephone, telefax, internet & e-mail service charges; maintenance of office equipment; and advertisement and public relations charges.

Supplies and services: Includes expenses on materials, supplies and manufactured goods.

Transport and plant cost: Covers expenses on operation and maintenance of vehicles; and fuels, lubricants and oil for vehicles used for administrative functions.

Property costs: Includes utility charges on electricity; water; other utilities such as gas, firewood and charcoal; and maintenance of buildings, grounds and equipments.

Transfer payments to other agencies: Covers mostly costs of participation in other programmes organised by other entities other than the UPF itself.

Other expenditures: Includes committee, council and Board expenses; medical treatment abroad; and information fund.

Loan charges: Includes domestic arrears and utilities arrears.

4.1.4 Cost Centre Budget Allocations

This section takes the budget analysis of the UPF budget a step further by looking at the Force's budget allocations by cost centre. Of the eight cost centres, employee costs have consistently accounted for the largest share of the Department's budget, averaging over 57% over the review period with the highest share (63.52%) being registered in FY 2001/02 and the lowest (52.72%) in 2000/01 (Table 4.6). Shares of the other seven cost centres show an inverse trend in their relationship to that of employee costs. Their budget shares peaked in the FYs 99/00 and 00/01 before plateauing in the subsequent years (FY 02/03 and 03/04).

Table 4.5: UPF Cost Centre Recurrent Budget Allocations for the Period FY 99/00 – 03/04

FY	Employee costs	Admin costs	Supplies & Services	Transport and Plant Costs	Property Costs	Transfer Payments to other Agencies	Other Expenditures	Loan Charges	Totals
99/00	24,145,380	1,706,721	5,067,828	6,226,628	5,128,513	1,758,451	825,930	35,309	44,894,760
00/01	26,185,385	1,584,463	4,332,789	7,056,092	4,933,573	1,272,663	395,156	3,876,189	49,636,310
01/02	39,782,369	1,239,493	4,171,292	6,095,092	5,830,423	2,975,451	815,610	1,721,000	62,630,730
02/03	40,068,412	1,291,865	4,934,266	6,228,224	5,238,240	5,757,705	670,830	1,321,000	65,510,542
03/04	40,330,925	1,348,655	9,356,443	7,066,635	5,240,280	7,415,056	1,056,285	2,317,400	74,131,679

Source: *MFPED, Approved Revenue and Expenditure Estimates (1999/00-2002/03) & 2003/04 Draft Revenue and Expenditure Estimates.*

Table 4.6: UPF Cost Centre Budget Percentage Shares for the Period FY 99/00- 03/04

FY	Employee costs	Admin costs	Supplies & Services	Transport and Plant Costs	Property Costs	Transfer Payments to other Agencies	Other Expenditures	Loan Charges	Totals
99/00	53.78%	3.80%	11.29%	13.87%	11.42%	3.92%	1.84%	0.08%	100.00%
00/01	52.75%	3.19%	8.73%	14.22%	9.94%	2.56%	0.80%	7.81%	100.00%
01/02	63.52%	1.98%	6.66%	9.73%	9.31%	4.75%	1.30%	2.75%	100.00%
02/03	61.16%	1.97%	7.53%	9.51%	8.00%	8.79%	1.02%	2.02%	100.00%
03/04	54.40%	1.82%	12.62%	9.53%	7.07%	10.00%	1.42%	3.13%	100.00%

Figure 4.3: Trends in Budget Allocations to UPF Cost Centres



Source: MFPED Approved Revenue and Expenditure Estimates

4.2 Recurrent Budget Allocations to Other Security Agencies

The Internal Security Organisation (ISO), the External Security Organisation (ESO) and the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), which includes the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), are the other three main security organs of the GoU beside the UPF.

ISO and ESO are budget programmes under the budget vote of the Office of the President while UPDF – Land Forces and Air Forces – are budget programmes under the Ministry of Defence. ISO, like UPF, has the largest programme recurrent budget share under the Office of the President budget vote followed by ESO. Similarly UPDF (land forces) has the largest programme recurrent budget share under the Ministry of Defence. Inter-programme analysis of ESO, ISO, UPDF and UPF programme budgets based on outturn budget figures was not possible. This is because while ISO and ESO have separate programme budget codes under the approved budget expenditure estimates for the Office of the President budget vote, budgets allocations for the two programmes are not only combined at outturn level in the MTEF but are also categorised under a different sector (security) from the other programmes under the Office of the President budget vote.

It is also not possible to compare the relationship between the development and recurrent approved budget estimates for the three security agencies. As earlier stated, this is because approved estimates for development budgets are given at vote level and because the three security agencies are only programmes under their respective votes, it is not possible to isolate particular development budget allocations that they receive as programmes. The subsequent recurrent budget analysis is therefore based on approved budget estimates over the review period as opposed to budget outturn figures.

Table 4.7 is a summary of the period recurrent budget allocations to the ESO, ISO and UPDF programmes over the review period. The UPDF has the largest budget among the three security agencies, followed by ISO and lastly ESO.

Table 4.7: Annual Approved Recurrent Budget Allocation for Other Security Agencies (Ushs.)

Programme	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
ISO	9,005,463	9,438,939	11,244,855	15,786,225	16,405,774
ESO	4,553,370	5,638,920	6,869,289	6,823,178	8,124,393
UPDF (L&A)*	186,628,199	178,723,037	197,378,036	223,825,926	292,401,037

* L&A =Land Forces and Air Forces

In terms of the annual budget growth rates, the budgets of all the three security agencies have on average been positively growing over the last four years of the review period (00/01-03/04). ISO leads with an annual average growth rate of 17%, followed by ESO with 16% and UPDF with 13%. UPF with an average annual growth rate of 13.62% (Table 4.4) over the same period compares favourably with this trend.

Of the three security agencies' budgets, only that of UPDF has had a continuously progressively positive annual growth rate over the last four years of the review period (Figure 4.4).

Table 4.8: Annual Percentage Growth of Recurrent Budget Allocation for Other Security Agencies

Programme	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04	Average
ISO	5%	19%	40%	4%	17%
ESO	24%	22%	-1%	19%	16%
UPDF (L&A)	-4%	10%	13%	31%	13%

Figure 4.4: Trends in Annual Percentage Growth of Recurrent Budget Allocations to Other Security Agencies



Analysis of the relationships between the size, shares and trends in the approved cost centre budgets of the three security agencies shows a similar pattern with that of UPF (See Annex 4a, 4b & 4c for details). The employee cost centres form the highest share of the budgets in all three agencies. Percentage shares of employee costs in ISO, ESO and UPDF over the review period averaged 64.73%, 66.76% and 62.18% respectively. UPDF like UPF is facing a decline in the size of its employee costs centre budget as percentage of the overall UPDF recurrent budget. It has fallen from 71% in 2000/01 to 55% in 2003/04. Reading from Figure 4.1 of Annex 4c, this is likely to be a result of the agency's increased spending on supplies and services for its forces (Land Forces, Air Forces and Headquarters). This is because of the apparent inverse relationship between the trend in the budget size of the percentage share of employee cost centre and that of supplies and services.

However, in the case of the budget size of the 'other expenditures' cost centre, there is a big difference between that of ISO and other security agencies, including UPF. The difference between the size of the percentage share of the 'other expenditures' cost centre and that of the other cost centres under the respective programmes (excluding employee cost) is much larger and irregular under ISO as compared to the UPF. In the case of ISO, the trend in the relationship between the percentage share of the 'other expenditures' budget item and that of the other six budget items shows a small and even difference in the first three years. It then more than doubles during the fourth year before levelling off in the fifth year. This observed difference is due to an increase in the size of the recurrent budget allocation to the 'other expenditures' cost centre over other cost centres.

The sudden rise in the percentage share of the 'other expenditures' cost centre is of particular interest for two reasons. First, as later seen, it occurs after a drastic rise in the rate of reported crime incidence and coincides with the levelling-off of the reported crime rate (see Figure 5.2). Secondly, it is under this budget item where the agency's classified expenditures are captured. This may suggest among other things that the agency played a key role in the Government's efforts to arrest the rising level of crime. Consequently, funding to the agency may have been increased to match its added responsibility.

A comparison of the size of UPF's 'employee costs' cost centre as a percentage share of that of ISO, ESO and UPDF shows that UPF's employee costs are approximately four times those of ISO, eight times those of ESO and a quarter of those of UPDF (Table 4.9). In the absence of exact numbers of personnel in each of the above forces, it is difficult to establish and compare the average expenditures per employee across the four security agencies.

The relatively large budget for employee costs under the UPF's as a share of employee costs under ISO and ESO is expected given the presumably smaller personnel sizes of ISO and ESO and the reverse is true for UPDF. However, further analysis of the relationship between employee costs of UPF and those of ISO, ESO and UPDF shows a 69% decline in UPF's employee costs as a share of ISO's employee cost and a 47% increase of the same as a share of ESO employee costs. In the case of UPDF, the share relationship has remained almost the same (approximately 24 person). This means that either the size of the UPF is declining relatively faster than that of ISO or the average expenditure per employee has increased in ISO compared to the UPF. The later is more probable considering the trends in Figure 4.1 of Annex 4a.

Table 4.9: A Comparison of UPF against ISO, ESO and UPDF Employee Costs

UPF employee costs as a % share of:	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	04/05	5-Year Average
ISO employee costs	445.41%	415.49%	526.82%	395.79%	375.96%	432%
ESO employee costs	794.15%	693.78%	856.68%	799.78%	840.67%	797%
UPDF employee costs	24.23%	19.71%	28.51%	26.91%	24.12%	25%

The relationship between cost centre budget percentage shares under the UPDF programme shows a rising difference between the percentage share of the 'supplies and services' cost centre budget and the other six cost centres (excluding employee costs). This means that the UPDF is less constrained by lack of logistical support as compared to UPF given that its ratio of expenditure on supplies and services to expenditure on employee costs is much higher than that of the UPF.

5. POLICE PERSONNEL, CRIME AND POPULATION GROWTH: 1999 - 2002

5.1 Police Personnel

The Uganda Police Force is subdivided into three categories: a) the regular force; b) civilian staff; and c) the auxiliary force. The regular police force comprises of officers recruited by the Uganda Public Service Commission. Civilian staff include persons serving within the Force but on terms other than those of the Police Statute 1994 and most probably as employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The auxiliary force, on the other hand, includes all personnel recruited and serving as re-enforcement for the regular police force as per section 65 of the Police Act 1994.

As of October 2003, the regular police force (UPF) had a total strength of 14,352 personnel of the different ranks and categories shown in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: Uganda Police Force (Regular) Personnel Strength by Gender, Rank and Category

Section Number	Section	Males	Females	Total
1.	General Duty	9,858	1,091	10,949
2.	C.I.D	2,059	251	2,310
3.	Special Branch	1,012	81	1,093
	Total	12,929	1,423	14,352

Source: UPF, (2003) PEAP Revision Information Paper.

Recent administrative data (2002/3) from UPF, however, places the current total number of UPF personnel at 13,129 down from 15,288 in 1998/99 (Table 5.2). This represents a 14% decline in the size of the regular force with an average annual decline rate of approximately 3%. This is despite an addition of 2,763 personnel who joined the Force as new recruits over the review period. The causes of personnel loss include death (1,629), dismissal (135), desertion (95), discharge from duty (219) and others factors (81).

Table 5.2: Trend of Uganda Police Force Personnel Strength as per the Available Administrative Records (2002/03)

	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	Totals
Total No. of Personnel	15,288	14,867	14,814	14,067	13,129	–
New Recruits	904	-	-	937	922	2,763
Dismissals	20	23	35	16	41	135
Deserters	16	18	19	18	24	95
Death	348	314	336	301	330	1,629
Discharges	37	34	38	33	77	219

Source: UPF (2003) Administrative Data.

Figure 5.1: Trend in Annual Personnel Size of the Uganda Police Force



Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide a breakdown of the civilian and auxiliary forces by personnel category.

Table 5.3: Number of Civilian staff under Uganda Police Force

Category	Number
Professionals	165
Group Employees	649
Total	814

Table 5.4: Strength of Auxiliary Forces under the Uganda Police Force

Category	Number
Special Police Constables	4,500
Local Administration Police	6560
Total	11,060

Table 5.5: Population Growth

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Population	21,050,253	21,791,152	22,558,129	23,352,100	24,146,071

While the personnel size of the UPF regular force has been declining at an annual average rate of 3%, the national population has been growing at slightly above the same rate (3.4%; Table 5.5). This means that the police force distribution (number of citizens per police officer) has been declining at an average rate of 6% per annum. Based on the 1998/99 size of the police force (15,288) and that of 2002/03 (13,129), the police force distribution has declined from 1 officer for every 1,337 citizens in 1998/99 to 1 officer for every 1,839 citizens in 2002/03. This very poorly compares with the international target of 1 officer per 600 persons in the long term.[22]

[22] *Justice, Law and Order Sector PEAP Revision Strategy Paper,* October 2003.

5.2 Crime Trends

Crime statistics from UPF[23] in 2003 indicate a steady rise in the national level of reported crime. The number of reported crimes mildly increased during the period 1995 to 1998 from 40,268 to 49,248 cases. It then suddenly increased by nearly 40% within a time-span of one year from 49,248 to nearly 69,248 reported crimes between 1998 and 1999. Thereafter, it levelled off maintaining an annual average level of approximately 68,000 cases between 1999 and 2001. Current statistics[24] show that the number of reported crimes has again risen by over 9% from 68,322 cases in 2001 to 75,118 cases in 2002.

Table 5.6: Total National Number of Reported Crimes

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
No. of Reported Crimes	40,268	40,779	44,980	49,248	68,319	68,032	68,322	71,118

Source: UPF, (2003) Administrative Data.

Figure 5.2: Trend in Reported Crime



A regional breakdown of reported crime in Uganda (east, north, south and west) positions the central region as having the highest level of reported crime (50%), followed by the west (20%), then the east (19%) and lastly the north (11%)[25]. However, according to the JLO Sector Secretariat, chances are high that the levels of reported crime registered in the northern region are much lower than the actual crimes committed. This is because the functionality of the Local Council system that is normally used by the majority of the population (50%+) as the dispute resolution mechanism of first instance has been weakened and is absent in some cases as a result of the civil conflict that has plagued the region for the last 17 years. The lower crime rates may therefore be because of lack of services offered.

According to the JLO Sector, the levelling off of crime witnessed during the period 1999 to 2001 resulted from reforms within the JLO Sector as a whole including community policing, implementation of anti-corruption measures and increased co-ordination with other sectors' agencies, and the Police Force in particular.

23 UPF, (2003) *Administrative Data.*
24 UPF, (2003) *Administrative Data.*
25 *Justice, Law and Order Sector PEAP Revision Strategy Paper*, October 2003.

Despite the rising levels of reported crime shown above, the proportion of Ugandan households that consider themselves to be safe from crime and violence remain high without any significant change over the first four years of the review period. Crime related statistics based on findings from the 2002/03 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS)[26] reveal that 52% and 20% of households feel very safe and generally safe from violence and crime respectively and only 8% feel very unsafe. 16% of households feel neither safe nor unsafe while 4% do not know how they feel (Table 5.7). The proportion of households that feel unsafe and neither safe nor unsafe is however, highest in the northern region. This confirms the above interpretation regarding the low crime rate reported for the northern region.

Table 5.7: Safety of Household Members from Crime and Violence (%)

	1999/00 by Region					2002/03		
Response	Central	Eastern	Northern	Western	Kampala	Rural	Urban	Total
Very Unsafe	7	6	18	5	6	9	7	8
Neither safe nor unsafe	11	16	18	12	22	15	17	16
Generally Safe	55	50	42	53	54	51	53	52
Very Safe	20	23	12	26	11	21	17	20
Don't know	5	2	7	1	5	4	4	4

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, (2003) Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) Table 7.8.1, P. 60

[26] The 2002/03 UNHS collected information from a sample size of 9,711 households from different parts of the country on population and socio-economic characteristics.

6. CONCLUSION

Crime prevention and management is a responsibility of the entire citizenry. However, public institutions such as the police and judiciary are mandated to play a lead role in crime prevention and management so as to ensure citizen safety. While these institutions need sufficient resources to effectively carry out their mandate, the level of public confidence in their ability to do so in a politically neutral and professional manner is paramount. Therefore, police funding only contributes partially to crime management and prevention. In other words, outcomes of crime management and citizen safety cannot solely be attributed to the effectiveness of the police force or its funding. This is a key limitation of this study. Against this background, this chapter makes the following conclusions about the impact of police funding on crime management and citizen safety in Uganda.

The explanatory factors for the trends observed in the above analysis are many in number and diverse in nature. However, for the purposes of this study, the conclusion classifies these factors into two: (1) factors directly related to funding trends; and (2) those that are indirectly related to funding trends. Factors identified as directly related to funding emerge entirely from the budget analysis in the preceding chapters, while the indirect ones are partially drawn from related information sources.

6.1 Factors Directly Related to Funding

Justice, Law and Order Sector and the GoU's National Budget:

Judging from the stagnation in the share of JLOS budget as a percentage of the national budget at about 7% over the review period, it is clear that the sector is less likely to be able to improve its operations, let alone maintain the current ones. While there may be some room for realising additional resources from efficiency gains, these cannot reach the level needed to bring about the required improvement in the Sector's operations. The Sector is therefore likely to be slow in the pace at which it achieves its mission and expected outcome – *"improved safety of the person, security of property and access to justice that ensures a strong economic environment to encourage private sector development and benefits poor and vulnerable people"*.

To address the above concern, the Sector's recurrent budget should be increased to a level that will optimally match its development budget. The widening gap between the Sector's development and recurrent budgets needs to be halted. This should be achieved through an increase in the Sector's recurrent budget because the justifications for the growing size of the Sector's development budget are valid and should therefore not be frustrated by subjecting them to budget cuts. However, given that GoU's choice on where to invest public resources is heavily influenced by the degree to which returns from a given investment contribute to poverty reduction, there is need for a clear link between crime and poverty to be established for GoU to be convinced about the need to raise the Sector's recurrent budget.

Uganda Police Force and the JLOS Budget:

It is clear from the preceding analysis that funding has negatively impacted on UPF's ability to effectively manage and prevent crime in two main ways. The first has to do with the actual amount of resources reaching the Police Force. The trend in the size of the Force's recurrent budget has not matched the trend in demand for the Force's services in terms of both the growth rate of crime and that of the national population. The situation is made much worse when the Force's development budget is considered. The size of the Force's development budget is very small for it to make any meaningful investment in the kind of assets required to tackle crime. Not only is the level of actual resources allocated under its development budget far below what is required, the release of these allocations is also persistently below their approved levels. According to the planning unit of the UPF, *"funding from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) has been characterised by wide divergences between approved and actual releases, let alone the budgetary cuts in the middle of the year"*[27]. Figure 6.1 illustrates the trend in the relationship between actual releases and approved development budget estimates.

Figure 6.1: Variations in Capital Actual Releases and Approved Releases.



This partly explains the reason why UPF has continued to suffer from under-capitalisation despite the fact that GoU has been assigning greater priority to development budgets across government sectors.

Uganda Police Force and Its Cost Centre Budgets:

The second way in which funding has negatively impacted on UPF's ability to effectively manage and prevent crime lies with the whole question of where UPF itself chooses to put its money. Rather than focus its limited resources on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its regular force, the UPF knowingly or not appears bent on stretching its resources in favour of achieving more geographical coverage. This is most evident when you consider the share of its auxiliary forces relative to the regular forces. This large number of auxiliary forces makes it very difficult for UPF to attain the kind of investment balance between its spending on personnel and on logistics that is necessary to modernise and adequately equip the regular force to carry out its mandate. Consequently, officers' ability to effectively discharge their duties is constrained due to lack of appropriate facilitation. This weakens public confidence in the ability of the Force to implement its mandate in a politically neutral and professional manner, which as earlier pointed out is a paramount factor in crime management and prevention.

[27] UPF, (2003) *PEAP Revision Paper.*

For example, the UPF acknowledges that in some cases, *"a district may not have a proficient Local Area Network (LAN) system. Radios and Walkie-talkies are not enough to cover districts or beats in the country. This makes coordination with its outposts in the rural countryside very poor and the scenario is as good as the posts not being there. A highly netted communication network gives the sense of crime detection and improves visibility".*[28]

This anomaly is further illustrated by findings from the second Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment exercise carried out in 2002. The poor cited lack of proper facilitation as one of the major hindrances to the ability of UPF to deliver its mandate as illustrated in Box 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1: Excerpt from the second Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Report[29]

People noted that the police do not have the means to do their jobs properly, pointing out in some sites that lack of proper facilitation leads to corruption. Transport was noted to be a particular problem. In Bugiri, people in Sigulu islands have to provide transport for the police to pick up suspects and sometimes hire and fuel boats to take them to court on the mainland. In Ntoroko, complainants have to pay to transport suspects to the police station in Bundibugyo Town and failure to meet such costs means the suspects are released. In Kasensero landing site in Rakai, people complained bitterly that the marine police, deployed at the landing site due to clashes between Ugandan and Tanzanian fishermen on the Lake Victoria, are useless, partly due to lack of fuel. The police have resorted to doing fishing business instead. Community members reported that they pay rent for the regular police officers stationed at the landing site and feel overburdened by requests for them to contribute to fuel for the marine police too.

In Bundibugyo and Buguri, people also noted that the police do not have proper cells. In Bugiri, a district official pointed out that culprits pay bribes to the police for a 'short-cut' out of disciplinary action because the conditions in the cells are so unbearable, with different criminals of different case magnitude kept in the same small prison cell.

Community members recommend equipping the police with transport and police posts with proper cells.

By examining the trend of the budget shares of different cost centres under the police programme (Figure 4.7, Chapter Four), it is notable that growth in the share of the 'employee costs' cost item happens at the expense of other cost centres. This is most pronounced from FY 2001/02 onwards. This period coincides with the starting point of the sharpest decline in the size of the UPF's regular force, meaning that the rise in employee cost was not as a result of an improvement in the payment terms of the regular police force but rather as a result of an increase in the numbers of auxiliary forces.

Some may argue that the pattern of funding prioritisation within UPF is a result of inter-cost centre resource allocation that is not informed by accurate situational analysis required for effective crime management and prevention. However, this is less likely to be the case given that planning for the UPF is partly conducted under a sector-wide approach, which lends the force to the planning strengths and experience of the wider JLOS sector.

In summary, the small size of the UPF budget and the declining trend of its development budget are gradually crippling the capacity of UPF to effectively curb crime and contribute to citizen

[28] UPF (2003) *PEAP Revision Paper.*

[29] Second Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Report, p. 191

safety. It is also eroding public confidence in UPF as an institution, which may explain the sudden rise in reported crime in 2001 – the period prior to the joint operations initiative and the formation of the Violent Crime Crack Unit in 2003 (Figure 5.2).

Therefore, given that UPF already takes the largest share of the JLO Sector budget, efforts to improve its funding should focus more on the following areas:

- Progressively increasing the size and share of UPF's development budget;
- Avoiding cuts on UPF's approved development budget; and
- Better prioritisation of spending choices between cost centres within UPF.

6.2 Factors Indirectly Related to Funding

The key indirect budget-related factor behind the trends observed above in police funding has to do with the divide and adherence to institutional mandates. In this case, since the police budget takes a substantial share of the JLO sectoral allocation in the national budget, a substantial reduction in the police budget implies a substantial reduction in the JLO sectoral allocation. Therefore, the biggest threat to the size of JLO sectoral share in the national budget lies in whatever could cause a substantial reduction in the police budget. One such cause is when some of the operations of the Police Force are overtaken and funded under other security agencies outside of the Force. For example, in the wake of the unprecedented level of organised urban crime that affected a number of urban centres in Uganda, including Kampala, joint operations comprised of all security agencies were initiated under a Presidential directive. According to the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), while the spirit with which the joint operations were established is commendable, the operations led to a strong involvement of other security organs in police work on the grounds that the police had failed to measure up to its responsibilities[30]. This initiative, according to UHRC, not only crossed the dividing line between the mandate of the police and that of the related security organs, but also became a big contributing factor to illegal arrests and detentions.

Considering the cost implications of the operations leading up to such arrests and detention, given the levels of investigations that they required and the fact that this is the period which witnessed a doubling in the size of the ISO's 'other expenditures' budget line (where classified expenditures are captured), it is arguable that funds that would otherwise have been used by the Criminal Investigation Department of the UPF to do the same job were reallocated to cater for operations by ISO and other security organs.

This anomaly sparked complaints from the general public about the legality of the entire operation and led to the creation of the Violent Crime Crack Unit within the police force as a specialised unit to tackle armed crime. This trend of events underscores the fact that as far as crime and citizen safety is concerned, institutional mandates should be respected and higher priority accorded to foresighted institutional development as opposed to switching to alternatives, which in the short-term may get the job done, yet in the long-term cripple the kind of institutional development required for sustainable results.

30 Uganda Human Rights Commission, 2001 Annual Report.

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions:

- The JLO Sector as a whole is less likely to be able to efficiently utilise its capital investments given its limited recurrent funding, thereby slowing down the achievement of the Sector's current targets.
- Funding to the UPF is way below the levels necessary for it to carry out effective policing. Furthermore, its growth has progressively lagged behind that of reported crime. This is particularly the case with the Force's development budget whose size as a share of the Force's overall budget has reduced by more than half over the review period.
- Rather than spend its limited resources on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its regular force, UPF appears to be giving greater funding priority to the recruitment and maintenance of auxiliary forces. This makes it very difficult for it to attain the required balance between development and recurrent spending on its regular force.
- Involvement of other security agencies in the institutional mandate of the UPF is crowding out resources that would otherwise come under the UPF budget.

Recommendations:

- Given the precedence that poverty reduction takes over all other budget allocation criteria, the JLOS needs to more convincingly demonstrate the contribution of its sector programmes and activities to poverty reduction.
- There is a need to halt the widening gap between the Sector's recurrent and development budgets and to increase its recurrent funding to a level that can enable it to optimise efficiency gains from its development spending.
- UPF needs to either develop and speedily implement an action plan for regularising its auxiliary forces (though this would of course depend on an increase in its budget share) or gradually faze them out as the security situation normalises in currently insecure parts of the country.
- GoU needs to be more supportive of UPF in enabling it to effectively carry out its mandate by investing more resources in long-term capacity development of UPF to handle organised crime as well as by desisting from using other security organs to carry out UPF's mandated function.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Poverty Monitoring Priority Indicators

	Indicator	Frequency of Reporting	Target (Yr)	Current Status (Yr)
I.	Economic Growth and Transformation			
	• GDP growth rate	Annual	7%	5%(02)
	• Proportion of national budget used for poverty focused programmes	Annual		33%(01)
	• Inflation rate	Annual	5%	4.5%(02)
	• Domestic Revenue/GDP	Annual		12%(01)
	• Foreign exchange reserves	Annual	5 months of imports	4.4 months (02)
II.	Good Governance and Security			
	• Incidence of misappropriation of public funds at national, district level	Annual	0%	
	• Number of people internally displaced by sex, age and location	Annual	None	
	• Beneficiary assessment of quality of service (police, and judiciary)	Bi-annual	Qualitative (good)	Very poor
	• Level of awareness about rights/entitlements	Annual		
III.	Increasing Incomes of the Poor			
	• Economic dependency	Bi-annual		
	• Poverty indicators-incidence/depth	Bi-annual	10%(17)	35%(2000)
	• Share of rural non-farm employment by sex and location.	Bi-annual		
	• Yield rates of major crops.	Bi-annual	400%	
	• Proportion of land area covered by forest.	Annual		
	• GDP per unit of energy use	Annual		
iv	Improving Quality of Life			
	• Life expectancy in years by sex	5 Years		43(2000)
	• Infant mortality	5 Years	68(05)	102(2000)
	• Maternal mortality	5 Years	354(05)	504(2000)
	• Nutrition (stunted)	5 Years	28%(05)	38%(2000)
	(a) Health			
	• Immunisation coverage (DPT3)	Annual	60%(05)	46%(02)
	• Percentage of approved posts filled with qualified health workers in public and PNFP facilities	Annual	50%(05)	40%(02)
	• Deliveries in public and PNFP facilities	Annual	35%(05)	25%(02)

	• HIV prevalence	Annual	5%(05)	6.1%(02)
	(b) Education			
	• Literacy rate by sex, location	Bi-annual	50%(07)	63%(01)
	• Net school enrolment by sex and location	Annual	98%(03)	
	• Pupil/trained teacher ratio	Annual	49:1(03)	58:1(01)
	• Pupil/textbook ratio	Annual	6:1(03)	4:1(01)
	• Classroom/pupil ratio by location	Annual	92:1(03)	98:1(01)
	(c) Water and Sanitation			
	• Number and proportion of population within ½ km to safe water by location	Annual	60%(04)	52%(01) (rural)
	• Number and proportion of population with good sanitation facilities.	Bi-annual	60%(04)	50%(01)

Source: Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (MFPED)

Annex 2: Justice, Law and Order Sector: Sub-Sectors' (Excluding Uganda Police Force) Mandates and Medium Term Objectives

1. Ministry of Internal Affairs

i) Headquarters

Mandate:

a. Coordinate law enforcement activities
b. Ensure guidance of the Ministry on political and policy issues
c. Coordinate activities of the National Security Committee
d. Oversee and administer matters related to the Police Authority, Police Tender Board, NGO Board, UNAFRI and other Departments of the Ministry
e. Initiate and handle legislative matters of the Ministry

ii) Immigration Department

Mandate:

a. Control and regulate the entry of foreign nationals into the country
b. Control the staying and taking up of employment by foreign nationals
c. Remove all undesirable foreign nationals who threaten the security of the country and those who stay in breach of Immigration Laws
d. Verify citizenship of Uganda Nationals and issue them with necessary travel documents and National Identity Cards
e. Grant conventional Travel Documents to registered refugees

Medium-term objectives:

a. Increase the speed of processing immigration documents through computerisation
b. Improve the control mechanisms for entry and exit into Uganda
c. Increase non-tax revenue through improved financial management

iii) Government Analytical Laboratory

Mandate:

a. Analyse, detect and quantify poison in various exhibits and samples including human tissues, fluids and organs
b. Identify and group blood and semen in assault, murder and sexual offences
c. Analyse human and animal food for suitability for consumption
d. Analyse narcotic drugs in drugs offences
e. Analyse water for drinking and specific purposes
b. Examine firearms and documents questioned in Law Courts
c. Analyse for pesticide residues
d. Write reports for different consumers
e. Give expert evidence in Law Courts
f. Train law enforcement agents e.g. Uganda Revenue Officers, Police, Medical Pathologist and Law Students, in various aspects of Forensic Science
g. Render advice and consultancy in all aspects of Forensic Science and Chemistry

Medium-term objectives:

a. Achieve Quality Assurance Certification ISO 9002 for the Headquarters
b. Establish four fully equipped Regional Centres
c. Increase the number of forensic specialists, particularly blood analysts and handwriting experts
d. Achieve Executive Agency status

iv) Community Service Programme (New)

Mandate:

a. Oversee the implementation of the Community Service Act
b. Spearhead awareness about the new law and change of attitude through sensitisation of the general public
c. Ensure that Community Service effectively contributes to the current reforms in the Justice, Law and Order Sector
d. Ensure humane treatment and rehabilitation of offenders
e. Ensure use of non-custodial sentences and involvement of the public in the administration of justice improved and increased

Medium-term objectives:

a. Contribute towards decongestion of prisons
b. Effective rehabilitation of offenders
c. Promotion of reconciliation of offenders with both the victim and the community
d. Contribute to reduce government expenditure on prisons

v) Amnesty Commission

Mandate:

a. Demobilise, resettle and reintegrate reporters
b. Sensitise the public about the amnesty law
c. Promote dialogue and reconciliation mechanism in the war-affected areas

Medium-term objectives:

a. Demobilise, resettle, and reintegrate
b. Sensitise the public about the Amnesty Law
c. Promote dialogue between Government, reporters and other parties involved in conflict

2. Uganda Prisons Service

Mandate:

a. Provide safe custody of prisoners, both convicted and those on remand
b. Ensure production of remand prisoners in Courts of Law for prosecution
c. Provide health care for inmates and staff
d. Provide correctional programmes to inmates by imparting new industrial, modern farming and livestock rearing skills for smooth reintegration into society as law abiding citizens
e. Prepare offenders to resettle into society once they are released

Medium-term objectives:

a. Provide an efficient and reliable workforce
b. Manage financial resources to maximise value for money and increase the returns on limited budgets
c. Ensure staff are equipped to do their jobs
d. Enhance the performance and implementation of Prisons planning and strategy and promote accountability
e. Provide reliable transport system to meet a wide range of policing needs
f. Provide suitable estate to meet the operational and support needs of the force
g. Provide the best possible communication and information technology services requirements of Uganda Prisons Service
h. Provide a Human Resource Policy and career development of staff
i. Develop and maintain prisoners' employment and education and rehabilitation programmes and their eventual reintegration back into their communities
j. Develop commercial industrial production in carpentry, metal workshops, and handicrafts

3. Judiciary

Mandate:

The mandate is enshrined in Article 126(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which states: *"Judicial power is derived from the people and shall be exercised by the courts established under this constitution in the name of the people and in conformity with law and with the values, norms and aspiration of the people"* In addition, Article 128(1) states that: *"In the exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be independent and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority"*.

Functions:

a. Hearing, considering and judging cases and disposing of them quickly and fairly in accordance with the law
b. Interpreting and applying the Constitution and other laws of Uganda
c. Protecting the rights of an individual and providing remedies in the event of infringement
d. Formulating and implementing policies regarding operations and management of courts
e. Initiating, developing and implementing training programs for the development of the judiciary staff
f. Contributing to the enforcement of law and orders; enrolling and licensing advocates, and licensing and disciplining court brokers
g. Keeping custody of laws enacted as well as disseminating legal literature.
h. Receiving government revenue accruing from courts
i. Introduce modalities for out of court dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce the burden of cases on the courts

4. Directorate of Public Prosecutions

Mission:

To maintain an efficient and effective system of criminal prosecutions and to deter crime in the country

Mandate:

To handle and prosecute all criminal cases in the country, delegate such powers where necessary, having regard to public interest, administration of justice and the need to prevent abuse of the legal process

5. Judicial Service Commission

Vision:

To establish an effective and efficient judiciary and to contribute to the promotion of law and order in Uganda

Mission:

To establish and maintain an independent and efficient machinery for administering justice for all in Uganda

Mandate:

a. To advise the President in the exercise of his powers to appoint persons to hold or act in any office of the:
   - Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, the Principal Judge, a Judge of the High Court and
   - Chief Registrar and a Registrar
b. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, to review and make recommendations on the terms and conditions of service of Judges and Judicial Officers
c. To prepare and implement programmes for the education and the dissemination of information to judicial officers and the public about the law and administration of justice
d. To receive and process people's complaints concerning the Judiciary and the administration of justice and generally to act as a link between the people and judiciary
e. To advise Government on improving the administration of justice

The Commission is also mandated to appoint persons to hold or act in any of the judicial office other than those specified above. The mandate includes confirming appointments, exercising disciplinary action and removal of such persons from office

In addition, the Constitution and the Judicial Service Act requires the Commission to:

- Advise the Chief Justice on the appointment of members of District Land Tribunals, and
- Appoint Land Tribunal members for each gazetted district, urban area and sub-county throughout the country

The Commission may also be required by Parliament under Article 147 (1) and (7) to perform any other function as prescribed in the Constitution of Uganda. For instance, the Electricity Act 1998 and the Communication Act of 1999 require the Commission to:

- Advise the Chief Justice on the appointment of the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson
- Advise the Chief Justice on the appointment of the Registrar for the stated tribunals

6. Uganda Law Reform Commission

Mandate:

a. To study and keep under constant review the Statutes and other laws comprising the laws of Uganda with a view to making recommendations for their systematic improvement, development, modernisation and reform with particular emphasis on:
   i. The elimination of anomalies in the law, the repeal of obsolete laws, the simplification and translation of the law
   ii. The incorporation into domestic laws of international and regional instruments ratified by Uganda
   iii. The adoption of new and more effective methods for the administration of the laws of Uganda and dispensation of justice
   iv. The development of new areas in the law by making the laws responsive to the changing needs of society in Uganda
b. To design and implement communication strategies for educating the public and government agencies on the law-making process
c. To enhance the management support function so as to make it more responsive in providing support to core activities for purposes of effectively and efficiently achieving the organisational objectives

7. Ministry of Local Government – Local Council Courts

Mission:

To co-ordinate and support Local Governments for sustainable, efficient and effective service delivery, within a decentralised system. The Justice Law and Order Sector, in partnership with this ministry, seeks support to the Local Council Courts

Mandate:

To co-ordinate, supervise, guide, harmonise, mentor and advocate for all Local Governments in the country through:

- Building capacity Local Governments Councils, to enable them to deliver services to the population efficiently and effectively
- Ensuring that Local Governments comply with the statutory requirements and adhere to national standards, and follow national policies
- Facilitating the implementation of the decentralisation policy to enhance democratic governance in the country. In this regard, the Ministry continues to develop and review systems, structures and guidelines for the local governments
- Providing technical assistance to the local governments in the area of information, communication and technology, development planning and management

The Ministry inspects, supervises, trains, equips, offers technical advice, and support to Local Governments to enable them achieve their main objectives of delivering quality services

Annex 3: Organisational Structure of the Uganda Police Force



KEY:

IGP: Inspector General of Police
DIG: Deputy Inspector General of Police
AIGP/A: Assistant Inspector General of Police In charge Administration
AIGP/O: Assistant Inspector General of Police In charge Operations
AIGP/SB: Assistant Inspector General of Police In charge Operations
AIGP/CID: Assistant Inspector General of Police In charge Operations
AIGP/LAP: Assistant Inspector General of police/ Local Admin. Police
HRM: Human Resource Management
HRD: Human Resource Development
NHR: Non- Human Resource
MS: Medical Supply
CP/O: Commissioner of Police Incharge Operations
CP/T&R: Commissioner of Police Incharge Traffic & Road Safety
CP/MPPU: Commissioner of Police Incharge Mobile Patrol Police
DD/CID: Deputy Director CID
CP/R&P: Commissioner of Police Incharge Research And Planning
CP/L&R: Commissioner of Police Incharge Legal And Records
CP/I: Commissioner of Police Incharge Inpectorate
CP/F: Commissioner of Police Incharge Finance
CP/OP: Commissioner of Police Incharge Operations
DD/SB: Deputy Director Special Branch
CP/ADM: Commissioner of Police Incharge Admin
D/CP/CR: Deputy Commissioner In Charge Crime
D/CP/A: Deputy Commissioner Incharge Admin
D/CP/IB: Deputy Commissioner In Charge Identification Bureau
PRO: Public Relations Officer
US/P: Under Secretary of Police

[31] UPF (2003), PEAP Revision Submission

Annex 4: Budget Allocations to Other Security Agencies

Annex 4(a): Budget Allocations to the Internal Security Agency

Table 4.1: Budget Item Allocations to ISO

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Employee Costs	5,420,980	6,302,321	7,551,395	10,123,687	10,727,498
Administration	743,407	759,100	768,078	400,398	476,126
Supplies & Services	66,000	62,700	64,268	58,548	-
Transport & Plant Costs	842,076	621,514	997,552	997,552	997,552
Property Costs	973,000	758,104	863,223	905,040	837,860
Transfer Payments to Other Agencies or Persons	-	-	-	-	-
Other Expenditures	960,000	935,200	1,000,339	3,301,000	3,001,000
Loan Charges	-	-	-	-	365,738
Total	9,005,463	9,438,939	1,244,855	15,786,225	16,405,774

Table 4.2: Percentage Budget Item Shares Under ISO

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Employee Costs	60.20%	66.77%	67.15%	64.13%	65.39%
Administration	8.26%	8.04%	6.83%	2.54%	2.90%
Supplies & Services	0.73%	0.66%	0.57%	0.37%	0.00%
Transport & Plant Costs	9.35%	6.58%	8.87%	6.32%	6.08%
Property Costs	10.80%	8.03%	7.68%	5.73%	5.11%
Transfer Payments to Other Agencies or Persons	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Expenditures	10.66%	9.91%	8.90%	20.91%	18.29%
Loan Charges	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.23%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Figure 4.1: Trends in Budget Item Allocations under ISO



Annex 4 (b): Budget Allocations to the External Security Organisation

Table 4.3: ESO Cost Centre Recurrent Budget Allocations

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Employee Costs	3,040,409	3,774,290	4,643,758	5,009,903	4,797,463
Administration	252,191	426,453	437,114	436,378	527,034
Supplies & Services	55,200	97,155	99,584	89,573	41,095
Transport & Plant Costs	120,000	115,785	118,679	113,613	118,679
Property Costs	238,366	318,772	326,883	254,583	426,883
Transfer Payments to Other Agencies or Persons	1,000	3,300	3,383	3,384	3,383
Other Expenditures	846,204	903,165	925,744	915,744	825,427
Loan Charges	-	-	314,144	-	1,384,429
Total	4,553,370	5,638,920	6,869,289	6,823,178	8,124,393

Table 4.4: ESO Cost Centre Recurrent Budget Percentage Share

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
Employee Costs	66.77%	66.93%	67.60%	73.42%	59.05%
Administration	5.54%	7.56%	6.36%	6.40%	6.49%
Supplies & Services	1.21%	1.72%	1.45%	1.31%	0.51%
Transport & Plant Costs	2.64%	2.05%	1.73%	1.67%	1.46%
Property Costs	5.23%	5.65%	4.76%	3.73%	5.25%
Transfer Payments to Other Agencies or Persons	0.02%	0.06%	0.05%	0.05%	0.04%
Other Expenditures	18.58%	16.02%	13.48%	13.42%	10.16%
Loan Charges	0.00%	0.00%	4.57%	0.00%	17.04%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Figure 4.2: Trends in Percentage Shares of Budget Item Allocations Under ESO



Annex 4 (c): Budget Allocations to Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF)

Table 4.5: Percentage Shares of Budget Item Under UPDF

FY	Employee costs	Adminis-tration Costs	Supplies & Services	Transport and Plant Costs	Property Costs	Transfer Payments to other Agencies	Other Expendi-tures	Loan Charges	Total
99/00	53%	0%	29%	5%	1%	0%	0%	12%	100%
00/01	71%	0%	18%	5%	1%	0%	0%	4%	100%
01/02	69%	0%	20%	6%	2%	1%	0%	2%	100%
02/03	64%	1%	22%	6%	3%	1%	0%	2%	100%
03/04	55%	1%	34%	7%	2%	1%	0%	1%	100%

Figure 4.3: Trends in Budget Item Percentage shares of the UPDF Budget



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CHRI Programmes

CHRI's work is based on the belief that for human rights, genuine democracy and development to become a reality in people's lives, there must be high standards and functional mechanisms for accountability and participation within the Commonwealth and its member countries. Accordingly, as well as a broad human rights advocacy programme, CHRI advocates access to information and access to justice. It does this through research, publications, workshops, information dissemination and advocacy.

Human Rights Advocacy: CHRI makes regular submissions to official Commonwealth bodies and member governments. From time to time CHRI conducts fact finding missions and since 1995, has sent missions to Nigeria, Zambia, Fiji Islands and Sierra Leone. CHRI also coordinates the Commonwealth Human Rights Network, which brings together diverse groups to build their collective power to advocate for human rights. CHRI's Media Unit also ensures that human rights issues are in the public consciousness.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Right to Information: CHRI catalyses civil society and governments to take action, acts as a hub of technical expertise in support of strong legislation, and assists partners with implementation of good practice. CHRI works collaboratively with local groups and officials, building government and civil society capacity as well as advocating with policy makers. CHRI is active in South Asia, most recently supporting the successful campaign for a national law in India; provides legal drafting support and inputs in Africa; and in the Pacific, works with regional and national organisations to catalyse interest in access legislation.

Constitutionalism: CHRI believes that constitutions must be made and owned by the people and has developed guidelines for the making and review of constitutions through a consultative process. CHRI also promotes knowledge of constitutional rights and values through public education and has developed web-based human rights modules for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. In the run up to elections, CHRI has created networks of citizen's groups that monitor elections, protest the fielding of criminal candidates, conduct voter education and monitor the performance of representatives.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Police Reforms: In too many countries the police are seen as oppressive instruments of state rather than as protectors of citizens' rights, leading to widespread rights violations and denial of justice. CHRI promotes systemic reform so that police act as upholders of the rule of law rather than as instruments of the current regime. In India, CHRI's programme aims at mobilising public support for police reform. In East Africa and Ghana, CHRI is examining police accountability issues and political interference.

Prison Reforms: The closed nature of prisons makes them prime centres of violations. CHRI aims to open up prisons to public scrutiny by ensuring that the near defunct lay visiting system is revived.

Judicial Colloquia: In collaboration with INTERIGHTS, CHRI has held a series of colloquia for judges in South Asia on issues related to access to justice, particularly for the most marginalised sections of the community.